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The current notion of seabasing requires that three 
Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) of a 2025 Joint Expeditionary 
Brigade (JEB) need to be able to transit from the Sea Base 
to the objective within a 10 hour period.  Of the three 
BLTs, two of them must be transported by surface craft a 
distance of no more than 200nm in sea state 4 or less.  The 
two surface bound BLTs need to be loaded onto the 
transporting craft and delivered to shore, whether it is a 
port facility or austere beachhead.  There is no current or 
future system of connectors to meet all the time-distance, 
sea state, and interface flexibility requirements for this 
aspect of seabasing.  To meet these requirements a High 
Speed Assault Connector (HSAC) is needed which either 
augments current or replaces existing connector platforms 
to deliver and support the required forces ashore.  The 
Joint ACCESS is a HSAC that brings the necessary speed, 
payload capacity, interface capability, and mission 
flexibility needed to fill the Sea Base to shore 
transportation gap.  With a maximum speed of 43kts and 
payload capacity of 800LT, 12 Joint ACCESS trimaran can 
transit 200nm and fully offload in 7 hours.  Its beachable 
design uses a floating bow ramp to reach out to austere 
beaches, while its combat system suite provides self 
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This report is prepared in order to fulfill the 
requirements of the Total Ship Systems Engineering program 
at the Naval Postgraduate Scholl and in partial support to 
the Wayne Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering. The goal 
was to develop a High Speed Assault Connector (HSAC) that 
will support the transport, logistics, and operations of a 
2025 Joint Expeditionary Brigade (JEB).  The seaborne 
components of the 2025 JEB comprised of 2 Battalion Landing 
Teams (BLT) must be transported from the Sea Base to the 
point of entry up to 200nm away within a 10 hour period.  
After the deployment of forces ashore, there must be a 
continuous and efficient flow of materials and supplies to 
maintain the logistics train between the Sea Base and those 
forces until it is decided that they need to be withdrawn.  
Throughout the force deployment process, there must be 
adequate support for the landing forces as they make their 
way onto and through the beach as well as their withdrawal 
from it. 
The need for the design and development for a HSAC is 
rooted in the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) assessment 
in Sea Power 21 where seabasing is stated to be a future 
naval forces capability.  In 2002, the Total Ship System 
Engineering (TSSE) team focused on the development of a 
system of ships that would facilitate the notion of 
deploying a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from a Sea 
Base indefinitely.  This work was later followed up by the 
2003 TSSE design team which developed the Littoral 
Combatant Ship (LCS) to provide the “Sea Shield” defense 
layer for the Sea Base.  Now it is the 2004 TSSE design 
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team’s task to develop a system of ships that will 
transport the seaborne components of a 2025 JEB from the 
Sea Base to the shore, provide a reliable logistics train 
for the deployed forces, and provide beach operation 
support. 
The amphibious craft and doctrine in place today can 
provide for an amphibious assault on almost any beach in 
the world.  The issue is that this process is extremely 
slow, highly specialized to the United States Marine Corps 
and relies heavily on port access close to the area of 
assault for continual logistics support.  Seabasing removes 
the reliance on suitable ports for offloading material and 
has evolved to include forces beyond the United States Navy 
and Marine Corps.  In addition, it is now desired that the 
components of a 2025 JEB be deployed from the Sea Base to 
the beach within a 10 hour period.  No ship or combination 
of ships in the U.S. Naval Fleet can meet these 
requirements.  The HSAC is the vital link that will 
ultimately make the Sea Base to shore connection a reality. 
The objective of this project is to develop and design 
a vessel that will work in conjunction with today’s current 
and future vessels to meet the requirements of force 
deployment, logistics sustainment, and operational 
amphibious support of Sea Base to beachhead operations.  A 
secondary objective is to design this vessel so that it can 
serve a dutiful purpose in the fleet when not conducting 
its primary mission, especially during non-wartime periods.  
The end product should be a ship that not only brings 
seabasing to becoming more a reality, but also brings 
greater overall flexibility and capability to the U.S. 
Navy. 
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II. JOINT EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS OVERVIEW 
A. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
1. Objective 
This Operating Concept describes the postulated view 
of Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO) and the associated 
Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) in the 2025 time frame 
as developed by the Systems Engineering and Analysis cohort 
Six (SEA-6).  Emphasis is on full integration, where all 
aspects of United States-led military power are fused and 
synchronized.  JEO can be considered in phases: Pre-Crisis, 
Closure, and Sustainment.  The section is intended to 
describe the entire operation from 1) Pre-Crisis to a need 
for military power, 2) the application of military power 
until objectives are reached, and 3) the withdrawal and 
redeployment of that military power.  Figure 1 pictures 
these three areas of operations that scope the project. 
 
Figure 1.   Joint Expeditionary Operations. 
 
2. Overview 
The Expeditionary Forces must be capable of seizing 
the initiative within 10 days, achieve the expeditionary 
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objectives within 30 days, then reconstitute and redeploy 
within the next 30 days (10-30-30).  The Expeditionary 
Logistics systems must meet the demand of the Combined Task 
Force Commander (CTF CDR) without slowing the desired 
operations tempo. 
These operations may occur in any of the littoral 
regions of the world, day or night, all weather,1 up to sea 
state 5 (6-8 ft. waves)2 and sustained winds up to 20 
knots.3 
The Area of Operations (AO) and objectives are in a 
geographic location where conventional access (road/rail, 
neighbor over flight, and/or permissive port/airfield 
facilities) is not available.  The objectives may be at 
sea, on land, in the air, in space, or in cyberspace.  
Power is projected and sustained from a Sea Base in crises 
or conflicts where a Sea Base adds combat capability.4   
The Area of Operations (AO) may include limited5 land-
based Forward Logistics Sites (FLSs)6 which support the 
Expeditionary Forces.  These FLSs are as far as 2,0007 
straight-line miles from the AO (actual transit distances 
                     1 All weather implies rain, snow, ice, reduced visibility, high and 
low temperatures. 
2 Sea Basing CONOPS, p. 14. 
3 Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, The 
American Practical Navigator, 1995 ed., Defense Mapping Agency 
Hydrographic/Topographic Center, Bethesda, 1995, p. 535. 
4 Sea Basing CONOPS, pp. 1-3. 
5 The requirement for expeditionary forces is driven in part by an 
antiaccess environment.  As such, it is reasonable to assume that the 
number available will not be in the ideal location nor have every 
desired capability. 
6 As described in Professor David Schrady’s Expeditionary Logistics 
Framework. 
7 N42 Draft Sea Base Logistical CONOPS, 04 June 2004. 
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may be longer due to geography).8  Critical straight-line 
air routes are not available and plans are based on flight 
through international airspace.9  The littoral region of the 
AO may include regions that are both favorable and 
unfavorable10 to amphibious landings.   
The assumed threat includes any adversary ranging from 
non-state actors (terrorists, insurgents, etc.) with low 
technology to a near-peer competitor with one or more 
comparable or superior defense technologies.11  In both 
cases, the potential for highly asymmetric threats is 
assumed. 
3. Expeditionary Forces 
Expeditionary Forces are those that… 
 
 “…are rapidly deployable, employable and 
sustainable throughout the global battlespace 
regardless of antiaccess, or area-denial 
environments and independent of existing 
infrastructure.  Designated elements based in the 
United States, abroad or forward deployed [are] 
configured for immediate employment and sustained 
operations in austere environments.  These forces 
[are] capable of seamlessly transitioning to 
sustained operations as a crisis or conflict 
develops.”12 
 
                     8 May be the case when a strategic strait is between the FLS and the 
AO. 
9 The whole Sea Base concept assumes an antiaccess environment.  This 
would be worst case.  Additionally, many U.S. strategic lift aircraft 
do not have Global Airspace Management Technology (United States Air 
Force Vision 2020).  
10 Examples: mangrove swamps, high-rugged cliffs, barrier 
reefs/islands, etc. 
11 National Military Strategy, 2004, p. 2. 
12 Quote by the Secretary of Defense in the Joint Operations 
Concepts, November 2003. 
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The Combined13 Expeditionary Force is a United States-
dominated, Joint Force augmented by one or more allied 
partners.  This Force uses the Component Commander 
construct as used in the Joint Component Commander 
organization.  These joint forces are fully integrated.14  
Specifically, they share common equipment, training, 
doctrine and terminology.  These forces range in size from 
a two-man Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit to an 
Expeditionary Brigade-sized force ( ~5,000 ground combat 
troops).  Some elements of Expeditionary Forces are forward 
deployed.  Expeditionary Forces and their materiel will be 
moved, assembled and sustained using multimode vehicles 
called Connectors. 
B. JOINT EXPEDITIONARY OPERATION PHASES 
1. Pre-crisis 
Pre-Crisis describes the configuration and disposition 
of the Expeditionary Forces (EXFORCES), shown abstractly in 
Figure 2 with no preexisting connections.   
 
Figure 2.   Pre-Crisis                      13 U.S. Joint Force and another state entity. 




Once the nation decides to employ military power, the 
Expeditionary Forces (EXFORCES) begin closing on the Area 
of Operations (AO), with associations as labeled in Figure 
3.  A portion of Forces come direct from forward locations, 
some Forces direct from home base and some Forces through a 
Forward Logistics Site (FLS) on their way.  Because of 
their location and equipment, key elements of these forces 
arrive ahead of the others.  
 
Figure 3.   Closure 
Within 10 days of the Deploy Order,15 the CTF CDR will 
put the Preliminary Elements16 of the ground forces at the 
initial objectives.  These objective(s) may be within 240 
miles17 of the Sea Base.  The Sea Base may be within 25-100 
miles of the coastline18.  The Preliminary Elements shall 
                     15 Quote by Vice Admiral Nathman in the Navy League of the United 
States, June 2004. 
16 Preliminary Elements will vary by situation and objectives within 
that situation. 
17 Sea Basing CONOPS, p. 14. 
18 Ibid, p. 15. 
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deploy to the initial objective(s) within one period of 
darkness (10 hours).19  These elements are able to either 
complete the operation or prepare the battlefield for 
Follow-on Forces.  
Expeditionary Force Protection projects layered 
organic and external defensive power to protect Joint and 
Combined assets and to dissuade and deter possible 
adversaries during Expeditionary Operations.  Expeditionary 
Force Protection defends against the threats described in 
Section II.  The Joint Expeditionary Logistics (JELo) 
system and Sea Base supports the requirements of 
Expeditionary Force Protection. 
Forcible Entry Operations are used in a nonpermissive 
environment to locate, counter, or penetrate vulnerable 
seams in an adversary’s access denial system to enable the 
flow of Follow-on Forces.  The essence of Forcible Entry 
Operations is Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) in order to 
expedite the speed of action relative to the enemy over 
time.  This superior tempo uses the rapid buildup of 
focused combat power ashore via vertical and surface lift 
capabilities, tactical/operational flexibility and maneuver 
at and from the sea.20 
3. Sustainment 
At some point, a majority of the Force has converged 
on the Area of Operations (AO) and operation has reached a 
steady level of effort.  Figure 4 shows the level of 
complexity of the logistics lines needed to support this 
phase. 
                     19 Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare List, 16 June 2003, p. 21. 
20 Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), Commandant of the Marine Corp, 
LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, 
 25 July 1997. 
9 
 
Figure 4.   Sustained Operations 
Sustained Expeditionary Operations (Figure 4) are 
those expeditionary operations that last for a period of 30 
days or longer.  Forces that have closed within the AO are 
able to plan and execute movement and maneuver from the Sea 
Base with the following capabilities:21 
1. Maneuver and support a battalion from sea, 110 NM, within 
10 hours.  
2. Maneuver and support a battalion from the sea, 200 NM, 
within 24 hours.   
3. Maneuver and support smaller forces (e.g. recon, radio 
relay teams) from the sea, 240 NM, as required to support 
operations. 
4. Phased Based Logistics 
Table 1 below lists the critical logistics concepts 






                      21 Ibid. 
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Table 1.   Phase Associated Logistics Concepts 
JEO Phase Associated Logistics Concepts 
Pre-Crisis • reach around the globe  
• scale to conflict level 
• berth and sustain crew and troops 
• interface with the Forward Logistics Site(s)
• transfer material and personnel 
(onload/offload) while underway 
• survive expected threats 
• integrate with the Expeditionary Force 
Protection 
• defend themselves commensurate with their 
role  
(transport/Sea Base) 
• support Unmanned Vehicle (UV) operations 
• interface among each other and the Sea Base 
• carry, deploy, and support Preliminary 
Elements 
• maintain mobility against expected combat 
damage 
• enable assembly of personnel and materiel 
• reconfigure to meet mission requirements 
• scale in capacity, speed, range, and 
interoperability  
• balance between onload/offload speed and 
platform stability/maneuvering 
• maintain capacity, speed, range, and 
interoperability so that weather effects 
don’t adversely impact operational tempo 
• maintains sufficient availability to 
complete mission 
Closure • have space and modular facilities to support 
en route and on-station planning 
• support SOF equipment and operations  
• secure SOF equipment and information 
• maintain forward progress sufficient to 
preserve operational tempo 
• resupply in transit up to sea state 5 
• interface among each other and the Sea Base 
• operate with transfer mechanisms to move 
personnel and materiel within the Sea Base 
and to/from the Sea Base 
Sustainment • change configuration to support given 
mission 
• decontaminate themselves 
 
C. JOINT EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS EMPLOYMENT 
To facilitate the JELo closure phase, the U.S. Navy is 
currently relying on FLSs like Diego Garcia and the current 
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inventory of Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) ships to 
be able to bring the appropriate gear and supplies to the 
objective.  Ships under development like the Maritime Pre-
positioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) and the Rapid Strategic 
Lift Ship (RSLS) are the vessels that the Navy is looking 
toward to reduce the closure time of massing the required 
equipment and supplies for a brigade size force at the Sea 
Base.  Though these new designs try to address the issue of 
transporting large amounts of material rapidly over long 
distances to the Sea Base, they fail to address how that 
material is going to make its way from the sea base to the 
shore. 
As stated in the previous JELo description, the 
requisite troops, vehicles, and supplies need to be 
transported from the Sea Base and taken to shore.  Current 
connector technologies such as Landing Craft Air Cushion 
(LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) have an effective 
range of 25nm or less and their speed is heavily dependent 
on the sea state.  To deliver and continually support 
forces ashore with these technologies requires bringing a 
large number of support ships, such as the MPF(F), to 
within 25nm of the coastline, greatly increasing their 
susceptibility to hostile fire. 
There is a significant gap in the U.S. Navy’s ability 
to transport the requisite forces and material from the Sea 
Base to the shore over the proposed 200nm distance and 
maximum sea state 5.  To close or remove this gap, a new 
capable high speed connector needs to be developed to 
provide the transportation of the initial forces to the 
shore within a 10 hour period and then be able to provide 
continuous logistic support until the force needs to be 
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removed.  Until this HSAC is developed, maneuvering forces 
from the Sea Base to the shore in excess of 25nm will 
remain a difficult, if not an impossible challenge. 
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II. DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS 
A. INITIAL REQUIREMENTS 
SEA-6 requested that the TSSE program develop a 
conceptual design for a logistics transport to act as a 
connector between the Sea Base and shore to augment or 
replace existing connector platforms.  This logistics 
transport was to be a HSAC to close the gap SEA-6 had 
identified in their JElo study of being able to transport 
and support a 2025 JEB from the Sea Base to the shore.  
From the SEA-6 employment perspective this meant: 
• The HSAC system or system of systems must be 
capable of delivering two BLTs (~8000LT 
consisting of troops, cargo, and gear) from the 
Sea Base to the shore. 
• The HSAC system or system of systems must deliver 
the requisite payload a distance of 200nm in sea 
state 5 or less within a 10 hour period 
• The HSAC system or system of systems must interface 
with the Sea Base, developed ports, and austere 
beaches in order to transfer cargo to and from 
the ship. 
The TSSE faculty members then augmented these 
requirements with the following three additional 
requirements that they deemed were necessary for the HSAC 
design: 
• The HSAC must support amphibious operations ashore 
in addition to its delivering payload. 
• The HSAC must be capable of performing secondary 
missions. 
• The HSAC must be capable of independent operations. 
From these initial requirements, the design team then 
formulated the functional and operational requirements that 
would shape the HSAC design. 
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B. REQUIREMENT DEVELOPMENT 
The TSSE design team reviewed the initial requirements 
provided by SEA-6 and the TSSE faculty and examined the 
guidance set forth in the 2004 TSSE project document 
(Appendix I).  Three weeks were then spent reviewing 
numerous documents related to the Seabasing Concept, Joint 
Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS), transport factor, and 
high speed transport in order to fully understand the 
design problem.  After reviewing this material, the team 
was ready to proceed with detailed functional and 
operational requirement development. 
1. Defining the Operating Environment 
Prior to generating any detailed requirements, the 
TSSE team defined the operational environment in which the 
HSAC would operate.  The transit area between the sea base 
and the shore received the most attention.  This area was 
subdivided into a loading zone at the sea base, a transit 
zone from the sea base towards the beach, and an unloading 
zone at the beach.  The threat the ship would expect to 
encounter was then defined for each zone based on input 
from SEA-6 documentation and the broad operational 
experience within the TSSE team.  Figure 5 illustrates the 
breakdown of the zones and the corresponding threats the 
HSAC may encounter. 
The Loading Zone was defined as the immediate area 
surrounding the sea base.  The team assumed that the HSAC 
would be protected by the defense systems associated with 
the protection of the sea base while the HSAC is loading 
and unloading at the seabase. 
The Transit Zone spans the distance from the sea base 
to within about one mile of the beach.  Based on SEA-6 
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documentation, the distance from the sea base to the shore 
can be as much as 200 nautical miles.  Within this zone, 
the HSAC is expected to encounter enemy ships, small boats, 
aircraft, and missiles.  It was assumed that other assets 
assigned to the littoral will provide protection from any 
undersea threat. 
~1nm200 – 25 nm


















Figure 5.   HSAC Operating Environment 
Approximately one mile out from the beach to the beach 
is the area categorized as the Unloading Zone.  At this 
point in the design process, it was unclear how the HSAC 
would deliver its cargo to the shore, so the Unloading Zone 
was pushed offshore one mile to cover the possibility of 
offloading the HSAC to another waterborne craft for 
delivery to the beach.  In this zone, the HSAC is expected 
to encounter small boats, aircraft, missiles, and small 
arms fire.  The team made the assumption that the boat 
lanes leading to the beach would be mine free prior to the 
HSAC entering the Unloading Zone. 
The beach was defined as the fourth zone in the 
operating environment.  Here the HSAC is expected to 
encounter hostile ground forces, missiles, small arms fire, 
and aircraft.  Although enemy forces may possibly present 
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on the beach during landing operations, it was assumed that 
any potential beach landing would be conducted in a reduced 
threat environment. 
2. Detailed Requirement Development 
Having established the operating environment and 
having a clear set of initial requirements, the team 
developed the mission needs statement listed in Appendix 
II.  From this mission needs statement, the team developed 
the needed operational and functional requirements for the 
HSAC.  To begin this requirement development process, the 
12 person design team was divided into three sub-teams; 
ship capabilities and characteristics, combat system 
capabilities, and payload interfacing.  Each sub-team then 
generated a list of specific requirements that the HSAC 
must satisfy to effectively meet the initial requirements 
set forth by SEA-6 and the TSSE faculty.  These 
requirements would then be reviewed and combined to form 
the HSAC Operational Requirement Document (ORD). 
a. Ship Capabilities and Characteristics. 
This team was charged with developing notional 
requirements that defined the HSAC’s performance, ability 
to execute its mission, and maneuver throughout the oceans 
of the world, ranging from blue water to the littoral.  The 
requirements developed under this category are listed in 
Appendix III. 
It was decided that while the primary mission of 
the HSAC is to deliver cargo from the sea base to the 
shore, it is necessary for the ship to be capable of trans-
oceanic voyages in order to be a self-sustaining, 
deployable ship.  The possibility of having another ship 
transport the HSAC from a CONUS base to an advanced land 
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base and/or to the sea base was eliminated early in the 
process because of the considerable restrictions it placed 
the design alternatives of the HSAC. 
b. Combat System Capabilities. 
This group developed notional requirements to 
accomplish the primary mission within the defined threat 
environment and to satisfy the Threat Mitigation 
Requirements in the Mission Needs Statement.  These 
requirements are listed in Appendix III. 
The key concept produced by the development of 
these requirements was that the HSAC would carry a combat 
systems suite in order to provide self defense and to 
project power ashore at short range, protecting the landing 
force both during transit and offload.  The self defense 
capabilities of the HSAC would be short range systems, 
relying heavily on other assets within umbrella of the “Sea 
Shield” to protect the HSAC from more formidable blue water 
threats. 
c. Payload Interfacing. 
This team was tasked with developing notional 
requirements that define the amount and type of cargo that 
the HSAC will be required to carry throughout the 
amphibious operation (tons and volume at a minimum).  The 
requirements for this category were driven by the initial 
two BLT composition shown in Appendix V. 
While the requirements were being generated, it 
was decided that the HSAC will transport the Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicles (EFVs) from the sea base to the shore.  
Initially it was discussed that the EFVs may make the 
transit from the sea base to the beach on their own power, 
but the limited range of the EFV would only allow for this 
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if the sea base was less than 60 nautical miles from the 
beach.  Since our initial requirements called for the sea 
base to be as far as 200 nautical miles from the beach, it 
was decided that the design would best be accomplished if 
the EFVs are assumed to always be included in the HSAC 
load-out.  This decision was made early in the design 
process because the 98 EFVs that are in two BLTs have a 
significant impact on the necessary payload capacity of the 
ship due to their large weight and footprint area. 
3. Final Development 
All of the sub team requirements were thoroughly 
analyzed by the entire TSSE team before selecting the final 
list of requirements for which the HSAC would be designed 
to meet.  In some cases the same requirement was developed 
by more than one group, and in other cases the team decided 
that a requirement was not realistic or necessary.  One 
week of class time was spent by the TSSE team reviewing and 
analyzing each requirement in order to develop the final 
list.   
To generate a final prioritized list of requirements 
each team first weighted their requirements on a scale of 1 
to 10 as shown in Appendix III.  Then the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to generate an overall 
weight value for each of the sub-teams’ design 
requirements.  As depicted in Appendix III, the payload 
requirements were most influential with an overall weight 
of 53.90%.  The ship characteristic requirements were next 
with a weight of 29.73% followed by combat systems with a 
weight of 16.38%.  The individual team weighting was 
normalized using the AHP derived weights to allowing the 
team to rank the derived requirements relative to each 
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other.  Finally, all the requirements were prioritized 
using their normalized weight, resulting in the final 
operational and functional requirement list seen in 
Appendix III.  With this detailed set of requirements, the 




















































III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES  
A. GENERATION OF MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
Starting from the payload, speed, and cargo 
requirements for the design, the design team developed 
three Measures of Performance (MOP) for the HSAC: 
flexibility, survivability, and transport factor. 
1. Flexibility 
This MOP depended on four factors: payload, draft, 
number of ships, and speed. The objective preferences for 
this MOP were as follows: 
Objective Preferences (Flexibility)  
 # of Ships Speed Payload Draft 
# of Ships 1 1 2 2 
Speed 1 1 2 2 
Payload 0.5 0.5 1 1 
Draft 0.5 0.5 1 1 
  
The above objective preferences led to the following 
weightings: 
• Number of ships : 14.21% 
• Speed   : 14.21% 
• Draft   : 35.79% 
• Payload  : 35.79 % 
After a careful examination of the above weighting 
factors, and to make the flexibility MOP more balanced, the 
team decided to give more weight to the speed and number of 
ships. The final weighting that was used for the rest of 
the AOA procedure is as follows: 
• Number of ships :  20% 
• Speed   : 20% 
• Draft   :  30% 
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• Payload  :  30% 
The MOP score for flexibility is then scaled between 0 
and 20 (with 20 being the best a ship can achieve). 
2. Survivability  
This MOP depended on three factors: number of ships, 
speed, and the ship’s length. The objective preferences for 
this MOP were as follows: 
Objective Preferences (Survivability) 
 Speed # of Ships Length 
# of Ships  1 2 2 
Length 0.5 1 2 
Speed 0.5 0.5 1 
  
The above objective preferences led to the following 
weighting factors: 
• # of ships : 49.34% 
• Length  : 31.08% 
• Speed  : 19.58% 
The actual values used during the AOA phase were a 
round up of the above values as follows: 
• # of ships : 50% 
• Length  : 30% 
• Speed  : 20% 
The survivability MOP is then scaled between 0 and 20 
(0 being the worst case scenario and 20 reflecting a ship 
with a perfect survivability). 
3. Transport Factor 
The last MOP selected for this design project was the 
transport factor (TF). The TF is a non dimensional 
relationship between the weight, design speed, and 
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installed power of a ship given by: 
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where, W : Full Load Weight of Ship (WSHIP + WCARGO  + WFUEL) 
  WCARGO  :   Weight of Cargo 
   WFUEL  : Weight of Fuel 
  WSHIP : W - WCARGO  -  WFUEL 
  VK  : Design Speed 
  K1 and K2 :  Conversion Constants for hp,lb and LT 
  SHP : Total Installed Power 
More on TF can be found in [1]. 
By examining the TF for existing ships, the team 
concluded that the higher the TF, the better the design is. 
The team also learned that the highest possible TF with 
current technology for the speed range is around 48.  
Figure 6 shows the operating envelop for the proposed 
designs. From this plot of transport factor vs speed, it is 
evident that the operating envelope is below the Carderock 
theoretical maximum which is the red line.  On the graph 
are many other points which correspond to other ships, and 
the results are well above most of those.  This is expected 
due to the fact that the ship’s main objective is to carry 
a large quantity of cargo at high speeds, and technological 
advances should allow the design to approach closer to the 
theoretical maximum. Therefore, the teams used a scale 
between zero and 50 for the TF values (none of the designs 






























Figure 6.   TF Operating Envelop 
4. Overall measure of performance 
All of the above measures of performance were then 
used to derive an overall MOP that will ultimately drive 
the design choice. 
The weighting of each of the above MOPs in the overall 
MOP is as follows: 
• Survivability :    42% 
• Flexibility  : 16% 
• TF   :  42% 
Therefore, the  
 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES TOOL 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the 
individual MOPs (and therefore the overall MOP) depended on 
parameters like speed, payload, number of ships, length of 
each variant, installed power, displacement, and draft. At 
this point of the design, a “tool” was needed that provided 
Survivability Flexibility TF MOP= .42 .16 .42
20 20 50
Normalized      + +          
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a good estimate of each of those factors as the design 
parameters were varied. 
Because the team was familiar with the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) spreadsheets tool, the team 
decided to use this software as a “first cut” tool for the 
evaluation of different hull forms.  
1. Overview of the MIT Spreadsheets Tool 
This spreadsheet tool, commonly known as MAPC, uses 
parametric models and scaling to create high level designs 
of various hull types. The inputs are the desired speed, 
range, payload, sea state and maximum displacement. Some of 
the software’s outputs include the fuel requirements, 
draft, displacement, length, beam and installed power. A 
sample interface is presented in Figure 7.  
Initial Input
Ranking
1 Desired Speed in Waves 30                 knots
2 Desired Payload 2,000            long tons
3 Desired Range 500               nautical miles
Sea State 1 wave height at top of SS1 = 0.3 feet
Maximum Displacement 12,000          long tons
Results Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES
Semi-Planing 
Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH
Calm Water Speed 3,12 knots 30.0               30.0               30.0               30.1                30.0               30.1               30.0               
Speed in Waves 1,3,4,9,10,11 knots 30.0               30.0               30.0               30.0                30.0               30.0               30.0               
Payload Weight 2,3,4,9 long tons 2,000             2,000             2,000             1,000              2,000             2,000             2,000             
Range at Speed in Waves 4,7,9 nautical miles 500                500                500                100                 500                500                500                
Displacement 3,7 ylong tons 5,391             4,682             5,437             2,115              5,631             5,334             5,824             
Installed Power 3,6,7 ylong tons 87,560           49,696           77,450           36,117            68,783           33,885           58,471           
Engines 5 ylong tons 6 LM 1600 6 LM 1600 6 LM 1600 6 LM 1600 6 LM 1600 6 LM 1600 6 LM 1600
Fuel Carried On Board 3,7,8 ylong tons 246                144                218                21                   196                98                  169                
Length feet 421               313              479              282               419              634                291               
Beam feet 107               90                90                56                 134              153                129               
Hullborne Draft feet 57.9              43.7             19.8             20.9              19.1             15.9               26.7              
Foilborne / Cushionborne Draft feet 23.5              23.2             5.5               N/A N/A N/A N/A
Rough Order of Magnitude Cost 150,000,000$ 133,000,000$ 149,300,000$ 114,900,000$ 148,500,000$ 141,200,000$ 152,600,000$ 
Lift to Drag Ratio 19.5              25.9             22.3             16.5              23.5             47.1               24.2              
 
Figure 7.   Sample Interface of the MIT Spreadsheets 
2. Modification of the MIT Tool  
In its original format, this tool used geometric and 
dynamic similarities along with regression analysis to 
generate its outputs. Also, it intended only for relatively 
small vessels with speeds up to 40 knots. The TSSE 2003 
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team modified this tool to account for larger and faster 
hull forms, though. In this design, these modified MIT 
spreadsheets were used to allow the comparison of the seven 
proposed hull types (Hydrofoils, HYSWASs, SWATHs, SESs, 
Planing monohulls, Catamarans, and Trimarans) for speeds up 
to 60 knots. Although the team did not conduct any analysis 
to validate the use of this tool for the purpose of the 
design, the latest generation of high speed Wave Piercing 
Catamarans (WPC) built by the Hobart Company INCAT have 
validated the use of this tool for large vessels at higher 
speeds.  
Although the tool has provided only a first estimation 
of the key hull form parameters, it was deemed an adequate 
evaluation tool for the purpose of this stage of the AOA. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES PHILOSOPHY 
Starting from the required payload to carry (8000LT) 
and an approximate combat system payload of 150LT (derived 
from a preliminary study conducted on the combat system 
requirement for the ship), the team calculated the payload 
for the possible designs as follows: Each ship in a 
specific design will carry ([8000LT/(number of ships in the 
design)]+150LT). At this point, it was decided that all 
ships will have the same combat system payload but will be 
designed in a modular way as to allow for flexibility in 
the selection of the different combat system elements. As 
an example, for a design with 5 ships, each will have to 
carry a payload equal to: (8000/5)+150=1750LT. 
1. Possible Designs  
Because there were many possible designs that fulfill 
the requirements of the HSAC, it was necessary to divide 
the team into three groups where each group selected a 
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payload range and conducted the needed analyses. The 
results of the analyses allowed the team to determine the 
characteristics (advantages and drawbacks) of the different 
designs.  
Ships with payloads less than 2000LT were considered 
big ships, ships with a payload between 1000 and 2000LT 
were deemed medium size ships, and finally ships with a 
payload less than 1000LT were considered small ships. 
Group I analyzed the data for the cases of two, three, 
and four ships variants (big ships), group II analyzed the 
data for five, seven and 10 ships variants (medium ships), 
and group III analyzed the data for 15 and 20 ships 
variants (small ships). 
Each group was tasked to calculate the overall MOP for 
each possible payload (varying from 550LT in the case of 20 
ships to 4150LT in the case of two big ships) and each 
possible hull type (the seven hull types in the MIT 
spreadsheets) for speeds varying from 30 knots to 50 knots 
(with a 5 knot increment).  
The total number of possible runs was equal to 280(7 hull 
forms * 5possible speeds * 8 possible ship groupings =280)  
All runs were then grouped to show the MOP for each 
possible hull type, speed, and payload.   
Appendix IV shows the overall results collected from 
all three groups.  
Appendix IV shows a sample of the MOP calculation 
results of the medium size ships.  
2. Design Selection Tests 
Due to time constraints, it was not possible to 
analyze all of the possible 280 designs and a method was 
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neded down that number to a more reasonable figure. Based 
on a statistical analysis of the results from all runs, the 
following was noted: 
1- MOP values varied between 0.2 and 0.5 (most ships 
exceeded 0.3, though). 
2- For some ship designs MOP values varied 
dramatically as speed is changed. 
Based on those observations the team decided to run 
all deigns through a series of three tests. In case they 
pass the last test, they are kept for further processing. 
If not, they are dropped out of the AOA process. The three 
tests were as follows: 
Test1: If the average MOP is less than 0.4, then that 
is considered a bad design (spreadsheet reads: Return ZERO 
if average< 0.4, otherwise, return the average MOP over all 
speeds). 
Test2: If the max (MOP)-min (MOP) exceeds 0.05, then 
the design is not robust enough and is considered as a bad 
design (spreadsheet reads: Return ZERO if max (MOP)-min 
(MOP)>0.5, otherwise return the average MOP over all 
speeds). 
Test3: Any design that has an average>0.45 or passes 
the two tests (regardless of the design’s average MOP) is 
considered a good design and will be kept (spreadsheet 
reads: Return the average MOP if a design passes test 3 and 
Zero if it does not pass it).  
At this point, it is important to note that the reason 
it was decided to keep deigns with an average MOP>0.45 
although they might not have passed test two (max (MOP)-min 
(MOP) exceeds 0.05) is that 0.45 figure was deemed a high 
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enough MOP (compared to the average over all deigns) that 
cutting those deigns would not be fair.   
Figure 8 shows a snapshot of the required excel work 
to run the three tests for the 15 ships variant. It can be 
seen clearly how only two out of the seven possible deigns 
made it through the three tests. For the particular case 
shown on the figure, only 15 Hydrofoils or 15 Catamarans 




Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30 0.4032911 0.4196021 0.437716 0.3810574 0.4266967 0.4918212 0.419973
35 0.407435 0.4054498 0.417811 0.3651894 0.4198396 0.455274 0.396339
40 0.409043 0.3938541 0.402963 0.3511751 0.4129364 0.4310445 0.379645
45 0.408529 0.3859061 0.391949 0.3478963 0.4058566 0.4203088 0.37051
50 0.4073266 0.3781461 0.383412 0.3442935 0.400095 0.409754 0.361815
test1 0.4071249 0 0.40677 0 0.4130849 0.4416405 0
test2 0.4071249 0.3965916 0 0.3579223 0.4130849 0 0
test3 0.4071249 0 0 0 0.4130849 0 0
 
Figure 8.   Excel work to establish the design selection 
tests  
3. Design Selection Results 
At the conclusion of the three tests, only 23 possible 
deigns passed the required tests and were kept for further 
processing.  
a. Modified cost model 
The next step in the AOA was to analyze each of 
the 23 designs with respect to cost. Again, the MIT 
spreadsheets were used to obtain a rough estimate of the 
cost of each of the possible ships. After an initial run, 
the team noticed that the MIT spreadsheets assigned almost 
the same cost to all possible designs no matter how much 
the speed and payload requirements were varied. 
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After a thorough examination of how the MIT 
spreadsheets calculated cost, the team realized that the 
model used a miscellaneous cost of $300M that is the same 
for all ships and is always added to the overall cost of 
any particular ship type. Also, the combat systems cost was 
not accurate enough and does not reflect what is needed for 
the design. At this point, the team deemed necessary to 
modify the cost model in order to have a more accurate idea 
on how much each of the variants will cost.  
In building a modified cost model for the purpose 
of the HSAC design, the miscellaneous cost was disregarded; 
the combat system cost calculations were tailored to 
reflect the ship’s requirements, and only the cost of the 
machinery ($225/HP for installed HP) and structural weight 
($10/lb) were accounted for. The team believed that the sum 
of the machinery cost, the structural weight cost, and the 
combat system cost is a more reasonable cost calculation 
model to sort the different designs. 
Based on the TSSE 2003 design, and because the 
Sea Swat had a similar combat system suite to the one 
designed for this project, the team estimated the combat 
system cost for one ship to be equal to $50M. Starting from 
the realization that the cost of the combat system suite 
for a specific design should not increase linearly with the 
number of ships, the team developed a combat system cost 
model to account for designs that have a large number of 
ships as is illustrated in Appendix IV. The new combat 
system cost model results show that starting from a cost of 
$50M when one ship is built, the cost decreases to only 
$27M/ship when 20 ships were built; something that was 
deemed very reasonable.  
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Also, because building more ships of the same 
type involves a learning curve that can minimize the 
overall cost of the total number of ships (as compared to 
multiplying the cost of the lead ship by the number of 
ships), a “0.9” learning factor was used in the cost 
calculation to give credit to designs where only few ships 
were to be built.  
The cost of the nth ships was calculated according 





   =  
where u = unit of interest;  Z U= resources for 
unit u 
K = resources for 1st unit;  s = learning curve 
slope. 
Appendix IV illustrates the excel work involved 
in calculating the modified (new in the spreadsheet) cost 
for six of the possible 23 designs. 
b. Final selection 
The final step in the AOA is to analyze the 23 
possible deigns with respect to cost. For each design, the 
overall MOP was plotted against cost. The resultant plot 
that reflects the final results is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.   Cost vs. MOP for all possible designs 
Because the team was looking for a grouping of 
ships with the highest MOP possible and the lowest cost, it 
was evident that the trimaran design led to the best design 
of all possible ones.  
Because the ship’s draft is a big design driver 
for the project, and taking into account the fact that the 
more ships a design includes, the lower the draft is, the 
team decided to select a number of medium size trimarans as 
the design of choice rather than to pick an exact number. 
The final number would depend on other constraints (cargo, 
ramp feasibility study, hull design study, machinery 
requirements, beach slope study and draft requirements, 
etc.) that will come up during further design analysis.  
Figures 10 and 11 show that the three ship and 
four ship variants versus MOP broken out by speed. Again, 
it can be seen clearly how the trimaran hull form 
distinguished itself among all possible hull forms. 
33 




























7- Sw ath  
Figure 10.   Four ship vs. MOP broken out by speed 




























7- Sw ath  
Figure 11.   Three ships vs. MOP broken out by speed 
D. SUMMARY 
Analyzing the outcome of all possible hull designs, 
the trimaran displayed the best results to fulfill the 
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requirements of the project. In addition, the trimaran had 
the best draft and the largest deck area which are both big 
design drivers for the project. 
Based on these results, the team decided that the High 
Speed Assault Connect (HSAC) will be a design that involves 
a number of medium size trimaran. 
E. BEACHABLE VS. NON-BEACHABLE FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Current amphibious operation’s use two different 
methods to transfer troops and equipment to the beach: 
First, a beachable craft with a relatively low draft that 
is able to reach the beach and use a ramp to off-load 
troops and equipment. Second, a non-beachable ship that 
anchors or loiters 5-25nm off the beach and uses LCAC´s or 
AAV’s to transport troops and equipment to the each. Though 
both of these delivery methods are proven technologies, 
neither can meet the distance, speed, and sea state 
requirements that the current seabasing requirements 
stipulate.  Thus the HSAC design must replace or augment 
these amphibious landing craft technologies. 
The design team decided that the HSAC would either be 
a beachable ship or a non-beachable ship.  The beachable 
variant would take the requisite cargo from the Sea Base 
directly to shore.  The non-beachable variant would “ferry” 
loaded landing craft from the Sea Base to a short distance 
from the beach and then allow the landing craft take the 
cargo ashore.  A feasibility study was conducted on each to 
determine which alternative to pursue. 
After reviewing the Naval Research Advisory 
Committee’s (NRAC) concept for a LCAC “ferry,” the team 
initially believed that a non-beachable design that would 
“ferry” LCACs to and from the Sea Base would be the easiest 
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and more direct design to implement[3].  Since LCACs are 
already actively employed, this design would require few 
tactical changes.  It would extend the effective range of 
the LCAC from the Sea Base and would help minimize the 
effect the sea state has on LCAC performance by 
transporting the LCAC through the worst seas.  The design 
automatically addressed the beaching issue by using the 
LCAC which is a proven high speed connector.  Since the 
HSAC does not have to beach itself, the draft of the 
connector “ferry” would not be as big an issue and it is 
kept at a safer distance from the potentially hostile 
beach. 
However, a LCAC can carry a maximum payload of 60LT 
and weighs 200LT when fully loaded.  To move the 
approximate 8000LT of vehicles, troops, and gear that 
comprises two BLTs, at least 114 LCACs would be required, 
well above the current U.S Navy inventory.  Thus a LCAC 
“ferry” design would require a significant payload capacity 
and significant number of ships to transport enough loaded 
LCACs to make the design worthwhile.  Though the HSAC could 
be designed to facilitate multiple LCACs trips in an effort 
to reduce the number of LCACs required, the LCAC’s 30 
minute load and unload time combined with the HSAC transit 
time could exceed the 10 hour period allowed.  Finally the 
mean time between failures of the LCAC and its approaching 
end of service life was of concern, greatly affecting the 
reliability of the overall system. 
To start the beachable design analysis, the team 
examined the characteristics and capabilities of the 
Newport class LST.  Of note from this examination was that 
the LST could carry 3000LT of cargo, had a 16ft average 
draft, had a stern gate for amphibious vehicle deployment 
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and recovery, and had a deployable bow ramp.  The Newport 
class LST performed a mission similar to the HSAC and 
proved that a large vessel could be made beachable.  From 
here the team determined that newer technologies in the 
area of hull forms, structure, and propulsion could greatly 
enhance the design concepts implemented in the LST.  The 
beachable variant would also provide a single connector 
solution that would maximize the 10 hour employment time.  
As a single connector solution, the design keeps the 
loading and unloading interfaces to a minimum, greatly 
increasing the overall reliability.   
Making a craft beachable, however, creates structural 
issues for bow ramp design and requires additional 
structural reinforcement to facilitate beaching.  The 
additional structure required along with the draft 
constraint could limit hull form options when trying to 
achieve high speeds with larger payloads.  Beachable craft 
are more susceptible to shallow water mines than LCACs, 
requiring a low mine threat or mine clearance prior to 
beaching.  Also, the beach characteristics (obstructions, 
slope, etc.) affect beachable vessels ability to land more 
than air cushion craft. 
The technical risks posed by the beachable design 
seemed more surmountable than those posed by the LCAC 
“ferry,” especially when a similar design had been 
implemented in the past.  The beachable design provided a 
single connector solution that could carry a significantly 
larger payload.  The payload capacity would be used for the 
required cargo and not have to account for the extra weight 
imposed by LCACs, reducing the number of ships required to 
complete the mission.  After examining the pros and cons 
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for each design variant it was determined that a beachable 
HSAC would be the most feasible alternative and the team 
proceeded to conduct its detailed design of the HSAC.   
F. REFERENCES 
1. Design Trends in High-Speed Transport Colen Kennell  
(Marine Techonology, Vol 35, No.3, July 1998, pp 127-
134)MIT spreadsheets 
2. TSSE 2003 Final Report.  
3. Mendlow, Larry.  Seabasing.  Presentation given to 
TSSE students at the Naval Postgraduate School regarding 
NRAC’s studies and ideas regarding seabasing.  Monterey, 


















































IV DESIGN PROCESS 
A. CARGO DESIGN 
1. Establishing the Cargo Parameters 
As stated in the initial requirements, the system or 
systems of HSACs needed to be capable of transporting two 
Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) of a 2025 JEB from the Sea 
Base to shore within ten hours.  The joint nature of the 
force and future time frame made it difficult to define 
exactly what vehicles, troops, and equipment would comprise 
a 2025 JEB.  SEA-6 used the United States Marine Corps 
vision of a 2015 MPF(F) MEB as a surrogate [1] to develop 
the notional 2025 JEB listed in Appendix V.  The 2025 JEB 
listed in Appendix V listed the weight, area, and volume 
for all the vehicles in the BLT.  This provided an accurate 
picture of what needed to be transported, how much it 
weighed, and how much area it occupied.  With this data in 
hand, a thorough analysis could begin on interface design 
and cargo placement. 
2. Cargo Load Plan Development 
The analysis of alternatives conducted earlier 
determined that a system of 10 medium size trimarans, each 
with a payload capacity of 800LT would be capable of 
transporting the two BLTs.  However, the analysis of 
alternatives primarily examined the weight that needed to 
be moved and not the footprint area of the vehicles.  The 
initial hull form design provided for a large cargo deck, 
24.4m wide and 76.2m long, that spanned the side hulls of 
the trimaran, providing 1859m2 of cargo area.  The first 
step then was to ensure that the two BLTs would fit across 
10 HSACs. 
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Table 2.   Vehicle Data 
Vehicle 2 BLTs Length Width Area Height
Humvee 204 16.84 7.1 119.564 8.5
EFV 98 29.85 12 358.2 10.46
M1A2 28 32.25 12 387 9.47
LAV 50 27.09 8.73 236.4957 8.825
ABV 4 32.25 12 387 9.47
AVLB 2 31 12 372 10.46
M9ACE 8 22 12 264 10.46
M88A2 2 29.38 11.25 330.525 10.25
ITV 16 16.67 5.67 94.5189 5.5
AVENGER 10 16.25 7.17 116.5125 8.67
MTVR 38 22.75 8 182 9.34
LW155 12 30.43 9.09 276.6087 7.42
M105 16 13.78 6.93 95.4954 8.17
MK155 6 15.03 7.98 119.9394 6.17
M101 34 12.24 6.14 75.1536 6.93
M149 2 13.42 6.86 92.0612 6.37
M116 2 12.34 6.25 77.125 2
AN/TPQ 2
FORKLIFT 8 23.63 8.53 201.5639 10.14
CONTACT TRUCK 4 22.75 8 182 9.34
Vehicle Total: 546  
First, data was compiled and tabulated in Table 2 on 
all of the vehicles to include length, width, height, and 
weight.  In some cases there were multiple variants of the 
same vehicle or piece of equipment.  When faced with this 
situation, the heaviest weight and largest dimensions of 
the multiple variants were used.  This allowed the design 
to be geared towards the worst case scenario and ensured 
that all vehicle variants would fit in the design.  Also, 
several items in the BLT are vehicles still under 
development for which exact data was not readily available.  
The design team was forced to use conservative estimates 
for these items based on available data or existing 
vehicles of similar size.  All of the weights used to 
describe the vehicles in the BLT include fuel, personnel, 
and the gear which the vehicle would carry. 
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Next, the footprint for each vehicle within one BLT 
was constructed and then placed across 10 of the initial 
cargo decks.  To ensure loadout flexibility and 
feasibility, a 0.9m buffer separated each vehicle from a 
neighboring vehicle or ship structure.  Though only one BLT 
was being placed on the ships, doubling the resulting 
placement would yield the overall weight and area 
requirements for two BLTs.  After placing one BLTs worth of 
vehicles across the 10 cargo decks, 960m2 of cargo area was 
occupied leaving only 899m2 for the second BLT.  In 
addition, this notional cargo deck did not include any 
interfaces to provide access to the cargo deck, which would 
further reduce the amount of area available cargo area.  
Thus, it was determined that initial cargo deck did not 
provide enough usable cargo area for two BLTs.  It was also 
noted that the average loadout for one BLT over 10 HSACs 
was 420LT, making the average payload for two BLTs 840LT.  
This average payload exceeded the design payload by 40LT. 
Due to the average payload weight and area requirement 
issues discussed above, it was decided to distribute the 
two BLTs across a system of 12 ships.  Two BLTs occupied 
19,200m2 based on the initial 10 ship analysis.  Using 12 
HSACs would provide 22,311m2 of cargo area, comfortably 
holding the two BLTs, while allowing for cargo deck 
interface placement.  It would also allow one BLT to be 
embarked across six ships, providing mission commanders the 
ability to add or remove BLTs easily as the mission needs 





Table 3.   1 Battalion Landing Team distribution 
Vehicle SHIP 1 SHIP 2 SHIP 3 SHIP 4 SHIP 5 SHIP 6
qty qty qty qty qty qty
Humvee 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700
EFV 9 655911 8 583032 8 583032 8 583032 8 583032 8 583032
M1A2 2 278160 3 417240 3 417240 2 278160 2 278160 2 278160
LAV 5 145000 4 116000 4 116000 4 116000 4 116000 4 116000
ABV 0 0 0 0 1 139080 1 139080
AVLB 0 0 0 1 93194 0 0
M9ACE 0 0 1 37799 1 37799 1 37799 1 37799
M88A2 0 1 140000 0 0 0 0
ITV 1 7900 1 7900 1 7900 2 15800 1 7900 2 15800
AVENGER 1 8300 0 1 8300 1 8300 1 8300 1 8300
MTVR 4 164000 3 123000 3 123000 3 123000 3 123000 3 123000
LW155 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200
M105 2 10720 2 10720 1 5360 1 5360 1 5360 1 5360
MK155 0 0 1 6405 1 6405 1 6405 0
M101 2 5678 2 5678 4 11356 2 5678 4 11356 3 8517
M149 0 0 0 0 0 1 2600
M116 0 0 0 0 1 2360 0
AN/TPQ 1 43756 0 0 0 0 0
FORKLIFT 1 10000 0 1 10000 1 10000 0 1 10000
CONTACT 
TRUCK 0 0 0 2 40000 0 0
TOTAL 
PAYLOAD 
(LB) 1476325 1550470 1473292 1469628 1465652 1474548
TOTAL 
PAYLOAD 
(LT) 659 692 658 656 654 658
 
Using a 12 ship system also reduced the average 
loadout weight to 663LT with a worst case loadout of 693LT, 
both well below the design payload amount of 800LT.  With 
the worst case payload over 100LT less than the ship’s 
maximum payload, the HSAC will be able to grow and adapt to 
new equipment and loadout requirements in the future.  
Table 3 illustrates how one BLT was distributed across six 
HSACs. 
3. Cargo Deck Design 
The initial cargo deck layout was established to carry 
one sixth of a BLT, approximately 46 vehicles.  Also 
determined in this initial work was the need for a stern 
gate for cargo on load at the Sea Base or Forward Logistics 
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Station (FLS).  A bow ramp was also determined to be 
necessary for the offload of cargo at the beach.  To 
continue with the detailed design work for the cargo 
spaces, it was necessary to establish the dimensions of the 
cargo spaces and to examine specific vehicle storage 
locations.  The design team determined that it was prudent 
to allow for extra room within the cargo spaces to account 
for structural members and sufficient space for personnel 
to access any of the vehicles.  Also of importance to the 
design team was to establish a cargo floor plan which would 
allow for rapid loading and unloading of vehicles. 
The analysis of the cargo spaces to determine how many 
ships were necessary to transport both BLTs determined that 
two levels of cargo decks would be necessary to accommodate 
all of the vehicles.  The largest area available within the 
hull was located on the first deck spanning the beam of the 
ship to include the side hulls, approximately nine meters 
above the baseline of the ship.  Given a beam of 30 meters, 
the main cargo deck was limited to 21.4 meters in order to 
allow for structure and additional spaces or passageways 
that may be determined to be necessary on the same deck.  
In order to retain the main cargo deck within the area of 
the ship that extends from the main hull to the side hulls, 
the length was determined to be 76 meters, with the space 
beginning at the stern of the ship.  A minimum of four 
meters of deck height was determined in order to allow for 
sufficient overhead clearance for any vehicle or container 
which the ship would carry. 
The additional cargo deck was placed one deck below 
the main cargo deck and is restricted by the beam of the 
main hull, approximately 5 meters above the baseline.  This 
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was determined to be the best location because it would 
allow for storage of the heaviest vehicles lower in the 
ship, keeping the KG of the cargo as low as possible.  In 
order to fit the largest vehicles single file, it was 
necessary for the compartment to be five meters wide.  This 
cargo deck was to span the entire length of the ship in 
order to permit vehicles to drive in from the stern of the 
ship and drive out through the bow.  Again, a minimum deck 
height of four meters was deemed necessary. 
 
Figure 12.   Main and Lower Cargo Decks Fully Loaded 
Vehicle flow through the cargo spaces was of great 
importance to the design team because this would be a 
critical factor in allowing for rapid on and offload of the 
vehicles when conducting the primary mission.  Several 
design features were developed in order to enhance the flow 
of cargo through the ship. 
With the vehicles loading from the stern of the ship 
at the Sea Base or FLS, they would be able to roll on 
through the stern gate and would be easily stowed for 
transport facing the bow of the ship.  When the ship is at 
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the beach, the vehicles are facing forward and just simply 
will need to drive forward off the ship.  Figure 12 
provides a cut-away view of the cargo decks inside the 
ship. 
A problem the design team faced was how to effectively 
move cargo from the lower cargo deck to the main cargo 
deck.  Both the stern gate and bow ramp were determined to 
be located on the lower cargo deck level since that deck 
would pass through the entire length of the ship.  A system 
was necessary to allow the loading vehicles at the stern to 
gain access to the main cargo deck, and also for those 
vehicles to easily move back down to the lower cargo deck 
during offload. 
Fixed ramps were determined to be the best design to 
address this problem.  As the vehicles roll on through the 
stern gate, they will need adequate space to either access 
the fixed ramp to drive up to the main deck, or pass to the 
side of the ramp and travel through the lower cargo deck.  
At the forward end of the main cargo deck, a second fixed 
ramp would allow the vehicles on that deck to drive down to 
the lower cargo deck and then out through the bow.  Again, 
adequate space would be necessary for the vehicles on the 
lower deck to pass by the fixed ramp and continue forward 
to the bow.  Both ramps have an 18 degree slope. 
Limited by the main hull beam of xx meters, the design 
team desired to keep the lower cargo deck footprint within 
a 10 meter boundary.  This permitted the lower cargo deck 
to have a width of five meters and for the forward and aft 
ramps to also have a width of five meters.  In order to 
make it all fit within the confines of the main hull, it 
was decided to place the lower cargo deck to the left of 
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centerline.  The starboard bulkhead of the lower cargo deck 
would be on the ship’s centerline with the port edge of the 
forward and aft ramps also located on centerline. 
Through the ongoing collaboration with the hull and 
propulsion designers, space for the intake and exhaust 
ducts used by the gas turbine engines was to be allocated 
within the cargo area.  The necessary space was three 
meters wide and twelve meters long.  The engines were 
placed one deck below the lower cargo deck, and the intake 
and exhaust plenums would need to pass through both cargo 
decks along the ship’s centerline. 
There was adequate space in the main cargo deck, but 
the space intruded too much into the lower cargo deck, 
leaving only three and one half meters of width along the 
twelve meters of the intake and exhaust space.  By 
extending the lower cargo deck from centerline all the way 
to the structure of the port side of the main hull, the 






















Figure 13.   Main and Lower Cargo Deck Dimensions 
(meters) 
Approximately 12 meters ahead of the forward ramp, the 
lower cargo deck narrows to a width of five meters for the 
remainder of the distance to the bow ramp.  Figure 13 
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provides dimensions for each cargo deck and the forward and 
aft ramps. 
Although the heating and ventilation system has not 
been engineered in this iteration of the ship design 
process, the design team identified the need for sufficient 
ventilation to be installed on both cargo decks.  This is 
necessary to remove exhaust gasses while the vehicles are 
being on and offloaded, or whenever the vehicle engines may 
be started while inside the ship. 
4. Vehicle Models 
Three dimensional AUTOCAD models were obtained from 
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems of the vehicles which were to 
be carried by the ship.  In several instances, the design 
team was forced to use similar type vehicles to simulate a 
vehicle for which a model was not available.  For instance, 
a model of the M1A1 tank was used to simulate the M1A2.  
Figure 14 shows the three dimensional model of an MTVR 
which was used for the design. 
  
Figure 14.   Three Dimensional Model of an MTVR 
Three dimensional blocks were satisfactory for 
modeling the space which each vehicle would occupy, but the 
value of the actual vehicle model was excellent as a means 
to provide an accurate visual demonstration of how the 
vehicles will occupy space inside the cargo decks. 
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To ensure that the vehicles would fit within the cargo 
deck spaces, a one ship load-out was developed using the 
vehicle models.  The design team found that the cargo decks 
provided adequate space for all of the required vehicles, 
with room for additional vehicles or for the vehicles to be 
moved while fully loaded. 
The design vehicle load-out places the heaviest 
vehicles on the lower cargo deck.  This includes the M1A2 
tank and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), which 
will be stowed single file along the length of the deck.  
This assists with keeping the KG of the cargo as low as 
possible.  The average cargo weight per ship is 663 LT with 
a vertical center of gravity (KG) of 8.6 meters. 
  Also, since these vehicles are more difficult to 
maneuver, they will simply drive straight in and out of the 
ship with little or no need to maneuver.  Only the vehicles 
stored aft of the forward ramp will need to negotiate a 
slight turn to centerline.  With twelve meters of distance 
to move approximately three meters laterally, all of the 
vehicles will be able to negotiate this turn.  The EFVs can 
be loaded in reverse so that they may easily drive back out 
through the stern gate while the ship is underway or 
beached. 
While the main cargo deck is capable of holding any of 
the vehicles to be carried by the ship, it is designed to 
carry the lighter and more numerous vehicles.  The lightest 
vehicles will be stored on the extreme port and starboard 
sides of the deck to minimize stress on the structure 
supporting the side hulls.  There is also enough room on 
the main cargo deck to maintain a clear path from the aft 
ramp to the forward ramp with all of the vehicles onboard.  
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The obstacle caused by the gas turbine intake and exhaust 
is approximately 13 meters aft of the forward ramp, 
allowing room for all of the vehicles to maneuver around 
the obstruction and access the ramp. 
5. Stern Gate Design 
The key to achieving a rapid cargo on and offload rate 
was to design a simple and effective way for the cargo to 
be brought onboard and to then be removed at the beach.  
Since the ship will need to be able to load cargo at the 
Sea Base in addition to at a port, a roll on system was 
determined to be the quickest method. 
Interfacing with the Sea Base proves to be the most 
difficult aspect for cargo on-load because the ship must be 
able to move cargo onboard in conditions up through sea 
state four.  At such a sea state, craning operations can be 
slow and dangerous for both personnel and equipment.  The 
roll-on method allows for a safer operation at the higher 
sea state without suffering a large degradation in the on-
load rate. 
Another road block in the Sea Base interface is that 
the composition of the Sea Base is not yet fully 
understood.  Referring to existing documentation and 
exercises that have been used as test beds for the Sea 
Basing concept (REF [2]), the design team decided to 
interface the stern gate with a floating platform 
comparable to the floating causeway system used in the Navy 
Lighterage system.  This platform would be provided by the 
Sea Base and will not be an organic component of the ship.  
The vehicles would be moved from an asset within the Sea 
Base on to the floating platform.  The method in which the 
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vehicles are moved at the Sea Base to the floating platform 
was not considered in this design. 
 
Figure 15.   Stern Gate Operations at the Sea Base 
A stern gate was chosen as the best method to allow 
direct access to the cargo decks for the vehicle on-load.  
The gate is 10 meters wide and nine meters high to allow up 
to two vehicles to load simultaneously, with one vehicle 
entering the lower cargo deck and the other driving up the 
aft ramp to the main cargo deck.  Since the stern gate 
extends 4.5 meters above the lower cargo deck when in the 
vertical position, there will be a recession in the stern 
of the ship to allow for the gate to close completely and 
create a watertight seal around the opening into the lower 
cargo deck.  The gate will be able to open from the 
vertical closed position down through a 120 degree range of 
motion. It will be raised and lowered using a hydraulic 
piston system capable of holding the gate in the down 




Figure 16.   Stern Gate Operations at the Beach 
Similar stern gates have been used onboard other U.S. 
amphibious naval vessels, including the LPD-17 and LSD-36 
class ships.  Since this is a proven technology that is 
currently in use, no further design work was done in this 
iteration of the design process to allow the design team to 
focus more on other areas of the ship design. 
6. Bow Ramp 
Keeping with the mindset that a roll-off design would 
provide the most rapid means of off-loading the ship, the 
design team developed a bow ramp that would allow all of 
the vehicles to drive under their own power off the ship 
and onto the beach.  It was necessary to design a ramp 
which would be an organic component of the ship, provide 
adequate reach from the grounded ship to the beach, and be 
able to deploy and retrieve in a timely manner. 
Several options were considered for the bow ramp 
design, to include a fixed ramp from the weather deck and 
an inflatable ramp.  The design that was ultimately chosen 
is a floating ramp, comprised of eight five meters long 
sections, providing an effective ramp length of 35 meters. 
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Figure 17.   Bow Ramp Operation at the Beach 
The fixed ramp design would have required the ramp to 
be stored high on the ship so that it could be deployed 
from the weather deck over the bow.  This concept is 
similar to that of the ramp design on the LST-1179 Newport 
class ship.  Since the vehicles were to be stored lower 
inside the ship, the problem of getting the vehicles from 
the cargo decks to the weather decks was an issue.  In 
order to deploy and recover the ramp over the bow, an 
additional structure would be required on the bow.  This 
would result in more weight both forward and high on the 
ship, and detract from the ship’s optical and radar cross 
section. 
An inflatable ramp appeared to be an attractive option 
and received more analysis.  This concept would use high 
pressure air from the gas turbine engines to unroll and 
deploy the ramp.  The deck structure would be slatted to 
allow the ramp to be rolled when deflated and stored inside 
the ship.  The high pressure air would both inflate and 
unroll the ramp to the deployed position.  This design had 
the potential to be much lighter in weight compared to the 
fixed ramp and would allow for the vehicles to offload from 
the lower cargo deck. 
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The inflatable ramp concept was rejected because of 
the many technical issues that were inherent to the design.  
A means to rapidly retrieve the ramp was difficult to 
develop, and the survivability of the ramp was 
questionable.  Assuming the ramp would be constructed of a 
rubberized material capable of collapsing and rolling, it 
would be susceptible to puncture from underwater objects or 
hostile fire from the beach.  A complicated bladder system 
internal to the ramp would be necessary to ensure adequate 
pressure throughout the ramp in the event of a puncture. 
A floating ramp similar to the existing floating 
causeway used in the Naval Lighterage System was chosen to 
be the best alternative for the ship’s bow ramp design.  
This design allows the ramp to be stored inside the hull of 
the ship, can be rapidly deployed and retrieved, and allows 
the vehicles to offload from the lower cargo deck.  Table 4 
compares the specifications of the NL floating causeway to 
the bow ramp designed for the ship. 
Table 4.   Bow Ramp Specifications 
 NL Floating Causeway HSAC Bow Ramp 
Structure Steel Steel and Aluminum 
Length 27.4 m 35.0 m (effective) 
Beam 6.1 m 5.0 m 
Depth 1.7 m 1.7 m 
Displacement 62.5 LT 41.9 LT 
Capacity 80.4 LT 124.2 LT 
A capacity of 124.2 LT permits the bow ramp to hold up to 
two M1A2 tanks at one time.  Since a typical ship load-out 
will typically consist of two or less M1A2 tanks, this 
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constraint will not have a negative impact on the cargo 
off-load rate.  At full load, the bow ramp will have a 
draft of 0.94 meters, leaving 0.76 meters of freeboard. 
Bow ramp stability calculations were not conducted for 
this iteration of the ship design process.  When deployed, 
the ramp will be connected to the ship and will also make 
contact with the bottom near the beach.  Since these two 
supporting forces will be acting on the ramp in addition to 
the buoyancy force acting over the length of the ramp, 
stability in a variety of loading conditions should be 
acceptable.  As such, the design team left these 
calculations to be completed in a later iteration of the 
design. 
The ideal storage location for the ramp was found to 
be just below the lower cargo deck.  Since the ship will 
likely add ballast astern when beaching, the ramp will need 
to drop a short distance from its storage level to the 
waterline once deployed.  This presents a problem for 
recovering the ramp if it needs to be lifted out of the 
water while being retrieved. 
In order to allow the ramp to move in and out of the 
ship and negotiate the change in height, the ramp is split 
up into eight five meters long sections.  A flexible 
coupling system, similar to that found in the NL floating 
causeway, permits the ramp sections to bend as necessary to 
move in and out of the ship.  Future developments with the 
Improved Naval Lighterage System (INLS) will further 
enhance the coupling system, allowing sections to be 
remotely detached by a pneumatic actuating system.  
(REF[4]).   
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Figure 18.   Bow Ramp Track with Rollers (seven of eight 
sections shown) 
The ramp will be stored on a track just under the 
lower cargo deck.  The track will have a series of rollers 
and each section of the ramp will have a grooved track 
embedded within the structure.  One end of the ramp section 
groove flares open to a wider opening, allowing that 
section to make the height transition while being retrieved 
and deployed.  Figure 18 illustrates how the roller track 
inside the ship interfaces with the grooved track on each 
ramp section. 
The first ramp section, the end which will touch the 
beach, is sloped so that the vehicles can negotiate the 
transition from the ramp to the beach.  More importantly, 
it allows easier access for the vehicles to drive from the 
beach back on to the ramp when conducting loading 
operations at the beach. 
An electric motor will be dedicated to the task of 
deploying and retrieving the bow ramp.  It will drive the 
ramp out by pushing on a rigid connection with the last 
section of the ramp.  The last section, or section number 
eight, will not leave the ship when the ramp is fully 
deployed.  This section will have a mechanical stop to 
prevent it from leaving the ramp track, and will provide 
the rigid connection for the ramp to the ship and act as 
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part of the transition from the lower cargo deck to the 
floating ramp.  For retrieval, the rigid connection to the 
eighth section will pull the ramp back into the track.  The 
motor and connection system is estimated to deploy and 
retrieve the ramp at a rate of 0.22 meters per second, 
resulting in a deployment and retrieval time under three 
minutes. 
 
Figure 19.   Operations at the Beach 
7. Bow Doors 
The floating bow ramp design required a method to 
allow quick, reliable, and efficient ramp deployment and 
recovery, while at the same time providing a clear vehicle 
path from the lower cargo deck to the ramp.  Deployment and 
recovery rates of the vehicles and ramp would be maximized 
if both could utilize the same path.  This would reduce the 
total number of interfaces involved, reduce the number of 
points of failure, and provide a straight path from the 
ship to the beach.  Therefore, it was determined that bow 
doors needed to be designed. 
Though no current displacement craft in the U.S. Navy 
inventory has bow doors, pre-Newport class LSTs and current 
operational commercial ferries have implemented bow doors, 
proving their feasibility and functionality.  The Newport 
class LST moved away from bow doors to allow for a fine 
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bow, in order to achieve its design requirement of 20+ 
knots.  The trimaran hull form also has a fine bow, making 
the design of bow doors a challenge.  However, today’s 
structural and material technology makes large bow door 
development possible. 
Placing doors in the bow, where the ship experiences 
extreme forces due to ship speed and the overall sea state, 
causes concern for water intrusion into the ship.  Current 
commercial ferries have addressed this problem in their 
design by developing watertight doors that are located 
directly aft of the bow doors.  This technology will 
maintain the watertight integrity of the HSAC while 
transiting at high speeds and in high sea states. 
Having decided that bow doors were feasible, the next 
step was to determine what type of bow opening to 
implement.  Regardless of the implementation chosen, the 
bow opening would need to be large enough for both the 
vehicles and ramp to pass through.  The first approach 
considered was a single piece door that was hinged on one 
side of the hull and latched on the other side.  The 
concept was that the door would swing open to one side as 
one unit.  However, even if the door itself was 
manufactured from composites, it would place an extreme 
load on the door hinge.  Handling this intense load would 
require a massive amount of structure, adding weight to the 
bow and reducing the available space for the door opening.  
In addition, the single door must travel through a large 
range of motion before the ramp and vehicles can exit the 
ship.  This large range of motion increases the amount of 
time between the ship beaching and the first vehicle 
hitting the beach, which is undesirable in a hostile 
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environment.  These three issues were unacceptable to the 
design and therefore the single swing out door was 
rejected. 
The design team then considered the possibility of 
having two bow doors that would swing outward from the 
ship.  This solution greatly reduced the amount of stress 
and weight the hinges would have to encounter.  It also 
reduced the range of motion required for the doors since 
they would open outward from the centerline.  However, the 
bow of the trimaran hull had extreme curves making hinge 
design extremely difficult.  Though an elaborate hinge 
could be developed to facilitate dual bow doors, its 
complexity could make it prone to failure.  Due to the 
technical risk of hinge development, the dual outward 
swinging bow doors were eliminated as a design alternative. 
Next the design team looked at developing a bow that 
would flip open similar to how the nose of a C-5 Galaxy 
transport aircraft opens, as Figure 20 illustrates.  This 
design was attractive in that the only hinge required would 
be along the flat weather deck.  The portion of the bow 
that would open could be made of composites or aluminum 
reducing the amount of weight that needed to be lifted.  
Hydraulic rams would then be used to lift the bow up, 
allowing the ramp and vehicles to exit the ship.  Since the 
hinge would be a simple design and hydraulic rams are a 
proven technology, this solution would be highly reliable.  
In addition, this solution reduced the number of door seals 
required.  With the bow swinging up there would be only one 
seal required horizontally along the lower edge of the door 
and two (one on each side) seals going vertically up the 
hull where the bow section met the hull.  This design was 
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deemed more feasible and more functional than the previous 
two design alternatives and therefore considered a possible 
alternative. 
 
Figure 20.   C-5 Style Bow Door 
Though extremely functional from a cargo access and 
ramp deployment perspective, the C-5 style bow door option 
did not work well with the amphibious support requirements.  
With a desire to have main gun mounted on the bow, having 
the bow door flip up severely limited the firing arcs of 
the main gun when the door was open.  The purpose of the 
main gun was to provide suppressive and cover fire for the 
troops and vehicles as they left the ship and hit the 
beach.  Since this style door opening prevents the main gun 
from performing as required, another bow door alternative 
needed to be developed. 
The design team then reexamined the dual outward 
swinging bow door design.  Instead of having the doors 
hinged and swinging outward, the doors were mounted on 
hydraulic actuators and pushed directly outward.  The 
hydraulic actuators solved the hinge problem by eliminating 
the hinges completely.  Thus, the doors could be sized just 
large enough to facilitate a 5m wide and 6.2m high opening 
for vehicle passage and ramp deployment.  By using 
hydraulic actuators, the range of motion for the doors was 
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reduced as the rear part of the door had to move outward 
less than the forward portion of the door.  The doors would 
be constructed of composite materials for reduced weight 
and higher strength.  Figure 21 depicts how the 
hydraulically actuated bow doors would function. 
 
Figure 21.   Hydraulically Actuated Bow Doors  
The hydraulically actuated bow doors proved the most 
functional and feasible design solution for the HSAC 
design.  In addition to implementing this bow door setup, 
the design team placed an armored watertight door aft of 
the bow doors.  The addition of the watertight door not 
only added watertight integrity to the ship, but the armor 
plating provided crew and cargo protection during bow door 
opening and ramp deployment. 
8. Flight Deck and Flight Elevator Design 
The HSAC needed to be able to facilitate the launch 
and recovery of the various rotary winged aircraft of the 
2025 JEB.  Of particular interest were the CH-53X, MV-22, 
and SH-60R due to their logistics role with the Sea Base.  
Having an overall length of 30.3m and a maximum width of 
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25m (with rotors spinning), the CH-53X presents the largest 
deck area requirement.  The flight deck was then designed 
to be 30.2m long and 27.89m wide, allowing the CH-53X to 
land with minimal amount of fuselage overhanging the hull.  
Forward of the flight deck a single hangar was installed, 
capable of storing one SH-60R.  The hangar was deemed 
necessary to increase mission flexibility and provide for 
secondary mission support.  Since embarking one SH-60R met 
the primary mission requirements and due to limited 
available space, one hangar bay was sufficient. 
To allow for vertical delivery and transfer of cargo 
and vehicles, a flight deck elevator was designed to 
facilitate cargo movement between the flight deck and main 
cargo deck.  The elevator is 5m wide, 14m long, and placed 
directly above the aft cargo ramp as Figure 22 illustrates.  
 
Figure 22.   Flight Deck Elevator and Helicopter Hangar 
This location was chosen to facilitate the 
implementation of the elevator without occupying any 
additional cargo area.  The elevator is large enough to 
handle any vehicle from a BLT.  It can also raise and lower 
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a folded SH-60R allowing the main cargo deck to be used as 
a large hangar for additional SH-60R helicopters when the 
BLT is not embarked. 
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B. HULL DESIGN 
1. Design Process 
In order to design the best ship, from a system of 
systems perspective, requires the right balance among a 
large number of different systems. Each system is able to 
perform efficiently in accordance with a given set of 
requirements in the systems. 
A major problem during the ship’s design process was 
the multiple conflicting interests that changed the ship’s 
design in numerous ways. When each sub-team, would change a 
specific part of the ship’s system of systems, those 
changes would influence the entire ship’s system. This made 
a dramatic change in the performance of that system as a 
whole. When designing a conventional ship, such as mono-
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hull merchant ship intended for container transportation, 
there is a lot of available information and theoretical 
studies. But by changing one aspect of the ships system the 
entire ship responds differently. 
When designing a ship, intended for new concepts of 
system, without previous experience or background, it opens 
an environment with plenty of uncertainty in the ship as a 
system.  This increases the difficulty in starting the 
proper design during the early stages of the process 
causing new problems, new conflicts and new constraints 
will emerge causing delays in the design process which 
needs to be reviewed and analyzed for further changes. Many 
studies where performed in this design in order to narrow 
the number of alternatives and focus the final product for 
a well balanced system of systems. 
After the Analysis of Alternatives a trimaran hull was 
selected as the best platform. There is a growing interest 
in trimaran hulls for multiple purposes, a great number of 
preliminary designs and studies can be found in the 
literature, but very few of them are already in operation. 
Because of this, any preliminary calculations, such as hull 
and structure weight can’t be done based on previous 
designs and the risk of resulting in an unfeasible ship is 
higher than normal. 
Realizing that refinements would be necessary should 
towing tank data be made available and the weight and 
position of all equipment is known precisely, a preliminary 
hull design was done in order to produce working estimates 
and show possible conflicting areas. 
The goals of this preliminary design were: 
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• Produce a feasible design that can be 
reasonably built with short or mid term 
technology. 
• Analyze the space available for cargo. 
• Analyze the different ways that cargo can be 
transferred to shore. 
• Conduct a preliminary structure analysis to 
determine the expected hull weight and 
possible interferences with cargo movement 
on board. 
• Determine if enough space is available for 
engines and other machinery. 
• Study different types of propulsors. 
The ship also must be able to operate in shallow 
waters, getting as close as possible to the beach in order 
to unload the cargo and at the same time possess enough 
speed, range, seakeeping and maneuverability qualities to 
operate in open waters. 
A recently trimaran built by Austal Shipyards, the 
“Benchijigua Express” owned by Fred Olsen Lines and 
intended for cargo and passenger traffic, represents one of 
the most advanced trimaran already built. Based on her main 
particulars a trimaran hull was drawn. This served as the 
“parent” hull for our dsign. 
2. Type 
During the past several years the subject of high 
speed sea transportation, for both civil and military 
purposes, has experienced important developments. Aviation 
based gas turbines, fast diesel engines, water jets and 
other emerging technologies applied to ship design can lead 
to speeds at sea without precedents. 
In order to take advantage of these power plants, 
naval architects are exploring new hull configurations 
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other than traditional monohulls. Although a great variety 
of hull configurations can be used for fast speed 
transportation, some of them are still conceptual designs 
and others have been successfully used. 
In order to determine the optimal hull configuration, 









The analysis was done using the Maritime Applied 
Physics Corporation’s spreadsheet collection (MPAC).  This 
tool uses primary basis vessels for each type of hull to 
provide the block coefficients and ratios L/B and B/T. 
The inputs were desired speed, range, payload, sea 
state, and maximum displacement.  Speed loss due to sea 
state was considered for the alternatives. A detailed study 
of the different alternatives and MPAC’s result can be find 
in Chapter III. 
The goal of this Analysis of Alternatives was to 
identify the optimal hull configuration and narrow the 
number of hull alternatives to a manageable level for the 
available time to conduct the present study. 
Hull types such as SWATH and Hydrofoils were initially 
rejected because of excessive draft for a ship that is 
intended for shallow waters. Planning hulls were also 
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rejected due to excessive vertical accelerations when 
planning, which were considered too high for heavy weight 
transportation and also due to highly demanding structural 
reinforcements. 
Candidate hull types, which can be built using short 
and mid term technology and with a relatively low 
technological risk, were monohulls, catamarans, trimarans 
and Surface Effect Ships (SES). Each one of them presents 
clear advantages and disadvantages. The following sections 
present some of the advantages and disadvantages of these 
candidate hull types: 
a. Monohull 
A monohull is the traditional type of hull and 
there is large experience designing, building and operating 
them. This type of vessel, due to the amount of available 
information and experience, is the less risky option. It 
requires less development effort and, therefore, is one of 
the cheapest alternatives. Research and development 
expenses, that will increase the overall cost of the 
project, are estimated as low for this kind of hulls. 
Having large hull volume, monohulls offer great 
flexibility when designing cargo spaces, engine rooms and 
accommodation. Due to their large water plane area, and 
consequently their relative tolerance to loading changes, 
they can be operated with a variable deadweight. Therefore, 
they provide the biggest growth margin for future 
requirements. Monohulls also provide satisfactory 
seakeeping, when sailing in open waters, and adequate 
maneuverability when getting close to shore. Most 
amphibious ships are monohulls and their operation is 
satisfactory for most of the world navies. 
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Figure 23.   Newport Class LST (www.fas.org) 
At ordinary cruise speeds a monohull becomes a 
very attractive option and is worldwide accepted as an 
excellent cargo platform. However, when the speed 
increases, the power plant becomes excessively large and so 
does fuel consumption. 
Another important handicap arises when placing 
heavy load in upper decks, namely the lack of adequate 
stability. The HSSC is intended for different scenarios and 
will have a large number of different cargo configurations. 
Flexibility is a very important goal to achieve in this 
application. Stability is also a major concern when 
considering helicopter operations. Several of these aspects 
can be improved using a multihull platform. 
b. Trimaran 
Although few trimarans have been built recently, 
there are enough conceptual studies that have been centered 
on a trimaran hull configuration.  
 
Figure 24.   Triton Research Vessel 
(www.globalsecurity.org) 
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Some of the relevant characteristics can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Hull Resistance: A slender center hull with large 
L/B ratio offers reduced hull resistance compared 
to an equivalent monohull, especially at high 
speeds. Although the outrigger hulls increase the 
overall ship resistance, this is compensated by 
the savings in center hull resistance. Therefore, 
a smaller power plant is required and the 
resulting fuel savings can be important. Less 
fuel means that more cargo can be transported at 
faster speeds than a similar and comparable 
monohull. 
• Seakeeping and Stability:  A trimaran’s outrigger 
hulls provide improved transverse stability which 
means that heavy weights can be transported in 
the upper decks with minimal stability 
degradation. Trimarans are able to operate in 
higher sea states compared to other hulls 
configurations, especially when compared to 
catamarans, which can exhibit a “corkscrew” 
motion. The HSSC is intended to transport troop 
ready-to-fight and their comfort is an important 
concern. Secondary missions for HSSC such as 
medical and humanitarian evacuation also require 
superior seakeeping. 
• Deck Area: Trimarans have about 40% more deck area 
for a given tonnage than monohulls and this 
fraction can be increased with increasing side 
hull separation, although the latter may result 
in resistance and seakeeping compromise. This 
extra deck area offers great flexibility for 
accommodation purposes. Furthermore, it offers 
more space for helicopter operations and cargo 
arrangement. Side hulls separation is not a free 
variable and has some negative effects, requiring 
more structural weight and may result in 
increased resistance due to wave interference. 
The 2003 TSSE project offers a very detailed 
study of both resistance and seakeeping 
characteristics of trimaran hulls similar in size 
to the one considered in this work. Most of the 
results obtained from the 2003 study have been 
incorporated in this study as well. 
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c. Catamaran 
Catamarans are a popular option for passenger 
transportation and many of them have been built and are in 
operation during the past several years. Since a catamaran 
is a multihull, it exhibits many of the same advantages as 
trimarans, namely large deck area and  improved stability. 
On the other hand, they have reduced waterline area, 
limiting the range of cargo conditions that can be used, 
and a “corkscrew” motion in certain sea states and sea 
directions that can cause seasickness for unaccustomed crew 
and passengers. 
 
Figure 25.   Buque Bus (www.shiptechnolgy.com) 
Crew comfort and embarked personnel combat 
readiness is an important issue for the Sea Connector, and 
the associated inability of catamarans to operate at high 
sea states significantly handicaps this hull type’s 
applicability in this problem. Finally, when we conducted a 
preliminary study of existing catamarans, we saw that their 
cargo capacity is far away of what HSSC is expected to 
transport. Although cargo capacity will increase in the 
future, there is an associated technical risk that should 
be taken into consideration. 
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d. SES 
Surface Effect Ships were initially conceived for 
naval ship applications early in the 70’s. A SES greatly 
minimizes the wetted surface by forcing air down between 
the two hulls and resulting in a low resistance. A SES also 
offers very low draft, which is an important advantage when 
trying to reach degraded beaches. In this aspect such ships 
would exhibit the largest usability. 
Power requirements in order to move the lifting 
fans reduce dramatically their endurance and there are also 
limited operational capabilities up to sea state 3. These 
two issues became very negative aspects when the ship is 
intended to be operated form a distant base (sea base) 
located in open waters. 
3. Selection 
After the Analysis of Alternatives and the application 
of the MOP criteria, the trimaran hull configuration 
emerged as the preferred one. This result is in agreement 
with the preliminary analysis of the different types of 
hull discussed previously. 
Trimarans are traditionally classified as multi-hulls 
in clear opposition to monohulls. However, in many aspects, 
their performance is closer to monohulls rather than 
catamarans and, some authors prefer the term Stabilized 
Slender Monohull. 
As discussed above, their advantages and disadvantages 
can be summarized as follows: 
Advantages: 
• Reduced hull resistance at high speed. 
• Improved stability. 
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• Large cargo spaces in upper decks. 
Disadvantages: 
• Reduced space in lower decks, especially for 
tanks and engines. 
• Structural risk when grounding. 
• Rapid stability degradation when a side hull 
is damaged. 
• Reduced forward ramp width. 
 
4. Dimensions 
In order to get a feasible hull form with a relatively 
low risk, we based the parent ship on the recently launched 
“Benchijigua Express” as mentioned earlier. She is the 
largest trimaran currently in existence and represents the 
current state-of-the-art for such ships. Built by Austal 
Yards, it is intended for car and passenger transportation 
in the Canary Islands (Spain) and represents an excellent 
starting point to estimate near or mid term technology. 
The 126.7 meter cargo-vehicle-passenger ferry 
“Benchijigua Express” is larger than any existing diesel-
powered fast ferry – catamaran or monohull – and is the 
world’s largest aluminum ship. Ordered in June 2003, the 
ferry will sail at loaded speeds in excess of 40 knots, 
providing capacity for 1350 passengers, over 350 cars or 




Figure 26.   Benchijigua Express 
In order to determine the main dimensions and ratios 
of our ship, other existing or conceptual trimarans, in 
addition to the one mentioned above, were studied. Our 
conclusions are summarized below: 
5. Length/Beam Ratio (L/B) 
Length/Beam ratios range between 8 and 18. Large L/B 
ratios have the clear advantage of reducing the wave 
component of the resistance requiring a smaller power plant 
to be moved, especially at high speed. But these ships 
require a careful study of the structural strength, and 
this concern becames more important when the ship is 
intended for heavy weights transportation and off-loading 
onto a beach.  
In order to minimize such risk we selected the 
following range: 
/ 11 14L B ≈ −  
6. Froude Number (Fn) 
The terms high and low speed must be used in 
conjunction with the length of the ship. A 35kts carrier 
can be a slow ship and a 15kts boat a fast ship depending 






This is the relation between speed and length used to 
link both dimensions. When Fn<0.4 the ship is said to be in 
a displacement mode. Once Fn increases above 0.4 the ship 
reaches a semi-displacement mode and, for higher values, is 
said to be a planning hull. Although planning hulls require 
less power when the sail above Fn=0.4, extra power is 
necessary to initiate this regime. 
We concluded that a planning hull was not desired for 
the purposes of this design because of the increase of 
vertical accelerations that will lead to higher structural 
requirements and rugged slashes. This will present 
difficulties during loading and off-loading and will 
increase the risk for cargo integrity. Therefore, speed and 
length were selected in order to keep the ship in a 
displacement regime. 
0.4 0.5Fn −   
7. Cargo Ratio 
As previously mentioned, the relative lack of adequate  
information for existing trimaran ships was a major 
concern. This resulted in some difficulty to estimate the 
weights and the amount of cargo that the ship would be able 
to transport. 
From an analysis of existing ships, we concluded that 
about 35% of the total displacement could be used for cargo 
and consumables transport. In this way a 4900Ton vessel can 
carry 1700Ton of cargo and fuel, fresh water and other 
consumables. 
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Naturally these numbers would need to be verified and 
will depend on other factors such as double bottom height, 
placement of tanks under the deck, and cargo dimensions. 
Some light items will require more room than others. 
8. Center Hull Form 
Having determined a feasible range of main dimensions, 
ratios and proportion we analyzed different options to 
generate a hull form that matched the requirements for the 
ship. 
The first step was to determine the midship section 
coefficient. Three alternatives were considered as 
discussed below: 
 
Figure 27.   Center Hull Form Alternatives 
a. Alternative A 
This results in a deep hull with very low beam 
and squared bilges. This alternative provides the largest 
L/B ratio but also the largest draft (T). This 
configuration offers a very low wave-making resistance, due 
to large L/B ratio, but it is highly penalized because of 
the large draft. This was considered a negative aspect that 
would limit the ability of the ship to reach the beach. 
A short beam reduces the available space under 
the deck to mount engines and will also present 
difficulties with regards to proper arrangement of ramps 
that allow cargo movement to upper decks and to shore. 
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b. Alternative C 
This results in large values of beam and a 
minimum draft. It has a clear advantage when trying to 
reach the beach but by reducing the L/B ratio we lose the 
advantage of low resistance at high speeds. It is a more 
flexible option due to the large beam, which facilitates 
engine room arrangement and cargo movement, but it is 
highly penalized due to the increase in hull resistance. 
C. Alternative B 
This alternative is the one with intermediate 
values of beam and draft and it also offers the least 
wetted surface from all three. Although by increasing the 
L/B ratio there will be an important reduction of wave-
making resistance, the reduced wetted surface will result 
in less viscous resistance. 
For the above reasons, alternative B was 
preferred and was the selected one. It is also the 
candidate midship section for the car ferry developed by 
Nigel Gee and Associates for Norasia. A typical midship 




Figure 28.   Typical Midship Section of Alternative B 
9. Draft 
Low draft is required to be able to reach the beach 
easily.  By selecting a medium draft hull form we are 
penalizing the ability to carry out the ship’s mission. 
In order to reduce this problem we used a parabolic 
keel profile, reducing the draft forward. In addition, 
water ballast tanks are located forward, under the double 
bottom deck and, when empty, the ship will trim aft. 
 
Figure 29.   Parabolic Keel Profile 
10. Side Hull Form 
Side hull separation was selected in order to minimize 
the overall hull resistance, looking for positive 




hulls. The TSSE 2003 Sea Swath project deeply analyzed this 
configuration and their results were used in this study. 
Based on their conclusions, the following length and 
dimensions were selected: 
• Length Side Hull = 40% Length Center Hull 
• Volume Side Hull = 5% Volume Center Hull 
When the center hull is sailing at a Froude Number 
less than 0.4, in a displacement regime, the side hulls, 
due to its shortest length, are operating closer to a 
planning regime. Because of this peculiarity, the side hull 
form corresponds to a typical planning hull with a deep V 
shape. 
The hull was modeled as NURBS surface using the 
Autoship software.  The following table and figure show the 
ship’s main particulars and rendered shape. 
 
 
Table 5.   Ship Main Particulars 
 Main Particulars   
Displacement ∆ 4923 Ton 
Volume ∇ 4803 m3 
Draft to 
Baseline 
T 4.500 m 
Overall Length LOA 149.000 m 
Waterline 
Length 
LWL 145.761 m 
Molded Beam B 30.000 m 
Waterline Beam BWL 13.158 m 
Wetted Surface WSA 2194.761 m2 
Max cross sect 
area 
 47.45 m2 
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Waterplane area WPA 1711.236 m2 
 Cp 0.731  
 Cb 0.586  
 Cm 0.801  
 Cwp 0.892  
 LCB from zero pt 70.225 m 
 LCF from zero pt 66.905 m 
 KB 2.763 m 
 BMt 4.383 m 
 BMl 503.215 m 
 GMt 7.146 m 
 GMl 505.978 m 
 KMt 7.146 m 
 KMl 505.978 m 
 Immersion (TPc) 17.54 tonne/cm









Figure 30.   Rendered Hull Form 
11. Resistance 
Hull resistance was estimated extrapolating the 
information available from the 2003 TSSE Capstone Project 
“Sea Swath”, a ship with similar dimensions and ratios, 





Loa 124.30 1.200 149.16 m. ν 1E-06
Lwl 121.80 1.200 146.16 m. ρad 1.000
Lpp 121.80 1.200 146.16 m. ρas 1.025
B 15.270 1.200 18.32 m. λ 1.200
Bwl 9.620 1.200 11.54 m. Form Factor k 0.1
T 0.145 1.200 0.17 m. Additive Correction ∆Cf
Tfp 0.135 1.200 0.16 m. CAA 0.000
Tap 0.154 1.200 0.18 m. CA 0.000
D 4.382 1.200 5.26 m.
∇ 2780 1.728 4803.8 m3.
∆ 2850 1.728 4923.9 Ton.
Cp 0.671 1 0.671
Cb 0.542 1 0.542
Cm 0.807 1 0.807
Lcb 3.456 1.200 4.147 m.
Lcb 2.837 1 2.837 %
S 1457 1.440 2098.1 m2.
Lwl 48.72 1.200 58.46 m.
S 182.125 1.440 150.0 m2.
Towing Tank Test
Vs Vm Fn RNcm RNsm Rtm Ctm CFcm CFsm CVcm CVsm Caa Crm
Kt m/s x10^-6 x10^-6 N x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^4 x10^3 x10^3
10 5.144 0.149 545.8 218.3 71961 3.732 1.652 1.818 0.000 0.000 1.915
15 7.717 0.223 818.7 327.5 178400 4.112 1.569 1.726 0.000 0.000 2.386
20 10.289 0.298 1091.6 436.6 419625 5.441 1.514 1.666 0.000 0.000 3.776
25 12.861 0.372 1364.5 545.8 529373 4.393 1.473 1.621 0.000 0.000 2.773
30 15.433 0.446 1637.4 654.9 712729 4.107 1.441 1.585 0.000 0.000 2.522
35 18.006 0.521 1910.2 764.1 935636 3.962 1.415 1.556 0.000 0.000 2.405
40 20.578 0.595 2183.1 873.3 1192624 3.866 1.392 1.532 0.000 0.000 2.334
45 23.150 0.670 2456.0 982.4 1458076 3.735 1.373 1.511 0.000 0.000 2.224
50 25.722 0.744 2728.9 1091.6 1719120 3.567 1.356 1.492 0.000 0.000 2.075
55 28.294 0.819 3001.8 1200.7 1975317 3.387 1.341 1.476 0.000 0.000 1.911
Vs Vs Fn RNcs RNcs Ctm CFcs CFss CVcs CVss ∆Cf Ca Caa Crm Rtcb Rtsb RT
Kt m/s x10^-9 x10^-9 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 x10^3 kN kN kN
11.0 5.635 0.149 0.717 0.287 3.670 1.596 1.755 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.915 125.3 0.0 125.3
16.4 8.453 0.223 1.076 0.430 4.055 1.517 1.668 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.386 311.5 0.0 311.5
21.9 11.271 0.298 1.435 0.574 5.386 1.464 1.611 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.776 735.8 0.0 735.8
27.4 14.089 0.372 1.794 0.717 4.341 1.425 1.568 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.773 926.4 0.0 926.4
32.9 16.906 0.446 2.152 0.861 4.057 1.395 1.534 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.522 1246.7 0.0 1246.7
38.3 19.724 0.521 2.511 1.004 3.912 1.370 1.507 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.405 1636.5 0.0 1636.5
43.8 22.542 0.595 2.870 1.148 3.818 1.348 1.483 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.334 2085.9 0.0 2085.9
49.3 25.360 0.670 3.229 1.291 3.687 1.330 1.463 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.224 2549.8 0.0 2549.8
54.8 28.177 0.744 3.587 1.435 3.520 1.314 1.445 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.075 3005.2 0.0 3005.2
60.2 30.995 0.819 3.946 1.578 3.341 1.300 1.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.911 3451.4 0.0 3451.4
 
Figure 31.   Hull Resistance Calculations 
The computed resistance curve for the ship shows a 
hump, at higher speed than the base ship. Because of this 
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hump, the HSSC will avoid speeds between 22 and 24kts 
during transit. 
Figure 32.   Resistance Curve 
12. Deck Layout 
The depth of the ship is 14.000m. Three decks were 
installed with the following criteria: 
Double Bottom is with a depth of 2.000m. Volume under 
this deck was calculated in order to estimate the tanks 
capacity and to ensure that this capacity is enough to 
provide the required endurance. 
Lower Cargo Deck with a depth of 5.000m. In order to 
accommodate the gas turbine containers, double bottom at 






































between decks is enough to allow placement of the electric 
propulsion motors. 
Upper Deck is with a depth of 9.500m. This is selected 
to give enough clearance to the highest vehicle intended to 
be transported. 
Figure 33.   Deck Layout 
13. Tankage 
Most of the tanks were located below the double bottom 
decks, taking advantage of the rounded bottom selected to 
reduce resistance. 
In addition, provisions were made to mount daily 
service tanks high in the engine rooms. 
Forward double bottom tanks were dedicated for ballast 
in order to increase the aft trim when reaching the beach. 
Fresh water tanks, with a full load capacity of 
227tons were located between water ballast and fuel tanks, 
separated by a cofferdam to avoid contaminations. 
Combustible tanks, with a total capacity of 820tons, 
located aft of the fresh water tanks provides enough 
endurance for 2000nm at 20kts. Aft tanks are dedicated to 






a. First Estimate 
A preliminary structural design was done to 
estimate the hull weight and to study the available space 
for cargo decks. Section Modulus and Moment of Inertia 
Calculations were performed based on the American Bureau of 
Shipping GUIDE FOR BUILDING AND CLASSING HIGH-SPEED NAVAL 
CRAFT. 
The following items were included in the 
calculation of the section modulus and moment of inertia 
provided they are continuous or effectively developed 
within a span 0.4L from midships, have adequate buckling 
strength, and are gradually tapered beyond the midship 
0.4L. 
• Deck plating (strength deck and other effective 
decks) 
• Shell and inner bottom plating 
• Deck and bottom girders 
• Plating and longitudinal stiffeners of longitudinal 
bulkheads 
• All longitudinals of deck, sides, bottom, and inner 
bottom 
 
Figure 34.   Depiction of First Estimation 
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Midsh
 Element Number Thickness Height Long. Area Area Total Area C.G. Moment 2nd Moment
ITEM Type n t h or r A A AT dn A*dn A*dn2
(cm) (cm) (cm2) (cm2) (cm2) (m) (cm2m) (cm2m2)
Strength Deck Plating Rectangular 1 1.40 545 763.00 763.00 9.00 6867.00 61803.00
Strength Deck Stringer Plate Rectangular 1 1.60 130 208.00 208.00 9.00 1872.00 16848.00
Strength Deck Longitudinals W 160x14; F40x14 10 0.00000084 0.00000084 0.0000084 8.90 0.000075 0.000665
Sheer Strake Rectangular 1 1.60 80 128.00 128.00 10.50 1344.00 14112.00
Side Plating Rectangular 1 1.40 630 882.00 882.00 6.95 6129.90 42602.81
2nd Deck Plating Rectangular 1 1.40 675 945.00 945.00 5.00 4725.00 23625.00
Bilge (Curved Portion) Circle 1 1.40 190 417.83 417.83 1.09 457.28 500.44
Inner Bottom Plating Rectangular 1 1.40 545 763.00 763.00 2.00 1526.00 3052.00
Inner Bottom Margin Plate Rectangular 1 1.60 130 208.00 208.00 2.00 416.00 832.00
Inner Bottom Longitudinals W 200x10;F66x15 10 0.0000015 0.0000015 0.000015 1.72 0.000026 0.000044
Side Girders Rectangular 2 1.20 200 240.00 480.00 1.00 480.00 480.00
Center Girder (1/2) Rectangular 1 0.60 200 120.00 120.00 1.00 120.00 120.00
Bottom Plating Rectangular 1 1.40 485 679.00 679.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom Longitudinals W 200x10;F66x15 10 0.0000015 0.0000015 0.000015 0.28 0.000004 0.000001
Upper Hatch Side Girder 1
Lower Hatch Side Girder 1
5593.83 23937.18 163975.25
A= 11187.66




(Section Modulus) Ztop= 27396.86
cbottom= 4.28
(Section Modulus) Zbottom= 30224.01
Maximum Stress Calculation (at 64.0 m forward) For hogging Mmax= 10042
For Hogging Situation (Max) Tensile Stress in the deck= 35.95
(Max) Compressive Stress in the bottom plating= 32.58
FOR STEEL
Weight Estimations For Specific Weight = 77000
Middle Section (Cross Section Area) A= 1.12
Approximate Weight of Hull Per Length = 8.7843
Length of Our Ship = 147.00
Approximate Weight = 1291.2989
FOR ALUMINUM ALLOY
Specific Weight = 27000
Approximate Weight of Hull Per Length = 3.0802
Approximate Weight = 452.7931 
Figure 35.   First Estimate Calculations 
b. Detailed Calculations 
After the preliminary estimates for structural 
design shown above, a more detail spreadsheet calculation 
was performed to determine the hull weight and to study the 
available space for cargo decks. In order to get such 
detailed structural design data, longitudinal stiffeners 
were detailed and selected with sufficient cross section 
areas and inertias.  Dimensions were selected according to 
the distances between decks. Both steel and aluminum were 
evaluated for structural weight, and steel was selected for 




Midship Section and Longitudinal Structure Weight Calculation
 Element Number Thickness Width Long. Area Area Total Area C.G. Moment 2nd Moment Local 2nd Moment
ITEM Type n t h or r A A AT dn A*dn A*dn2 Io
(cm) (cm) (cm2) (cm2) (cm2) (m) (cm2m) (cm2m2) (cm2m2)
Main Deck Plating Rectangular 1 1.00 1075 1075.00 1075.00 9.00 9675.00 87075.00 0.009
2nd Deck Plating Rectangular 1 1.00 675 675.00 675.00 5.00 3375.00 16875.00 0.006
Inner Bottom Plating Rectangular 1 1.20 675 810.00 810.00 2.00 1620.00 3240.00 0.010
Bottom Plating Rectangular 1 1.70 475 807.50 807.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
Main Side Shell Plate Rectangular 1 1.10 566 622.60 622.60 7.00 4358.20 30507.40 830.133
Lower Side Shell Plate Rectangular 1 1.30 300 390.00 390.00 3.50 1365.00 4777.50 292.500
Bilge Shell Plate Circle 1 1.40 190 417.83 417.83 1.09 457.28 500.44 105.284
Side Girders Rectangular 2 1.20 200 240.00 480.00 1.00 480.00 480.00 160.000
Center Girder (1/2) Rectangular 1 0.60 200 120.00 120.00 1.00 120.00 120.00 40.000
Main Deck Tripping Brackets ST 8 WF (29 lb/ft) 3 54.97 164.90 8.84 1457.74 12886.44 0.166
2nd Tripping Brackets ST 8 WF (29 lb/ft) 3 54.97 164.90 4.84 798.13 3862.95 0.166
Main Side Tripping Bracket ST 8 WF (29 lb/ft) 1 54.97 54.97 7.40 406.76 3010.03 0.055
Main Side Tripping Bracket ST 8 WF (29 lb/ft) 1 54.97 54.97 6.20 340.80 2112.96 0.055
Lower Side Tripping Bracket ST 8 WF (29 lb/ft) 1 54.97 54.97 4.00 219.87 879.48 0.135
Lower Side Tripping Bracket ST 8 WF (29 lb/ft) 1 54.97 54.97 3.00 164.90 494.71 0.135
Main Deck Longitudinals L 5x3x(3/8) (in) (9.8 lb/ft) 10 18.45 184.52 8.91 1644.04 14648.36 0.128
2nd Deck Longitudinals L 5x3x(3/8) (in) (9.8 lb/ft) 6 18.45 110.71 4.91 543.58 2668.99 0.077
Inner Bottom Longitudinals L 5x3x(3/8) (in) (9.8 lb/ft) 8 18.45 147.61 1.91 281.94 538.51 0.103
Bottom Longitudinals L 5x3x(3/8) (in) (9.8 lb/ft) 5 18.45 92.26 0.08 7.66 0.64 0.064
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 8.60 137.60 1183.36 0.006
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 8.20 131.20 1075.84 0.006
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 7.80 124.80 973.44 0.006
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 7.00 112.00 784.00 0.006
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 6.60 105.60 696.96 0.006
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 5.80 92.80 538.24 0.006
Main Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 5.40 86.40 466.56 0.006
Lower Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 4.52 72.32 326.89 0.004
Lower Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 3.52 56.32 198.25 0.004
Lower Side Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 2.52 40.32 101.61 0.004
Bilge Shell Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 1.67 26.72 44.62 0.004
Bilge Shell Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 1.34 21.44 28.73 0.004
Bilge Shell Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 1.01 16.16 16.32 0.004
Bilge Shell Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 0.68 10.88 7.40 0.004
Bilge Shell Longitudinals L 4x3x(3/8) (in) (8.5 lb/ft) 1 16.00 16.00 0.35 5.60 1.96 0.004
6722.70 28356.05 191122.55 1429.117
A= 13445.41 cm2






(Section Modulus) Ztop= 30508.75 cm
2m
cbottom= 4.22 m
(Section Modulus) Zbottom= 34588.87 cm
2m
Maximum Stress Calculation (at 64.0 m forward) For hogging Mmax= 10042.00 MT-m
For Hogging Situation (Max) Tensile Stress in the deck= 32.28 MPA
(Max) Compressive Stress in the bottom plating= 28.47 MPA
FOR STEEL
Weight Estimations For Specific Weight = 77000 N/m3
Longitudinal Structure (Cross Section Area) A= 1.34 m2
Weight of Hull (Longitudinal) Per Length = 10.5571 MT/m
Length of Our Ship = 147.00 m
Approximate Weight = 1551.89 MT
FOR ALUMINUM ALLOY
Specific Weight = 27000 N/m3
Weight of Hull (Longitudinal) Per Length = 3.7018 MT/m
Approximate Weight = 544.17 MT  






c. Structural Weight 
Both steel and aluminum were compared to get the 
structural weight. Steel was finally selected for the final 
design. Total structural weight of the trimaran including 
longitudinal and transverse framing was calculated by using 
an Excel spreadsheet. The main results are shown below: 
SEA CONNECTOR
Structure Weight Calculation
             Transverse Web Frame Spacing for ST 8 WF (TEE SECTION) = 3 m
             Transverse Web Frame Spacing for ST 6 WF (TEE SECTION) = 0.6 m
Transverse Column Spacing for HOLLOW SECTION = 15 m
LENGTH OF THE SHIP  = 147 m
Number of Web for ST 8 WF (TEE SECTION) = 48
Number of Web for ST 6 WF (TEE SECTION) = 244
Number of Web for HOLLOW SECTION = 30
Cross Section Area of ST 8 WF (TEE SECTION) = 54.97 cm2
Cross Section Area of ST 6 WF (TEE SECTION) = 34.19 cm2
Cross Section Area of HOLLOW SECTION = 113.10 cm2
FOR STEEL
Weight Estimations For Specific Weight = 77000 N/m3
Transverse Structure Total Length for Cross Section = 51.35 m
Approximate Weight = 464.09 MT
FOR ALUMINUM ALLOY
Specific Weight = 27000 N/m3
Total Length for Cross Section = 51.35 m
Approximate Weight = 159.00 MT
FOR STEEL
TOTAL STRUCTURE WEIGHT = 2015.99 MT
TOTAL STRUCTURE
WEIGHT FOR ALUMINUM ALLOY
TOTAL STRUCTURE WEIGHT = 703.17 MT  
Figure 37.   Structural Weight Calculations 
d. Longitudinal Strength 
The midship section modulus was used along with 
an estimate of the maximum bending moment in order to 
determine the strength of the main deck and keel.  
In order to provide enough longitudinal 
resistance, steel was selected for the hull. 
Table 6.   Longitudinal Strength Data 
Max. Shear 263.12 MT At 21.000f   
Max. Bending Moment 10042 MT-m at 64.000f (Hogging)  
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Figure 38.   Longitudinal Strength Plot 
15. Hull Calculations 
The software package Autohydro was used for the Naval 
Architecture calculations. Sample calculations are shown in 
Appendix VI and they include the following: 
• Hydrostatics. 
• Cross Curves of Stability 
• Tanks Calibration 
• Floodable Length 
• Longitudinal Strength 
• Intact Stability 
• Damaged Stability. 
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Intact stability calculations were based on the High 
Speed Craft 2000 Multihull criteria in order to determine 
the stability adequacy of the vessel. This set of rules is 
suggested by American Bureau of Shipping and is described 
in “Guide for Building and Classing High Speed Naval 
Craft”. 
In addition, damaged stability was analyzed and 
several contingency cases were studied. Trimarans are 
highly dependant of side hull integrity to achieve adequate 
stability. Side hull damage was a major concern and several 
cases were evaluated. This ship is able to withstand the 
loss of half a side hull and the simultaneous damage of 
three forward watertight compartments. Under these extreme 
conditions, however, the main deck is immersed and flooded. 
Therefore, at this iteration of the design, main cargo deck 
will require watertight doors. 
C. COMBAT SYSTEM DESIGN 
1. Mission need statement  
As the roles, missions, and capabilities of today’s 
Navy evolve into the 21st century, so does the role of the 
combat system on board naval vessels. Dominance of the 
battlefield and the electromagnetic spectrum based on the 
ability to use and deny its use by the enemy at will is 
dependent on robust weapons systems and electronic warfare 
suites that can sustain the unique threats of the 21st 
century. 
As threats become more complex and asymmetric, the 
need to develop sensors, weapons systems and EW systems 
that can respond to changing environments is critical to 
superior battlefield surveillance, dominance and 
survivability. 
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The ability to detect, identify and take appropriate 
actions as necessary to counter a threat is central to the 
meaning of naval superiority and that is precisely what the 
proposed Ship Self Protection System (SSPS) is calling for. 
a. Background 
Weapons systems are the ensemble of elements that 
are used to destroy or perhaps simply disable a threat and 
as a result, also to threaten and defend.  
Electronic warfare, on the other hand, can be 
defined as the control and manipulation of the electro-
magnetic and electro-optical spectrum (i.e. radar, radio, 
and infrared) during military operations. Electronic 
warfare has always played a key role in deceiving the enemy 
and protecting the ship, its cargo, and its sailors. 
b. Mission 
Generally, Combat System suites protect the ship 
through a series of actions that vary from deception, 
jamming, and suppression, to attack and destruction. The 
HSAC SSPS is designed to be effective against a wide range 
of threats without affecting the ship’s dynamics or 
maneuverability capabilities. The mission is accomplished 
when any threat can be encountered. 
2. Operational Requirements  
a. Description of Proposed System 
The SSPS is envisioned as a self-protection 
suite, which includes all the necessary sensors, EW 
elements and the shipboard weapons systems elements that 
are necessary to mitigate all threats discussed in the 
threat analysis part of this chapter. 
Dealing with a threat environment of continuously 
growing complexity requires a smart marriage of hardware 
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and software. The SSPS should be designed to cope with 
extremely dense environments, long-range smart weapons and 
all kinds of radars. In addition to the ever-present need 
for short reaction times, this also requires a combination 
of high sensitivity, high selectivity, and high probability 
of intercept from the different SSPS subsystems. 
 
b. Operational and Support Concept 
The Ship Self Protection System (SSPS) will be 
distributed and installed on all units of the HSAC design. 
The ship’s multiple roles require capability for the 
following missions: 
Air Warfare Capabilities 
• Detect, track, and destroy up to 8 
simultaneous “leaker” missiles that escape 
 defenses supplied by other fleet units 
• Detect, track, and identify UAV, low slow 
flyers, attack aircraft 
• Defend against and engage hostile UAVs and 
low slow flyers (less than 200kts) 
Surface Warfare Capabilities 
• Detect, track, and identify surface threats 
to the horizon 
• Defend against and destroy small (less than 
200ft long), high speed (in excess of 
 40kts) surface craft 
• Deconflict potentially hostile craft from 
friendly and neutral shipping 
Undersea Warfare Capabilities 
• Avoid underwater mines 
• Conduct evasive torpedo maneuvers 
Amphibious Warfare Capabilities 
• Sustain hostile small caliber fire 
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• Provide suppressive fire for amphibious 
forces 
• Provide Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) 
for amphibious forces 
• Fuel and support rotary wing aircraft 
supporting amphibious operations both day 
and night 
• Provide for surface defense of Area of 
Assault 
Command & Control Capabilities 
• Conduct Electronic Protection Operations 
• Communicate with U.S. and coalition forces 
via both secure and unsecured channels 
• Maintain a CIC capable of collecting, 
processing, displaying, evaluating and 
disseminating tactical information 
• Provide a data link capability 
• The multi-role missions and the need to 
operate from the sea base (up to 200 nm from 
the target area) define the operational 
requirements and functionality of the SSPS.  
The SSPS should be able to Detect and Counter 
typical threads of current and future aggressors (people, 
institutions and platforms). These include Air to Surface, 
Ground to Surface, Surface to Surface, Subsurface to 
Surface, Mines, and terrorist attacks.  
c. Threat Environment 
As said, mission and multiple roles of the HSAC 
define multiple threats to counter. The basic threats that 
need to be considered are: 
• Radar guided weapons 
• IR guided weapons 
• Laser guided weapons 
• Small boat attacks 
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• Mines 
• Terrorist attacks 
• Basic enemy fire from shore locations or 
localized direct threats 
d. Expanded Sensor Operations/Ballistic Missile 
Defense 
The vessel will be equipped with a Multi 
Functioning Radar (MFR) and Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC). This will enable a battle group to use 
the HSAC as a picket ship to extend the sensor range of the 
surface combatants comprising the sea force. This ability 
will be especially important for two main reasons. First, 
it will have great impacts in littoral environments where 
shallow water will deter larger vessels from entering the 
area, and secondly, as a replacement for the 
decommissioning frigates which previously held this role.  
The HSAC can also be used as a sensor 
platform for Ballistic missile defense. The SPY-3 radar on 
this vessel can be used as a mobile missile detection 
platform enabling other surface combatants to be freed up 
to engage the targets or for other operations. With more 
combatants in a position to engage ballistic missiles vice 
being paired up as the sensor and the shooter,  more area 
can be covered and a greater probability of kill can be 
expected. 
3. Statement of Work 
a. Objective 
This project involves the complete design and 
integration of a Ship Self Protection System for the HSAC. 
The result will be a modular system deign that has to be 




(1) Develop Top Level Structure 
A system level block diagram and overall 
layout is required. Basic information along with key design 
specifications relating to the systems requirements should 
be included. Power consumption, electromagnetic 
compatibility, and different sensors and systems placement 
on board the ship need to be considered from the beginning 
of development. Weight and volume limitations need to be 
incorporated at first hand. 
(2) Choice of System Components 
The functional components need to follow the 
threats as described in the Operational Concept. In 
summary, all of following available components should be 
analyzed as suitable options for the SSPS, and then a 
decision on the preeminent sub-systems to use should be 
made.  
Sensor Suite: 
• Multifunctional Radar 
• Electro-Optical System 
• IR search and track System 
• Volume Search Radar 
• Navigation Radar 
• Basic Mine Detection System 
EW suite: 
• Radar warning Receiver 
• Laser Warning receiver 
• Missile Approach Warning System 
• Directed Infrared Countermeasures 
• Active/Passive Decoy System 
• IFF System 
Shipboard Weapons: 
• High rate of fire medium range gun 
• Medium range missile 
• Free Electron Laser System 
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• High Power Microwave Systems  
• Crew served weapons, small arms and non 
lethal weapons 
• Other short range weapon systems 
The components considered necessary for SSPS 
must be integrated following the top-level structure. An 
updateable threat library needs to be the base of the 
decision making process for most of the EW system 
components. The design must be modular in nature so that 
the HSAC can change missions and meet new threat 
requirements as deemed necessary.  
4. Ship Self Protection System Overview 
In this part, the Technical Specifications of the Ship 
Self Protection System for the HSAC are presented. In 
accordance with the Operational Requirements Document, the 
SSPS is designed to provide protection against a variety of 
threats. 
Throughout the discussion below we assume that the 
ship has adequate weight, space, cooling and electrical 
power provisions to accommodate the SSPS system 
requirements. 
a. System Overview 
Figure 39 below depicts the proposed operational 
block diagram of the SSPS for the Joint ACCESS. It includes 
all the sensor elements that will feed a system controller 
with specific target information. The system controller 
will, then, assign appropriate countermeasures to mitigate 
each of the threats based on their type and priority.  
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Figure 39.   Block diagram of proposed SSPS 
b. Design Philosophy: 
The HSAC will utilize a layered defense concept 
for protecting the ship, its embarked troops and cargo, and 
the landing forces ashore. It will leverage on technology 
that is being currently developed for the U.S. Navy, while 
certain systems that will be specific to HSAC mission need 

















Figure 40.   Design Philosophy 
 
The HSAC will be heavily dependant on the long-
range defenses of the Sea Shield and in particular the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This ship will be different 
from the LCS in that it will achieve higher speed and 
maneuverability, though. It will also have a larger 
complement of troops and cargo and will have a diminished 
capability in both self and landing force protection that 
is offered by the LCS. The HSAC will be outfitted with 
weapon and sensor suites to provide protection from known 
threats to primary mission within area of operation up to 
25 miles. 
It is planned that the combined number of HSAC 
vessels will utilize the advantage of distributed multiple 
platforms for a combined blanket of protection for 
97 
increased survivability. The ability to use technology to 
share sensor and weapon data between fleet assets will 
raise the effectiveness of conducting the primary mission 
over a larger area of operations.  
c. Threat Analysis 
The threat anticipated to naval forces moving 
ashore from a sea base in 2025 will be the heavy protection 
of territorial waters / shoreline and the disruption of 
surface traffic to and from the sea base. These systems 
will be employed to interdict transport vessels in order to 
slow down high speed operations and to maximize damage 
while troops and cargo are still embarked. Threat 
objectives will be the coordinated effort of using all 
target acquisition and support agencies, of the littoral 
force and sea base that are available, for the purpose of 
denying enemy combat power over the landing force during 
the initial trough final stages of movement ashore. Central 
to the threat’s defensive plan is the early identification 
and rapid denial and disruption in the littorals. Enemy 
systems are found to operate in multiple threat areas to 
include space, air, surface, undersea, electronic, and 
information warfare. 
The High Speed Assault Connector (HSAC) war 
fighting capabilities will be designed with an Inner (0 to 
5 miles), Middle (5 to 25 miles), and Outer (25 to 100 
miles) defense layers. Although this will mitigate threats 
in combat systems terms, particular attention will need to 
be placed on the known threats to the primary mission. With 
the primary mission of the HSAC being the transit to the 
landing zone and the off load of cargo, the threat analysis 
will center on that transit and landing. To identify the 
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major expected threats it is prudent to breakdown the 
mission into known areas of operation. These will be, in 
part, moving from sea base to 25 miles from landing zone, 
transit inside 25 mile boundary to 1 mile out, and the 
final move from 1 mile out to cargo off load on the beach. 
It is expected that threats to the HSAC will grow as it 
approaches the landing zone. In no way are these areas, as 
they are laid out, firm boundaries. They are only being 
used as a reference to classify major threats and crossover 
between two or more areas. The threats will next be 
analyzed and broken down by area. 
From the sea base to the 25 mile range, the craft 
will be in the same threat status as open ocean combatants. 
These will be the threats from enemy fleet assets in the 
realm of surface warfare, undersea warfare, and air 
warfare. Enemy surface combatants will utilize ship to ship 
cruise missile technology with support by large scale deck 
mounted guns. Sub Surface assents will include both 
submarines that will be able to launch various torpedo 
variants and possible sensor networks to identify and aid 
in HSAC tracking. Air warfare will be of a hybrid nature or 
modified approach to current tactics. Standard air to 
surface anti ship missiles fired from combat aircraft will 
still remain the primary air threat, but with the enemies 
need to lessen the effect of the HSAC air defense, which 
may include friendly fighter aircraft, it can be expected 
that commercial aircraft of different sizes will be 
employed as deceptively hiding air attack platforms.   
Within 25 miles of land the above threats will 
still be valid. The upgraded threat within the new zone 
will be primarily in the realm of surface warfare, but not 
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limited to it. Small surface combatants ranging from small 
cutter vessels to patrol craft will be used to deter 
transit within close proximity to and in territorial 
waters. These vessels will be multiple in numbers and of 
increased speed compared to the major enemy fleet assets. 
All will be capable of ship to ship cruise missile attack 
with the added ability for close in attack with deck 
mounted guns and torpedo launchers. Because of decreased 
cost and availability of these ships compared to larger 
scale surface combatants, the most likely engagement of the 
HSAC by the enemy will be by this means. In addition to the 
realized surface threat within this area, the potential 
surprise attack form deceptively hidden surface platforms 
may either start the enemies small craft assault or wait to 
prey on damaged HSAC vessels after engagement. These 
vessels will range from pleasure craft to small commercial 
vessels (fishing) that have been outfitted with a hidden 
one launch missile or rocket. Another concern within this 
area is the possibility of engagement from land assets. 
Coastal defense may include cruise missile facilities with 
the ability to reach out into the area. Although this 
technology can have farther reaching capability, the enemy 
will not utilize these facilities until the HSAC is within 
25 miles for 2 reasons. First will be to protect these 
facilities from our fleet and air assets which can target 
and destroy these sites, and secondly to increase their 
probability of kill by launching when the HSAC is within 
its most effective weapon range, which will lead to a 
decrease in the available reaction time for the HSAC. 
The landing zone area ranges from 1 mile out from 
land and into the beach area. The HSAC may be susceptible 
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to small boat attack, beach defenses, and from fire from 
troops that may occupy the landing area. The small boat 
attack will be varied from the paragraph above in that 
small RHIB type of craft or surf riders like jet skis may 
be employed for attack or for a  possible boarding attempt 
due to the HSAC need to drastically cut speed prior to the 
beach. The offensive capability will range from machine gun 
fire and rocket propelled grenades from both the craft and 
from the beach, to potential mortar or artillery fire from 
troops or armor units. Mining of beach area to deter 
landing will also need to be considered. Theses threats 
have historically have had exceptional effectiveness due to 
unpredictability and to its simple low tech nature. 
In the following pages, each of the major 
subsystems of the SSPS will be discussed in terms of their 
functionality and operational/technical specifications.  
5. EW suite: 
The EW suite of the HSAC will provide Electronic 
Support (ES), Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic 
Protection (EP) capabilities in the radar and infrared 
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. The primary 
functions of the EW suite are the detection and 
identification of threat emitters as well as automatic 
employment of coordinated on-board countermeasures. The 
best system that fits the above description is the Navy’s 
next generation Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare 
System (AIEWS). 
This system is designed for layered and coordinated 
countermeasures in the littoral environment and provides 
final layer of self-protection against air threat leakers 
and ASCMs for individual ships. Because the subsystems of 
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the AIEWS are still classified, we decided to conduct a 
thorough analysis of all possible subsystems and concluded 
that and the following EW elements are necessary to 
accomplish the EW suite mission. 
a.  Radar Warning Receiver 
The purpose of the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) 
is to provide information to the SSPS about Radio Frequency 
threats (radars and active RF-guided missiles) that are 
searching for, tracking or illuminating the ship. RWRs are 
generally the simplest form of ES receiver consisting of 
unsophisticated low-sensitivity (on the order of -40dBm) 
equipment that is present to cover the bands and 
characteristics of expected threats and exploits the range 
advantage to indicate a threat before it reaches its firing 
range [1].  
Because we are considering the year 2015 
technology and from RWR trade off analysis performed in 
Appendix VII, it was concluded that the HSAC RWR system 
should be based on Digital Receiver technology and should 
meet the requirements of a modern high-performance ES 
receiver as listed in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Modern High Performance ES Receivers 
Frequency range      0.5-40GHz 
Sensitivity Less than –75dBm 
Dynamic range greater than 70dBm 
Frequency resolution better than 2MHz 
Bearing accuracy better than 1 degree rms 
Pulse Rate 107 pulses/sec 
Pulse width resolution 25ns 
TOA resolution 50ns 
Amplitude accuracy 1dB 
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The data collected by the RWR receiver are 
analyzed in terms of angle of arrival, time of arrival, 
pulse width, PRF, frequency, scan rate, amplitude in order 
to detect the type of threat (radar and platform), based on 
the information stored in the threat library. The RWR 
controller then sends the available data for each threat to 
the SSPS System controller for further correlation with the 
data coming from other SSPS sensors and/or the ship’s other 
sensors and data links. 
b.  Radio Frequency Jammer 
The purpose of the Radio Frequency (RF) Jammer is 
to emit RF jamming signals in order to protect the ship 
from being detected, tracked or intercepted by enemy radars 
and RF guided missiles.  
Usually, naval vessels have Radar Cross Sections 
(RCS) that are very large (as contrasted with the airborne 
situation) which requires very large Jammer ERP to cover 
the target. Also, ships are relatively immobile and it is 
difficult to avoid an accurately targeted missile once 
launched.  
For the HSAC, it was decided to use the basic 
SLQ-32V for self-protection jamming using transponder and 
repeater jamming techniques with high ERP. The HSAC will 
rely on other fleet assets (E-A6B prowler) to provide stand 
off and escort jamming when necessary. The calculation in 
Appendix VII shows that the use of the SLQ-32 to cover the 
HSAC up to 2km from shore illuminating radars is feasible.  
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c. Missile Approach Warning System 
The purpose of the Missile Approaching Warning 
System (MAWS) is to provide information to the SSPS about 
missiles that are approaching the ship. Its role is 
especially important in the case of IR guided missiles, 
since these cannot be detected by the RWR. 
MAWSs may be either active or passive. The former 
uses a pulse Doppler radar to detect and track missiles by 
means of their skin return, while the latter responds to 
either the IR or UV signature of the exhaust plume from the 
missile’s rocket engine [2].  
The radar provides the advantage of providing 
all-weather range and range-rate data that enables 
calculation of time-to-impact data. Disadvantages involve 
the difficulty of extracting the small missile RCS target 
from competing clutter. An additional criticism of active 
radar is the possibility of it being used to as a beacon 
for an anti-radiation type missile.  
Passive MAWSs employ IR sensors to detect a 
missile’s plume out to the physical horizon. This is very 
crucial to the success of the mission especially those 
ASCMs become stealthier and are able to skim even closer to 
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the ocean surface. Even with a low RCS, the heat signature 
of the plume is still detectable by the MAWS IR sensors. 
These sensors generally provide relatively accurate angular 
data, but range must be estimated on the basis of signal 
strength. 
By the year 2015, we speculate that this 
technology will be mature enough so that the two types of 
sensors may be combined in a hybrid system, offering the 
best combined benefits of each [3].  
The data from the IR sensors are fed to the MAWS 
receiver for processing. The resulting threat information 
(angle of arrival, velocity, signature and/or type, if the 
missile’s signature is already stored in the threat 
library) is then sent to the SSPS System for correlation 
with other sensor data and the employment of the 
appropriate countermeasures. 
After a threat is detected the sensor will be 
able to continuously track the target to provide the 
necessary information to the DIRCM, if the SSPS System 
decides to employ it to counter the threat. 
Because we are considering threats of the year 
2015, the use of a hybrid MAWS on board the HSAC was deemed 
necessary to alert the crew of the presence of hostile fire 
control radar and missile carrying IR/EO passive sensors.  
d. Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) 
The purpose of the DIRCM system is to employ 
countermeasures against IR guided and Laser guided 
missiles, based on the information and cueing provided by 
the SSPS System. This system will be capable of 
transmitting laser energy against both IR missiles in the 
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3-5µm region and laser-guided missiles operating in the 
1.06µm frequency. Earlier versions of this type of system 
use the laser in a deceptive jamming mode to cause the 
missile seeker to break lock. The reflected laser energy 
coming from the threat missile’s seeker is demodulated to 
provide information about the tracking technique the 
missile IR sensor is utilizing. This, in turn, allows for 
the proper modulation to be applied to the jamming waveform 
to achieve deception. 
The newer versions use the laser beam to damage 
the seeker optics and IR detector, which in effect blinds 
the missile. This is the only technique that can be used 
against 3rd generation IR seekers, which employ Staring 
Array type detectors. Indeed, deception countermeasures 
against these types of sensors are largely inefficient [4]. 
The analysis done in Appendix VII shows that the 
laser system is the best available option and that power 
requirements of such system are easily achievable with 
today’s technology and certainly achievable in the year 
2015 time frame.  
e. Chaff/Flare/Decoy Dispenser 
Chaff is the oldest, and still the most widely 
used radar countermeasure. It is generally used to protect 
tactical aircraft, strategic aircraft and ships in either a 
corridor-laying or self-protection mode. Shipboard Chaff 
can be used in one of three modes: deception, saturation 
and seduction.  
Based on current technology, it was decided that 
the most appropriate Decoy Launching System (DLS) to use 
onboard the HSAC is the Mk 53 (NULKA). The NULKA is a rapid 
response Active Expendable Decoy (AED) System capable of 
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providing highly effective defense for ships of cruiser 
size and below against modern radar homing anti-ship 
missiles. It is being developed in cooperation with 
Australia ("Nulka" means "be quick!" in Aborigine 
language). It is intended to counter a wide spectrum of 
present and future radar-guided anti-ship missiles (ASMs) 
assessed to have passive decoy rejection and active angular 
deflection electronic countermeasures rejection 
capabilities. It is designed to over-come the inherent 
shortfalls of chaff, which are wind dependence, lack of 
placement flexibility, relatively slow reaction time, and 
susceptibility to Doppler discrimination. Combination of 
thrust and flight control enables successful launches to be 
made in severe sea state and high wind conditions [5]. 
The system that weighs approximately 3000 Lbs 
when fully loaded allows for automatic or operator 
designation of missile threat and, upon designation of a 
particular threat, will respond rapidly by launching an 
autonomous airborne decoy. Prior to launch, the system 
calculates optimum decoy flight trajectory for mission and 
programs that trajectory into the decoy’s flight control 
unit (FCU). With programmable and controllable flight path, 
the rocket hovers and positions itself to provide more 
attractive target for the threat missile. The decoy payload 
is provided with design that is optimized to provide 
effective protection to both large and small surface ships. 
An up close view of the decoy is provided in Figure 41.  
The system can either be integrated with the 
Combat System or used with the stand-alone AED Fire Control 
System. The DLS MK 53 Mod 4 is a modified DLS MK 36 Mod 12 
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by the addition of two NULKA launching tubes to each of the 
four MK 137 Mod 2 launchers and a Decoy Launch Processor.  
The Nulka decoy employs a broad-band radio 
frequency repeater mounted atop a hovering rocket platform. 
After launch, the Nulka decoy radiates a large, ship-like 
radar cross section while flying a trajectory that seduces 
and decoys incoming ASMs away from their intended targets. 
The decoy is designed to counter a wide variety of present 
and future radar Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) guided threats by 
radiating a large radar cross section signal while flying a 
ship-like trajectory thus enabling one decoy to counter 
multiple threats.  
 
 
Figure 41.   Nulka System 
6. Sensors Suite: 
a. Multi-Function Radar 
The Multi-Function radar (MFR) was selected as 
the radar of choice for the HSAC. This 3 dimensional system 
combines the functions provided by more than five separate 
radars currently aboard Navy combatant ships. 
It is essentially the SPY-3 radar currently 
undergoing development. The size and weight estimation of 
the SPY-3 radar are shown in Figure X. 
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This system is an active phased array X-band 
radar designed to meet all horizon search and fire control 
requirements and provide missile control based on mid-
course guidance and terminal homing. The most significant 
feature of the radar is to provide automatic detection, 
tracking, and illumination of low-altitude threat missiles 
in adverse environmental conditions routinely found in 
coastal waters. 
According to the analysis done in [6], the system 
will have a 76Km detection range against ASCM threats. 
Because most ship radars are horizon limited rather than 
electronics detection range limited, a careful examination 
of the placement of this system onboard the HSAC should be 
conducted. As a matter of fact, in a stand alone situation, 
the HSAC will only be able to detect ASCMs threat up to the 
physical horizon of the MFR.   
The horizon detection range of the MFR should 
exceed the missile range of the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile 
(30km) to allow for ample time for missile tracking. In 
addition, this system will be optimized for the littoral 




Figure 42.   SPY-3 weight and size estimation 
This solid-state, active array radar system will 
not only scan the horizon for high-speed, low-level cruise 
missile threats, but also provide fire-control illumination 
for HSAC air defense weapons. MFR is designed to detect the 
most advanced low-observable anti-ship cruise missile 
(ASCM) threats and support fire-control illumination 
requirements for the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile to support 
engagement of the most stressing ASCMs. The MFR mast design 
supports new ship-design requirements for reduced radar 
cross-section, significantly reduced manning requirements 
and total ownership cost reduction. 
b. Cooperative Engagement Capability 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a 
system of hardware and software that allows the sharing of 
radar data on air targets among ships. Radar data from 
individual ships of a Battle Group is transmitted to other 
ships in the group via a line-of-sight, data distribution 
system (DDS). Each ship uses identical data processing 
algorithms resident in its cooperative engagement processor 
(CEP), resulting in each ship having essentially the same 
display of track information on aircraft and missiles. An 
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individual ship can launch an anti-air missile at a threat 
aircraft or anti-ship cruise missile within its engagement 
envelope, based on track data relayed to it by another 
ship. Program plans include the addition of E-2C aircraft 
equipped with CEP and DDS, to bring airborne radar coverage 
plus extended relay capability to CEC. CEP-equipped units, 
connected via the DDS network, are known as Cooperating 
Units (CUs). 
As currently implemented, CEC is a major 
contributor to the Joint Vision 2010 concept of full-
dimensional protection for the fleet from air threats. In 
concert with multi-Service sensor and engagement systems, 
it can contribute to a major expansion of the battle space. 
The Joint ACCESS will be able to engage threats within its 
engagement envelope based on data relayed to it by other 
fleet assets. 
c. Navigation radar 
The navigation radar will allow the HSAC to 
switch off the high power (and distinctive) radar suites 
and utilize a simple system for navigation. Because the 
HSAC has to transit more than 100 miles before it reached 
the area of its primary mission (within 25 miles from the 
coast), the navigation radar will enhance the deception 
capability of the ship by giving signature comparable to 
commercial vessels. This is especially important during the 
early stages of transit (from sea base to about 25 miles 
from shore) during the first hours of the eight hours 
period of darkness. 
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Figure 43.   Navigation Radar 
The navigation radar that will be installed on 
board the Joint ACCESS will be an S-band radar that assures 
target detection in adverse weather conditions where X-band 
radars are heavily affected by sea or rain clutter.  
Such equipment is readily available in a variety 
of configurations: 30 or 60 kW output, short or long 
antenna radiator, with standard electronic plotting 
facility and optional Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA). 
These plotting aids are essential in ship borne radars to 
reduce the workload of ship personnel, and improve the 
standard of collision avoidance.  
The display unit shown in Figure 43 will employ a 
21" high-resolution multi-color monitor that provides an 
effective diameter of 275 mm. Radar echoes will be 
presented in a selected color with a day or night 
background color for easy observation in all lighting. 
Different colors are assigned to marks, symbols and text 
for user-friendly operation. The control head has logically 
arranged controls in a combination of push keys, rotary 
controls and a well-organized menu structure, and can be 
separated from the display unit via a flexible cable. The 
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display pedestal contains all major modules and may be 
separated from the monitor part.  
The operational features of the navigation radar 
will also include all functions required by the IMO and 
IEC, such as, Head-up/ Course-up/ North-up orientation, 
parallel index lines, True Motion, sensor status message 
for compass, SDME, GPS and other electronic position-fixing 
systems, wind parameters, depth sounder data, etc.  
d. EO system: 
After an extensive research on the available EO 
systems using current day technology, it was decided to use 
the Thermal Imaging Sensor System II (TISS II) as the EO 
system of choice for the HSAC.  
The TISS II was developed from operational 
experience to effectively detect, and identify targets in a 
passive mode in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean. The 
HSAC operating in the littorals can be faced with threats 
such as floating mines and fast small craft, which are 
difficult to detect due to low radar reflectivity and small 
cross-sectional areas. The problem of detecting potential 
threats becomes even more complex due to sea surface 
clutter, operating in small patrol areas, and the 
requirements to conduct operations at night and with poor 
visibility. Electro-optical (EO) sensors such as thermal 
imaging sensors, visible imaging sensors, and laser 
rangefinders provide additional situational awareness to 
complement current shipboard radars in a manner to overcome 
the issues of detection and identification of small surface 
targets.  
The TISS II incorporates the above-mentioned EO 
sensors into a single stabilized platform with a suitable 
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size and weight that allows mounting of the sensor onto the 
deck or mast of naval ships. With its suite of EO sensors, 
auto-tracking capability, and accurate stabilization, the 
TISS II has demonstrated the ability to support other roles 
such as navigation, suspect ship boarding, and air defense 
[5]. 
A thorough analysis of this system and its 
components can be found in Appendix VII. 
7. Shipboard Weapon Systems: 
a. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) 
According to the Trade-Off Analysis conducted in 
Appendix VII, the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile will be used 
as the medium range ship self-defense missile system for 
the Joint ACCESS. This missile will provide the HSAC with 
the capability to engage a variety of anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCMs) and aircrafts to support the medium and to 
a lower extend the inner self defense zones. This missile 
is very capable against low observable highly maneuverable 
missiles, and has a range that fits well the middle layer 
defense zone. 
This missile, which is the successor to RIM-7M 
NATO Sea Sparrow is a tail-controlled missile for 50g 
maneuverability against anti-ship missiles maneuvering at 
up to 4g. The autopilot allows several ESSM to time-share a 
single illuminator in much the same way as the SM-2.  
The ESSM uses an autopilot for mid-course 
guidance which is updateable via data link from the 
launching ship, switching to semi-active homing in the 
terminal phase of the engagement. It can also make flight 
corrections via radar and midcourse uplinks. A dual mode 
114 
(semi-active and IR) homing head is a possible future 
growth option.  
Because a Vertical Launching System (VLS) will 
not have directional issues when facing a saturation 
attack, has the advantage of providing a lower RCS, and 
does not have a reduced minimum firing range as compared to 
trainable launchers, it was decided that the ESSMs on board 
the HSAC will be fired from a vertical launching system.  
Loaded in a Mk 48 vertical launching system (using the Mk-
164 launcher), 32 of these missiles, with a quick start 
guidance section, offer a significant increase in load-out, 
response time, and fire power for the naval combatants of 
the future. The Mod 0 version that will be used in this 
design project (used in the Canadian “City”-class frigates) 
consists of two individual cells with exhaust uptakes 
between them and is designed to be installed on the ship’s 
side hulls. With dimensions of 190 inches high, 89 inches 
long and 52 inches deep, as illustrated by Figure 44, eight 







Figure 44.   MK 48 Mod-0 Launcher System 
The total weight of the system is composed as 
follows: 
• 02 Canisters: 1450 lbs 
• 02 missiles: 1100 lbs 
• Exhaust control: 725 lbs 
• Shipboard mounting interface: 800 lbs 
The ESSM takes full advantage of modern missile 
control technology. Inertial guidance and command mid-
course navigation with options for X-band and S-band data 
links. Home All the Way and Sample Data Homing terminal 
guidance provides ESSM with a broad spectrum of 
capabilities to meet the emerging ship defense threat.  
b. Small caliber Gun System 
According to the conclusions of the Trade-Off-
Analysis conducted in Appendix VII, the high rate of fire 
gun that will be installed onboard the HSAC is the Mk3 
BOFORS 57mm gun. This gun has been selected because of its 
small weight and volume, high firing rate, and excellent 
maximum and minimum range values that fall in accordance 







Figure 45.   57mm Gun System 
The 57 mm naval gun as shown in Figure 45 can 
fill both anti-air and anti-surface capabilities for the 
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HSAC. With a rate of fire of 220 rounds per minute, a short 
firing sequence, a stealth-designed cupola, an effective 
maximum range of just over ten miles, and air burst 
ammunition, this gun is highly effective against fast 
moving surface vessels and small boats.   
c. High Power Microwave Active Denial System 
(1) Introduction 
The high power microwave system that will be 
installed onboard the ship is a non-lethal, counter-
personnel directed energy weapon. It uses breakthrough 
technologies to provide unprecedented, standoff, non-lethal 
capabilities.  
This active denial system (ADS) projects a 
focused, speed-of-light millimeter-wave energy beam to 
induce an intolerable heating sensation on an adversary’s 
skin and cause that individual to be repelled without 
injury. This non-lethal technology was developed in 
response to Department of Defense needs for field 
commanders to have options short of the use of deadly 
force. This capability is expected to save countless lives 
by providing a means to stop individuals without causing 
injury, before a deadly confrontation develops.  
Non-lethal technologies can be used for 
protection of the Joint Access and in other situations in 
which the use of lethal force is undesirable. ADS will 
provide these capabilities in close in, as well as, at 
longer standoff ranges.  
Currently, the Air Force has taken the lead 
on this technology and has produced prototypes operating 
from a Hummvee mount and has personnel portable systems in 
the works. Mounting of a ship system should not be of great 
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difficulty due to increased power available on a ship and 
less space restrictions compared to a vehicle mount.  
(2) HSAC Mission Application 
The ADS system will enable the HSAC to 
engage threats inside its inner defense layer without 
expending ordinance. During the approach to the landing 
zone a major threat to the vessel will be from small boats. 
As we have learned from the USS Cole incident, these boats 
can be modified into mobile bombs. Because the crew of 
these vessels is typically exposed in pilot houses or open 
decks, they are susceptible to engagement by ADS. Although 
countering the system by getting under cover will occur in 
some instances, the time expended by the enemy to do so 
will aid in time needed to engage the threat by ship 
weapons. In addition, the ADS will allow the HSAC to sweep 
the beach prior to landing and continue to protect areas to 
the outside of the landing zone from an assault by ground 
forces on foot.  The system is intended to protect military 
personnel against small-arms fire, which is generally taken 
to mean a range of 1,000 meters. This range suits ship 
needs to confront these threats. 
More on how HPMADS work and its operating 
statements can be found in Appendix VII. 
d. Twin M240C Mounted Machine Gun 
In addition to the weapon systems described 
above, the team decided that the ship needs a very high 
rate of fire machine gun to deter hostile fire from the 
shore once the ship reaches the landing area. After a 
careful examination of the available weapons that can 
accomplish this mission, it was decided to use the twin 
mount M240C machine gun as shown in Figure 46 (Two M240C 
connected side by side).   
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Figure 46.   Single M240C Machine Gun (Twin mount not 
shown) 
This weapon is currently being used on the 
Bradley Fighting vehicle and by Seal team operators; 
therefore familiarity of this weapon with embarked troops 
will be high and that will enable the Joint ACCESS to use 
some of its troops aboard to defend itself, its cargo and 
its troops when a high rate of fire is desired to cover a 
short distance. 
Two mounts for the weapon will be positioned on 
both the port and starboard side, fore and aft (for a total 
of four mounts). Since the weapon is light and moveable, 
the vessel will be outfitted with eight guns that can be 
used at the discretion of the ship in one or multiple 
mounts.  In addition to a very high adjustable cyclic rate 
between 750 and 950 rpm (2800ft/sec muzzle velocity), this 
system offers an excellent maximum range of 3725 meters 
which is well outside expected useful need. Guns can be 
connected to either a standard 200 round ammunition box or 
heavier 600 or 1200 variations.   
8. Final System Overview 
Figure 47 shows the final system overview after all 
the subsystem elements are selected. 
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Figure 47.   Final System Overview 
All of the system sensors, including the EW elements, 
will fuse their target information to the system control, 
which based on an updated threat library and other sensor 
fusion algorithms, will assign the appropriate 
countermeasure that meets the threat’s type and priority. 
This procedure can be done either automatically or manually 
based on the judgment of the ship’s command.  
9. Combat Engagement Flow 
In the following section, we will proposed a concept 
for employing the sensor suites and combat systems elements 
onboard the HSAC when a threat is detected  
a. Air Defense  
The “contact” is first detected by the existing 
sensors onboard the ship and all available fleet assets in 
the area (these include radars, EO system as well as EW 
elements).  The IFF system next classifies the “contact” as 
hostile, neutral or friendly. If it is identified by the 
IFF system as a threat, fire control information (Range, 
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bearing and velocity) must then be obtained. If this data 
is unavailable, more sensors must then be allocated to 
track the target. Once the target information is obtained, 
the SSPS controller will propose the most appropriate 
weapon system to engage the target.  
The outer layer defense consisting of the 
Littoral Combat Ship and other fleet assets will be 
notified of the threat and appropriate action must be taken 
by those assets to counter the thereat. 
If the target escapes the outer layer defenses 
and enters the middle layer of the HSAC defense zone, an 
appropriate number of ESSMs will be fired once the threat 
is within their firing range. The number to fire depends on 
the number of threats and their characteristics.  
If the target enters the inner layer defense zone 
(less than 5 miles from the ships), the SSPS will decide 
the optimum position and firing range to engage the 57mm 
gun to counter the threat. In addition, the Nulka system 
will be used to deceive the target and divert it from a 
collision course with the HSAC. If the target escapes all 
defenses, the twin M240C machine gun will then engage it. 
This entire sequence can be either automatic or 
commanded by the Tactical Officer in charge. During the 
entire sequence, the SSPS will provide bearing and speed 
directions to optimize the RCS of the ship.   
b. Surface Engagements  
In a similar way to the air defense sequence, 
surface “contacts” are first detected by either the ship’s 
sensors or other fleet assets. If a “contact” is identified 
as a threat, fire control information must be obtained from 
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the target.  Once obtained, the SSPS will allocate the most 
appropriate weapon system to engage the threat.  Long range 
detection (beyond the radar horizon of the MFR) and 
engagement (>25 miles) may be possible if the LCS or other 
fleet assets are in the vicinity.  
If the target enters the lethal range of the 
ESSMs, the SSPS will decide if the target has high enough 
priority to utilize the ESSM to engage it.  
If a target enters the inner defense zone, the 
57mm gun will be employed to engage it. The Nulka system 
will also be used to deceive the target and redirect it 
from its collision course with the HSAC. The SSPS will also 
employ the HPMADS system and the M240C machine guns to 
deter or repel the personnel of any “unknown” vessel that 
closes to less than 3km range from the Joint ACCESS. If a 
target escapes all defenses, or that it is not a high 
enough priority to be engaged with the ESSM or the 57mm 
gun, the twin 40mm machine gun will engage it. 
Depending on the target type and the type of 
threat it poses, the SSPS will decide on the best course of 
action and the weapon system that can best engage the 
target.  
c. Subsurface warfare   
Submarine warfare will be designated to either 
the LCS or other fleet assets.  The TVs of the TISS II 
electro-optical system is capable of imaging floating 
mines, and submarine periscopes under clear visibility 
conditions but no mine destruction capabilities are 




The evaluation of the SSPS in terms of reliability is 
based on the concept of the reliability / survival 
function. The reliability is expressed and provided in 
terms of Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and the 
instantaneous failure rateλ . 
a. Definition 
Reliability is the probability that a system will 
perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period when 
used under specified conditions. A system's overall 
reliability can be determined by the development of 
reliability models. The complexity of these reliability 
models is dependent upon various factors such as mission 
profiles, function criticality, and redundancy 
characteristics. The general approach is to capture the 
modeling effort with the use of Reliability Block Diagrams. 
b. Reliability Prediction Analysis  
The reliability analysis can be used to define 
the quantitative parameters for each sub-system or the 
complete system, and may be expressed in number of failures 
in a given set period of time, set number of cycles or set 
number of operations, such as rounds fired from a small 
caliber gun, etc. 
A common expression used to define an item's 
reliability is its Mean-Time-Between-Failure, commonly 
known as its MTBF. Once this figure is known it can be used 
to determine the reliability of an item in terms of a 





c. Reliability Analysis (Methods) 
There are two methods available for determining 
the reliability of an item (this could be a piece part to a 
complete system) and are: 
(1) Reliability Prediction 
This is the process used to determine the 
MTBF of an item. This is achieved by performing a 
prediction analysis. 
(2) Similarity 
This method is used to determine what the 
reliability of a new product will be based upon the "known" 
reliability of an existing product with similar attributes. 
These attributes can be the type of technology used, 
digital circuitry, complexity of components and also 
comparable operating environments and scenarios [9]. 
The reliability of the SSPS is the product 
of the individual reliabilities of its different subsystems 
such that for a given MTBF, we define 1/MTBFλ = and the 
overall reliability of the system using the exponential 




R e e λλ −− ∑= Π =  
-3where = failure rate per hour*10 ,  and t is the number of hoursλ  
The reliability calculation of the ship self 
protection system is not detailed in this project. The 
failure rates provided in Table 8 do not reflect accurate 
data but are provided for illustrative purposes only. A 
Reliability prediction data summary spreadsheet table below 
was provided for use with the most important subsystems, 
once MTBF data is acquired. 
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Table 8.   Reliability Calculation 
Component Part Quantity of parts
(λ/Part) 
(Qunatity)
RWR 0.2 1 0.2
RFJ 0.3 1 0.3
MAWS 0.2 1 0.2
DICM 0.3 1 0.3
MFR 0.2 1 0.2
Nav. Radar 0.3 1 0.3
EO System 0.2 1 0.2
ESSM 0.3 32 9.6
57mm Gun 0.5 1 0.5
HPM System 0.5 2 1
Twin M240C 0.5 4 2
Σ= 14.80%
Failure rate (λ)= 14.80% /1000 hours





11. Availability and Cost Effectiveness 
The metrics of Availability is derived from the 
following common definitions: 
a. Operational Availability 
The probability that a system when used under 
stated conditions in an actual operational environment will 
operate satisfactorily when call upon. 
b. Achieved Availability 
Similar definition as Operational Availability, 
but includes preventive and scheduled maintenance. 
c. Inherent Availability 
The probability that a system or equipment, when 
used under stated conditions in an ideal support 
environment, will operate satisfactorily at any point in 
time as required but it excludes preventive or scheduled 





d. System Effectiveness 
This is defined as the probability that a system 
can successfully meet an overall operational demand within 
a given time when operated under specific conditions. 
e. Cost Effectiveness 
Relates to the measure of a system in terms of 
mission fulfillment and total life cycle cost, and needs to 
be expressed in a suitable way, referencing to the specific 
mission of the HSAC. [10] 
12. Maintainability 
The SSPS Maintenance will be organized in a way that 
will facilitate system operation and maintenance from 
forward sea bases. All subsystems will incorporate Built-
In-Test capabilities with Automated Fault Detection. 
Maintenance will be implemented in the commonly known three 
levels which are as described in following paragraphs. 
a. Organizational Maintenance 
Organizational maintenance is the responsibility 
of and performed by the equipment operator; scheduled 
preventive maintenance services are performed by trained 
personnel. Operational maintenance consists of proper 
equipment operation, safety and serviceability inspections, 
lubrication, and minor adjustments and services. 
b. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate maintenance is the responsibility of 
and performed by a designated maintenance shop. The extent 
of intermediate maintenance encompasses the removal, 
replacement, repair, alteration, calibration, modification, 
and the rebuilding and overhauling of individual 




c. Depot Maintenance 
Depot maintenance is performed on equipment 
requiring major overhaul or comprehensive restoration to 
return an item of equipment to a "like-new" condition. 
Depot level maintenance uses production line and assembly 
line methods whenever practical. 
d. Modular Design 
Modular design should be incorporated in order to 
allow facilitated access and replacement of components. 
Functional subsystems will comprise Line Replaceable Units 
(LRUs). The SPS-level Built-In-Tests will troubleshoot 
malfunctions to the LRU level, allowing remove and replace 
maintenance functions to be executed at the O maintenance 
level (i.e. flight line), facilitating operations from 
forward deployment bases. 
13. Risk Management: 
a. Purpose  
The purpose of the risk management plan is to:  
• Provide a disciplined and documented 
approach to risk management throughout the 
SSPS life cycle and its upgrades. 
• Support management decision making by 
providing integrated risk assessments 
(taking into account cost, schedule, 
performance and safety concerns). 
• Communicate to management the significance 
of assessed risk levels and the decisions 
made with respect to them. 
b. Definition 
• RISK: An undesirable situation or 
circumstance that has a realistic 
probability of occurring and an unfavorable 
consequence on the overall mission success. 
• Risk Levels 
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• High – Likely to cause significant 
degradation of the performance, even 
with special project emphasis 
• Medium – Can potentially cause 
disruption of schedule, increase in 
cost, and/or degradation of 
performance. Normal project emphasis 
will probably be sufficient to overcome 
issues 
• Low – Has little or no potential for 
disruption of schedule, increase in 
cost, and/or degradation of 
performance. Normal project activities 
will probably be sufficient to overcome 
issues. 
c. Components of risk 
Risk is the product of the probability of the 
unwanted outcome x loss experienced if the outcome occurs 










Figure 48.   Risk Analysis 
 
d. Phases 
• Risk Assessment – Identify possible risks, 









• Risk Analysis – Determine probability of 
occurrence, and determine most likely 
consequence of identified risk 
• Risk Abatement –Identify potential risk 
reduction actions, and analyze and 
prioritize changes to existing plans 
e. Risk Management Plan for the HSAC 
Figure 49 shows the proposed Risk management Plan 












RISK = Pf*Cf 
IS RF > 0.7?  IS RF > 0.3?  
HIGH RISK: 
1. Risk Report 
2. Risk Abatement   
    Plan 
3. Special Review   
LOW RISK: 
1. Regular Review 
2. Monitor Program    
    activity in program    
    status report 
MEDIUM RISK: 
1. Risk Report 
2. Risk Abatement  
    Plan 




Figure 49.   Risk Management Plan for the HSAC 
14. Survivability Analysis 
In this survivability analysis, it was decided to 
start from the outer layer and analyze the probability of 
kill down to the inner layer of the self defense zones. 
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Most of the threat in the outer layer will be taken 
care of by the LCS and other fleet assets. It was assumed 
that half of these threats (aircraft, missile, etc.) will 
be destroyed by non HSAC weapons. Therefore, the Pkill of the 
HSAC in the outer layer is: 
Pkouter=1-0.5*0.5= 0.75 
Inside the middle layer, the ESSM is the main 
countermeasure to put down any threat. It was assumed that 
the missile reliability includes 3 components: the 
capability to track the target, the capability to guide the 
seeker to the target, and the capability of properly 
detonating the fuse at the target. 
Data collected from previous reports that assessed the 
performance of the RIM-7 missile will be used for the rest 
of this analysis. It has been assumed that there will be 
sufficient number of missiles to engage each ASCM.  
The ESSM missile is assumed to have a reliability of 
90% and a warhead lethality (given a hit) of 75%. Therefore 
a Single Shot Kill Probability against any ASCM is 
PSSK = 0.90 × 0.85= 0.765 
Because the probability of a single shot kill is 
relatively low, it is probably more practical and safer to 
deploy two missiles to ensure a higher probability of kill 
against any ASCM threat. Therefore, the PK-ESSM= 1-(1- 0.765)2 
=94.5% 
A figure of 60% has been assigned to the HPMADS 
ability to soft-kill (repel) an enemy once it engages it. 
This is the probability that the denial system will render 
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an enemy unable to fight once it is subject to the HPM 
projected high energy beam. 
Pk-HPM = 60% 
The Twin M240C mounted machine gun system has been 
assigned a Pk-twin = 20%, once they engage the threat. 
The electronic warfare systems have been given a Pk-EW = 
60% effectiveness against ASCMs. 
Therefore the total effectiveness of the layered 
defense (going from the outer to the inner layer) is 
defined as:   
2401 (1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )KTOTAL Kouter K ESSM KHPM twinM C K EWP P P P P P− −= − − − − − −   
PKtotal=1-(1-0.750)(1-0.945)(1-0.600)(1-0.200)(1-
0.600)=0.998 
According to the ORD of the HSAC, each of the HSAC 
variants should be able to counter a maximum threat 
involving 8 simultaneous ASCMs. Therefore, assuming 96 
incoming ASCMs (8 missiles for each of the 12 HSACs 
conducting one single mission), the possibility of 1 or 
more missiles leaking through all the defenses of the HSAC 
is:  
PLeakage = 1- 0.9988 = 0.175 
Given this value, .175*12= 2 of the total number of 12 
HSAC could be hit in this worst case scenario attack. 
The remaining squadron of ten ships would remain a 
viable fighting force.  
15. RCS Calculations 
The ship’s RCS was calculates using three methods. The 
first is an empirical method, the second is by using the 
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POFACETS software developed at the Naval Post Graduate 
School, and the last method is the XPATCH software. 
All calculations were conducted in the 300MHz 
frequency band. 
a. Empirical Method: 
By now, there have been sufficient measurements 
and trials to allow ranking and scaling of RCS calculations 
to take place for naval vessels. There are a lot of 
empirical formulas out in the literature but the most 
suggested one for low grazing angles is developed by 
Skolnik. It calculates the RCS of a ship based on its 
displacement (or length if displacement is not known) and 
the frequency used. 
0.5 1.51644F Dσ =  
where D is the ship’s displacement in kilotons 
and F is the frequency is GHz. 
According to this formula, the mean RCS of the 
ship based on its displacement is  
0.5 1.51644 0.3 5 1006 07 4SHIP GHz KtonsR B mCS d s= × × = =  
This approximation varies with aspect angle and 
it is suggested that 13dB is added to provide the broadside 
“flash” while 8dB must be subtracted to reach the minima. 
Therefore, we estimate the ship’s RCS to vary between 
32dBsm (for minima) and 53dBsm for broadside angle. 
b. POFACETS Method: 
(1) Inputs 
POFACETS version 3.0 is RCS calculation 
software developed by Professor David C. Jenn (NPS), 
Commander Elmo E. Garrido Jr. (Phillipine Navy) and Major 
Filippos Chatzigeorgiadis (Hellenic Air Force). 
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 (2) Results 
The POFACETS Method, led to the following 
results: 
Figure 50.   POFACETS Results 
(2) Conclusion: 
As shown in Figure 50, we can clearly see 
that the POFACETS results led to significantly lower 
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numbers than the empirical formula results. The median RCS 
was about 20dBsm. The broadside RCS (90 and 270 degrees) 
was in the 45dBsm while the minimum was significantly lower 
than 32dBsm. 
d. Xpatch results: 
Because the XPATCH software provides DOD baseline 
measurements, it was necessary to run it against our model. 
Due to distribution limitations, the program is run by Dr. 
David Jenn (ECE Department).  
In order to use Xpatch, we first converted our 
ship’s rhino file into a “.facet” file. We did this using 
the Cifer conversion utility included in the Urbana 
software that is available in the ECE microwave lab. The 
most important target information after the conversion 
process and some of the Urbana options are outlined next: 
Target is Perfect Electric Conductor (PEC) 
Target name: rhino3.facet 
Length unit is meter 
Target total facet surface area =   15106.79     
Facets: good= 696   bad(thrown out)= 178    
absorb=  0 
Target geometry: facet 
1st bounce: z-buffer(FD)   Higher bounce: SBR    
Edge diffrac: none 
Ray divergence factor is set to 1 
All mono-static rcs are in dBsm & angles in deg 
Then, we provided Dr. Jenn with the 
“rhino3.facet” file. He run the program and provided us 
with the results in an ASCII format. 
After plotting the results in Matlab (as shown in 
Figure 51, we noticed that the XPATCH results were very 
comparable to the POFACETS results. The median RCS was 
about 20dBsm, while the broadside angles led to an RCS in 
the vicinity of the 45dBsm.  
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Figure 51.   XPATCH RCS calculations results 
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D. PROPULSION 
1. Propulsion Plant Analysis  
An in-depth analysis of propulsion plant alternatives 
was conducted.  The possibilities ranged from purely 
mechanical drive to purely electrical drive to a 
combination of the two. Ultimately, the benefits of 
electric drive far outweighed the other alternatives, and 
therefore an integrated propulsion system to the electrical 
distribution system was chosen for the HSAC. 
a. Propulsion Plant Trade Off Analysis 
There are many aspects to consider when selecting 
a propulsion plant type.  Among those are:  size and weight 
of the propulsion plant, efficiency, reliability, power, 
acceleration, and modularity.  Most of the possible marine 
propulsion plant types were researched and considered in 
light of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and 
the Mission Needs Statement (MNS).  The propulsion plants 
considered were:  Conventional Steam Plants, Nuclear Steam 




b. Conventional Steam Plant 
Conventional steam plants are very efficient at 
low speeds.  High power is also available for high speeds 
even though efficiency is low.  Another advantage of steam 
plants is the ability to use steam for many auxiliary 
systems.  In addition to these advantages, a steam plant is 
easy to start up, but start up time is long and requires a 
high volume and weight.  Steam plant fuel efficiency is 
low, therefore requiring much more volume and weight for 
fuel storage.  Manning for a conventional steam plant is 
high, and maintenance demands are extensive due to long 
overhaul periods.  Based on design considerations such as 
needing a high speed vessel to carry large amounts of 
cargo, the conventional steam plant was removed from 
further consideration. 
c. Nuclear Steam Plant 
Nuclear power plants are highly efficient at all 
speeds and powers.  Large storage volumes for fuel are not 
required due to the nuclear reactor having its own fuel.  
There are however, many disadvantages to a nuclear powered 
steam plant.  Nuclear power plants are very heavy due to 
shielding and require extensive manning which is not 
necessary for other plant types.  Radiation and political 
issues are also significant concerns.  Nuclear power plants 
take an extremely long time to start up and require 
extensive maintenance practices.  All information with 
regard to nuclear power is classified, therefore it would 
be difficult to obtain information and conduct the required 
analyses.  Based on the above disadvantages and practical 




d. Fuel Cells 
Fuel cells are a clean, efficient source of 
power.  However, even though there is promising technology 
in the field of fuel cells, current capabilities are well 
below that required by the Joint ACCESS.  Current 
technology power levels are significantly below the 
required power level of approximately 60 MW at full speed 
and load.  Based on this technology gap, fuel cells were 
removed from further consideration. 
e. Diesels 
Diesel engines are very cost efficient and have 
low specific fuel consumption.  In contrast, however, 
diesel engines have low power to weight ratios and have 
intensive manpower requirements.  Diesels also require 
large storage volumes for fuel oil.  Another disadvantage 
of a diesel engine is that in order to meet the power 
requirements of the Joint ACCESS, multiple engines per 
shaft would be required which leads to space and 
arrangement problems.  Based on these disadvantages, diesel 
engines were removed from further consideration. 
f. Gas Turbines 
Gas turbines have many features and 
characteristics that make it an attractive option for 
surface ships.  Gas turbines are modular in design, one can 
be removed for maintenance and it can either be repaired or 
replaced with a new, identical gas turbine.  Gas turbines 
have high power to weight ratios, and are very efficient at 
the high power requirements of the Joint ACCESS.  Gas 
turbines have very fast startup times and require little 
maintenance and manning.  Gas turbines have low noise 
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signature compared to diesels and are a very reliable 
source for high power applications.   
Gas turbines typically do have high infrared 
signatures, but this disadvantage pales in comparison to 
the advantages of gas turbines.  Due to the fact that gas 
turbines are a reliable, efficient power source currently 
on many naval combatants, gas turbines were chosen as the 
power plant for the Joint ACCESS. 
2. Gas Turbine Comparisons 
a. ICR WR21 
The ICR WR21 (Intercooler Recuperator) combines 
the most advanced technological advancements in gas turbine 
machinery.  The Intercooler Recuperator can reduce specific 
fuel consumption by as much as 14% over single cycle gas 
turbines, as well as greatly reduce the infrared signature 
due to the intercooling stage.  The main disadvantage of 
this gas turbine is the very high weight compared to other 
single cycle gas turbines.  Other disadvantages are high 




Figure 52.   ICR WR21 Gas Turbine 
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b. MT30 TRENT  
The MT30 Trent is a high efficiency, high power 
gas turbine.  The power available from the MT30 is 36 MW, 
therefore, two of them would be sufficient to overcome the 
total power required at full speed and load of the Joint 
ACCESS.  The MT30 is also efficient at lower power levels, 
which is uncommon for gas turbines.  The major disadvantage 




Figure 53.   MT 30 Gas Turbine 
c. LM 2500  
The LM2500 is a proven reliable gas turbine and 
can be found in many naval applications.  The LM2500 is 
fairly efficient and requires minimal maintenance (40 hours 
of maintenance out of every 10,000 hours of operation).  
The efficiency of this gas turbine can be greatly increased 
by using the exhaust for other applications such as boilers 
and other auxiliary systems.  The LM2500 has a higher 
volume and lower power output than the improved version 




Figure 54.   LM2500 Gas Turbine 
d. LM 2500+  
As previously stated, the LM2500+ is an upgraded 
version of the LM2500.  This engine has lower installed 
cost per horsepower lower life-cycle cost than its 
predecessor.  The LM2500+ operates at 3600 RPM to achieve 
40,000 brake horsepower (BHP) with a single cycle 
efficiency of 39% operating at ISO conditions.  The LM2500+ 
delivers 25% more power than the LM2500 primarily by adding 
another compressor stage on the front of the LM2500 
compressor and increasing the airflow through the engine by 
as much as 23%.  The LM2500+ is one of the most desirable 
on the market for high power applications primarily due to 
its high efficiency and reliability, low SFC, and 
modularity.   
 
Figure 55.   LM2500+ Gas Turbine 
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e. LM 1600  
The LM1600 is another high-efficiency gas turbine 
primarily due to the high pressure ratios of the 
compressors, high turbine inlet temperatures, and 
conservation of cooling air.  This gas turbine is fairly 
small, and power output is only around 13 MW.  Even though 
this gas turbine has a high power to weight ratio, the 
Joint ACCESS would require at least 5 of them, so the 
LM1600 was removed from further consideration. 
 
 
Figure 56.   LM 1600 Gas Turbine 
f. LM 6000  
“The LM6000 is the most fuel-efficient simple-
cycle gas turbine in its size class today, delivering more 
than 40 MW with a thermal efficiency over 40%.” (Reference 
[internet www.geae.com/engines/marine/lm6000.html])  The 
LM6000 is the ultimate in single cycle engines with regard 
to efficiency and power to weight ratio.  The main 
disadvantage of this engine is the requirement for a large, 
heavy water cooling system.  Also, two LM6000 engines would 
be needed for a total of 80 MW which is significantly more 
than the required 60 MW of the Joint ACCESS.  Due to the 
142 
high volume and weight requirements for the cooling system, 
the LM6000 was removed from further consideration.   
 
 
Figure 57.   LM6000 Gas Turbine 
 
As previously discussed, the LM1600 was removed 
from consideration due to the fact that it is too small for 
our application.  The LM6000 was removed from further 
consideration due to the need for a high volume and weight 
water cooling system.  The LM2500 was removed from further 
consideration since the LM2500+ can provide 25% more power 
at a significantly lower volume.  Based on the following 
figure, the ICR WR21 was removed from further consideration 
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Figure 58.   Weight Comparison for Gas Turbines 
Only the LM2500+ and the MT30 Trent remained as 
feasible gas turbines for the Joint ACCESS, therefore, the 
LM2500+ and the MT30 were chosen for further comparison for 

















Required Enclosed Volumes 
 
Figure 59.   Volume Requirements for Gas Turbines 
Resistance calculations of the hull form were 
used to generate the specific power requirements for 
propelling the Joint Access, as shown in the next figure 
power versus speed. 
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Figure 60.   Joint ACCESS Power vs Speed 
The ship required 38000 HP for achieving a speed 
of 33 knots, including the required electrical load of 
about 2 MW. As stated above the two engines that could fit 
better in the vessel were the LM2500+ and the MT30. These 
two engines were examined for their efficiency, performance 
and better utilization as far as vessel’s needs. 
Both engines could power the ship up to 33 knots, 
but for a desired speed of 40 knots, a second engine must 
be installed. The MT30, even though it gives about 5.5MW 
more that the LM2500+, could not offer a speed more than 37 
knots. Fuel efficiency and consumption charts are presented 
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Figure 61.   LM 2500+ and MT30 Fuel Efficiency Comparison 
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Figure 62.   LM 2500+ and MT30 Fuel Consumption 
Comparison 
An analysis of the fuel required for an endurance 
of 2600NM was conducted, assuming a cruising speed of 33 
knots, which is achievable from both engines, and the 












Figure 63.   LM 2500+ and MT30 Endurance Fuel Comparison 
The difference between the LM2500+ and MT30 Trent 
was not dramatic, therefore the LM2500+ had to be examined 
to determine how much fuel would be required to attain the 
desirable endurance. According to the next plot, the knee 
of the curve occurs at the desirable cruise speed of 33 
knots for the Joint ACCESS. 
148 










0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00 40.00 45.00 50.00
Speed  [ kt s]
 
Figure 64.   Joint ACCESS Fuel Estimation 
The LM2500+ was chosen as the prime mover because 
it outperformed the other engines in volume, weight, and 
efficiency requirements and because of the power 
requirement of about 60 MW; it fits very well within the 
design of the Joint ACCESS. The vessel will use one Gas 
turbine for cruising up to a speed of 33 knots and a second 
one for achieving higher speeds up to a maximum of 43 knots 
during operational phases for deploying cargo. A third 
relatively small gas turbine will be used as an emergency 
power back up and for providing the required power during 
harboring. The Allison AG9140 was selected to serve as the 
back up generator 
3. Electric Propulsion Motor Trade Off Analysis 
A propulsion motor trade off analysis was conducted 
between conventional motors, DC Homo-polar motors and High 
Temperature Superconducting (HTS) AC Synchronous motors.  
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Both the DC Homo-polar and the HTS are superconducting 
motors, and a comparison was done between superconducting 
motors and conventional.  The table below shows a 
comparison of superconducting applications to conventional.   
Table 9.   Comparison of Superconducting Electric Power 
Applications to Conventional Technologies 
 
Superconducting technology greatly increases the 
overall efficiency of the system.  Also, superconducting 
technologies have longer lifecycles than conventional.  The 
only downside of superconducting motors is higher cost, but 
this is mitigated by having a longer lifecycle.  Also, 
superconducting motors are much smaller than conventional, 
and space consideration is of extreme importance onboard 
the Joint ACCESS.   
After comparing conventional motors with 
superconducting motors, conventional motors were removed 
from further consideration. 
a. DC Superconducting Homo-Polar Motor 
For propulsion R&D purposes, the Navy built a 
25,000 HP induction motor that weighs 117 tons and has a 
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volume of 2500 ft3.  A DC homo-polar motor that provides 60% 
more power weighs less than a third, and occupies a volume 
roughly half of the R&D induction motor.  The DC homo-polar 
motor generates a very low noise signature, so it is quite 
stealthy.  The downside of this motor is that it requires 
two cryo-coolers, each weighing aroung 200 lbs. 
b. HTS AC Synchronous Motor 
As shown in the figures below, the American 
Superconductors HTS AC Synchronous motor is approximately 
one fifth the size and one third the weight of a 
conventional motor of equivalent power. 
 
 




Figure 66.   Weight Comparison of HTS vs. Conventional 
Motor 
 
The HTS can be driven at several times the rated 
output for short periods of time, giving the ship added 
operational flexibility when emergency propulsion is 
required. 
The HTS is also smaller than the DC homo-polar 









Volume ( 3m ) 
HTS AC 
synchronous 
2.65 2.08 1.0 
DC 
Homopolar 
2.65 3.05 1.4 
Figure 67.   HTS AC Synchronous vs. DC Homopolar Motor 
Dimension Comparison 
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The design team was informed by a representative 
of the manufacturing company that the dimensions of the 
desired motor of 15 MW would not be much larger than their 
current 5MW motor due to the relative high RPMs that the 
propulsors will operate. Therefore, the HTS motor will fit 
very well inside the narrow main hull form. 
Based primarily on the size and weight advantage 
of the HTS over the DC homo-polar motor, the HTS was chosen 
as the electric drive motor for the Joint ACCESS 
4. Propulsor Trade Off Analysis 
The most popular available technologies were taken 
into account for the trade off studies of the propulsor 
type. These are propellers, electrical pods and water jets. 
Since there was a high-speed requirement for the design, 
water jets have an overall advantage compared with the 
other technologies. 
a. Propeller 
The disadvantages of conventional propellers are:  
increased navigational draft, lower efficiency at higher 
speeds, and limitations that could be introduced because of 
the narrow beam and shallow draft that was desirable for 
the Joint ACCESS. Nevertheless, propellers are the most 
popular propulsor solution with the smallest risk. 
b. Podded Propulsors 
The disadvantages of podded propulsors are the 
additional amount of resistance, increased aft draft, 
additional drive trains, and the total complexity of the 
system. Considering our hull dimension limitations and the 
beachable operational concept of our craft, despite their 
significant maneuverability, podded propulsors are not a 
viable alternative for the JOINT ACCESS. 
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c. Conventional Water Jets 
The biggest weakness of water jets is the added 
water weight problem. The water that fills the duct for the 
jet to operate, and the additional infrastructure required, 
greatly increase the ship’s aft weight. 
d. Bird-Johnson AWJ-21 
This great weakness had been overcame with the 
selection of the Rolls Royce Advanced Water Jet propulsor 
application (AWJ-21TM) by Bird – Johnson company. The AWJ-
21TM is a podded water jet which is mounted at the aft part 
of the hull as shown in the figure below. 
 
Patents Approved & Pending  
Figure 68.   AWJ-21TM Integrated into Hull 
 
The Joint ACCESS will be propelled by four AWJ-
21TM s, each driven by an HTS motor as stated in the above 
section. The AWJ-21TM is based on an advanced mixed-flow 
pump design which is highly efficient even at low speeds in 
contrast to conventional water jets. Another basic 
attribute is the patented underwater discharge 
configuration which has been incorporated into its design. 
These two basic characteristics offer an improved 
cavitation performance, greater tolerance to poor inflow 
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conditions, and reduce the jet-related wake disturbances 
and noise level, which gives this water jet a stealth 
character, as the manufacturing company asserts. 
The AWJ-21TM features an integrated steering and 
reversing system with a single hull penetration which 
provides superior maneuverability even at low speeds. This 
will offer a great potential to the concept of deploying 
cargo by “touching” the beach with the bow and maintaining 
ship’s position by self power to the jets, in contrast with 
old beachable vessels that had to go onto the beach. 
Furthermore, the need for reversing drive shaft direction 
is eliminated. The next figure presents a cut-away view of 
the water jet. 
Figure 69.   Cut-Away View of AWJ-21TM 
Another advantage is that they need not be 
considered during “Mediterranean” mooring maneuvers of the 
vessel, because they are not exposed since they are not 
placed at or near the transom. Another great benefit is 
that they typically will not have an impact on the 
navigational draft. Rolls Royce provided the team with data 
that they used for estimating the operational RPM and size. 
Despite the fact that the team did not have specific 
dimensions and characteristics for the 15 MW jets that were 
chosen for the design, size and RPM vs. power were plotted 
P a te n ts  A p p r o v e d  &  P e n d in g
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in order to make a rough estimation of the jet’s features. 
From Figure 70 it can be seen that the AWJ-21TM of the JOINT 
ACCESS will operate at a maximum power around 450 rpm and 
from Figure 71 that the approximate diameter for the 
desirable jet of 15 MW will be around 1.70 m.      






























Figure 71.   AWJ-21TM Size vs. Power 
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Due to the fact that the aft hull of the vessel 
sweeps up 3 m from the mid section until the transom, it 
leaves plenty of clearance for placing the water jet with 
no impact on the ship’s draft. A comparison was conducted 
with a conventional propeller, using a propeller 
optimization program, resulting in a propeller diameter of 
4.5 m which would result in a 2 m or more increase of the 
aft draft. 
The technology this water jet employs allows it 
to operate at 2 – 3 times the rpm of a conventional 
propeller and requires less torque for driving it, 
therefore results in electric drive motors with a smaller 
size and weight. This improvement makes the AWJ-21TM ideal 
for electric driven systems.  
Also, by examining the data of the Kamewa water 
jet SII series that is presented in Appendix VIII, the team 
concluded that the water that is inside the system weighs 
approximately 60-65% of the total corresponding structural 
weight.  Eliminating this water column is extremely 
beneficial to reducing the total weight of the propulsion 
system. 
For all the reasons above the AWJ-21TM is more 
than adequate to fulfill the operational concept of the 
Joint ACCESS and is selected as the ship’s propulsor. 
E. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 
1. Distribution Design Analysis 
To provide a robust, flexible, and reliable electrical 
distribution system for the Joint ACCESS, we decide to 
pursue a DC zonal distribution system.  The DC Zonal 
distribution allows for simpler and faster fault detection 
by isolating faults to their corresponding zones.  Since 
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the generator frequency is decoupled from the actual 
distribution equipment, the prime movers can be run at 
their optimum speed.  Finally, the zonal distribution 
itself allows for greater survivability in the event of 
battle damage. 
The DC zonal distribution works well in the Joint 
ACCESS design for several reasons.  First with a 
significantly reduced crew size, the DC zonal distribution 
system allows control systems to isolate the general and 
possibly the exact location of the fault.  This greatly 
reduces the number of men and man hours required to isolate 
and repair the problem.  Secondly, the Joint ACCESS’ 
offensive and defensive capabilities are limited due to its 
primary mission, relying on the protection of “Sea Shield” 
for overall defense from enemy attacks.  The DC zonal 
distribution helps increase the survivability of the Joint 
ACCESS in the event of a casualty and helps ensure that it 
can continue on and complete its mission.  Finally from the 
propulsion analysis, it was determined that an electric 
drive would propel the ship.  The DC zonal distribution 
will tap directly off the propulsion bus without causing 
any other design changes. 
2. Actual Distribution 
The distribution system that was implemented was 
derived from the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Challenge 
Problem. This reference system was chosen due to its 
emphasis on creating a reliable, dependable, and survivable 
system that not only met the current needs of the ship but 
also allowed for the expansion of future high power 
weapons.  Figure 72 depicts overall electrical distribution 

























Figure 72.   Joint ACCESS Example Electrical Distribution 
To provide the total 58MW required for propulsion and 
the 2MW for combat systems and hotel loads while underway, 
two LM2500+ gas turbines producing 30.5MW each (61MW total) 
were used as the prime movers.  The LM2500+ gas turbines 
each power a 13.8kV AC bus, one on the port side and the 
other on the starboard side. Each AC bus goes through an AC 
to AC converter and powers two HTS AC synchronous motors 
which drive two waterjets. The AC busses are cross 
connected so that either LM2500+ can provide power to all 
four HTS AC synchronous motors in the event of a LM2500+ 
casualty. 
For powering the ship in port, an Allison AG9140 
producing 3.2MW is connected to both port and starboard AC 
busses.  In the event of one or two LM2500+ casualties, the 
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AG9140 can supply combat system and hotel load power, along 
with limited propulsion power. 
The combat systems equipment and hotel loads all draw 
their power off of port and starboard 1100V DC busses.  
Each buss is connected to the port and starboard AC busses 
via a power supply.  The ship is then divided up into six 
zones as Figure 73 illustrates.  Each of the six zones then 
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Figure 73.   Joint ACCESS DC Zonal Zones 
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F. DAMAGE CONTROL 
Use of an Automated Damage Control System (ADCS) will 
assist in the HSAC achieving the requirement for reduced 
manning. Use of this system in conjunction with concepts 
like DC Flex will enable a significant reduction in 
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personnel needed to combat a casualty compared to the large 
number of personnel are assigned to damage control 
organizations onboard ships currently. The damage control 
system, including the chemical, biological and radiation 
warfare system is described below. 
1. Detectors 
The following proposed fire detection systems, smoke 
detectors, carbon monoxide detectors, fire and flame 
detectors, CCTV system, heat detectors, smart micro 
sensors, humidity detectors, and liquid level detectors 
will be utilized onboard the for HSAC. 
A ship-wide array of sensors will allow continuous 
monitoring compartment by compartment. The system will 
indicate the exact location of the damage. Progressive 
damage or changes in damage will be updated or reported in 
real time. Controlling actions can then be directed to the 
exact area where required. The speed of the response will 
be increased by eliminating the need for investigators to 
search for the damage within zones able to bet detected. 
Multi-sensor fire detectors will monitor each compartment. 
Fiber optical or electrostatic smoke detectors, triple 
wavelength infrared flame, carbon monoxide, closed circuit 
television, and high performance optical, or fiber optical 
heat sensors will detect smoke and fires. Monitoring of a 
fire's progression from the first sign of smoke through the 
initiation of a fire will occur until the physical limits 
of the detectors are reached. Various alarm thresholds can 
depict different conditions from the same sensor. Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) guidelines were used in determining the 
type of fire and smoke detectors required in each space. 
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Compartments located below the damage control deck 
will also be monitored for flooding by liquid level 
detectors. Flooding detectors will consist of multiple 
sensors located from the bilge level to the overhead which 
will aid in the calculation of stability information.  The 
detectors will be located to indicate the presence of 
liquid at 2 and 6 inches, and at heights to monitor 
flooding at 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of the 
Compartment.  
All the remote operated valves and compartment 
accesses will also be monitored for their exact material 
condition. Paint lockers and pump rooms will be monitored 
for atmospheric content. Sewage spaces will be monitored 
for hydrogen sulfide gas. Air conditioning and 
refrigeration rooms will be monitored for refrigerants and 
low oxygen levels. Other appropriate monitoring will be 
conducted in spaces subjected to hazards that are present. 
Immediate notification to control stations will prevent 
unaware watch standers from entering the compartments. The 
type of detectors installed in each type of compartment is 










Table 10.   Installation of Detectors Onboard 
Compartment 3I CCTV HPO FO Smart Humidit Liquid 
Machinery X X X X  X 
Engine X X X   
Magazine X X X X 
Elect Equip X X X X  
Hanger X X X   
Flight Deck X   
CIC X X X   
Bridge X X   
Cargo Deck X X X   
Berthing X X   
Galley X X   
Passageways X   
Paint X   
Pump rooms X X X 
AC / X X X 
All sensors will be connected to a data network 
allowing the various processing centers to access the 
information. The processing centers in turn pass the 
information to the control centers for display and 
decision-making. Multiple interconnected data networks will 
be strategically routed throughout the ship with redundant 
networks in place to increase survivability of the system. 
Processing centers will send information to the control 
centers which will be able to evaluate the information or 
be set up to initiate automatic response to an alarm. 
Control stations will be located in main watch stations to 
including the Bridge, CIC, Damage Control Lockers, and 
Engineering Control Center. All control stations will have 
full control and display capabilities but not the ability 
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to process the data. Therefore loss of a single control 
station will not adversely affect the system. Watch 
standers will be able to monitor the alarms and visually 
watch actions of the damage control organizations as they 
occur. Actions performed by damage control personnel will 
be added manually to the display by a control station 
operator. 
On scene personnel would have wireless hand held 
input/output into the ADCS for direction and information 
update as needed. 
2. Installed Detector Descriptions. 
The following is the description of the installed 
Damage Control detectors installed on the HSAC. 
a. Smoke Detectors 
Photoelectric smoke sensors operate by projecting 
a beam of light across a sensing chamber. A photosensitive 
receiver detects changes in the projected light pattern 
caused by smoke particles within the chamber. These 
detectors provide good response to smoke with larger 
particles. However, they are subject to false alarms from 
other airborne particulates.[1] Optical detectors 
(including fiber optics) are based upon the photoelectric 
principle, except the beam is not confined to a sensing 
chamber and may be projected across open areas. These 
detectors can monitor areas up to 25 meters across, and 
areas subjected to high airflow rates. An ionization 
detector uses an extremely small quantity of radioactive 
material to make the air in the detector chamber conduct 
electricity. Smoke from a fire interferes with the 
electrical current and triggers the alarm. Smaller 
particles are detectable, as compared to the photoelectric 
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sensor, providing higher sensitivity in critical 
compartments. These detectors can also be prone to false 
alarms from airborne particulate matter. Electrostatic 
detectors operate by detecting naturally charged particles 
across a set of electrodes. The principle of operation is 
the same as the ionization detectors without the need for a 
radiation source, as with an ionization detector. These 
detectors are not as sensitive as ionization detectors and 
do not alarms with "nuisance" smoke, such as burnt toast. 
These detectors generally require smoke from a developed 
fire to trigger an alarm. 
b. Carbon Monoxide Detectors 
Irrespective of how intelligent a smoke detector 
is it still needs the smoke to be introduced to the 
detector before it can be sensed and an alarm decision 
made. It is difficult if the protected area is large and 
open or the seat of the fire is in a hidden area such as a 
linen locker or adjacent unprotected room. [1] In a slow 
smoldering fire situation, typical of those started by 
discarded cigarette ends in soft furnishings or smoldering 
sawdust and other organic materials, smoke may not be given 
off for many minutes, even several hours in certain 
situations, after ignition. During this time the insidious 
carbon monoxide gas can build up to a level sufficiently 
high so that, on awakening, sleeping persons are too 
disoriented to evacuate the area. When smoke is given off 
and has reached the detector it can frequently be too late 
to stop the rapid spread of the fire. It is also well known 
that smoke escaping into corridors can cool and fall to the 
floor thus making them impassable by the time the smoke 
reaches the detectors at the ceiling and generates an alarm 
condition. Smoke can also be prevented from reaching the 
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detectors by barriers of hot air building towards the 
ceiling. CO fire detectors react well to smoldering 
pyrolysis fire (wood), and glowing smoldering fire 
(cotton), but open plastic fires (polyurethane), and liquid 
fires (n-heptane) do not produce sufficient CO gas to 
trigger an alarm. CO fire detectors are particularly well 
suited to accommodation areas where there is a risk of slow 
smoldering fires causing death through the build up of CO, 
limiting occupants’ ability to evacuate. 
c. Fire/Flame Detectors 
Infrared and ultraviolet detectors operate on the 
ability to distinguish respective radiation wavelengths 
that are only given off during a fire. These optical 
sensors are capable of monitoring large open areas by a 
single sensor. Infrared sensors can be subject to false 
alarms by such things as electrical arcs, whereas 
ultraviolet sensors are subject to false alarms by such 
things as arc-welding, electrical arcs, x-rays and 
lighting. Certain infrared sensors can also be used to 
monitor temperatures by annualizing the returned radiation 
spectrum. UV flame detectors are very sensitive to arc-
welding, electrical arcs, x-rays and lighting. Although it 
is possible to eliminate false alarms from lighting and 
electrical arcs by the inclusion of time delay processing 
the elimination of false alarms from arc welding and x-rays 
is much more difficult to achieve. The detectors’ 
sensitivity to these false alarm sources can be a 
significant problem. There are external influences, whose 
presence can have a detrimental effect on the ability of 
the detector to see flame radiation. The main inhibitors of 
UV propagation are oil mists or films, heavy smoke or 
hydrocarbon vapor and water films. These phenomenon are 
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present in machinery spaces and on offshore platforms and 
can significantly reduce the intensity of the UV signal if 
present in the flame detection path. The shortcoming of UV 
detectors for offshore and machinery space applications has 
resulted in operators preferring the Triple Wavelength 
Infra Red Flame Detectors. 
 
Figure 74.   Typical Hydrocarbon Fire Spectrum[1] 
The use of Triple Wavelength Infra-Red Detection 
principles has overcome the main shortcoming of Infra Red 
Flame Detectors, namely response to solar radiation and 
black body radiation. 
d. Closed Circuit Smoke and Flame Detection 
System 
The system uses standard CCTV Cameras. The system 
functions by comparing one frame with the next, so that any 
change can be evaluated. Compound Obscuration evaluates the 
total attenuation of light from the camera to the furthest 
point in the field of view. The algorithm is able to de-
couple smoke quantity from smoke density i.e. large clouds 




Figure 75.   Schematic Video Smoke and Flame[1] 
The system can also be used to detect visible oil 
mist, high-pressure oil leakage from pipes, and steam leaks 
the moment they occur.  
e. Heat Detectors 
Heat detectors come in different types including 
spot detectors and line detectors. Spot detectors sense 
temperature at a specific location. Line detectors consist 
of a cable run where temperatures can be detected at a 
point along the cable, within a certain distance, typically 
1.5 meters. Heat detectors work on five basic principles as 
follows in the paragraphs below. Fixed temperature sensors 
alarm when temperature reaches a fixed point. Fixed 
temperature heat detectors are suited to alarm in the 
presence of slowly rising temperatures. Fixed temperature 
heat detectors are suited for installation where high heat 
output fires are expected or in areas where ambient 
conditions will not allow use of other detection methods, 
Rate-of-rise sensors alarm when rate of temperature 
increase exceeds a predetermined value. It is common 
practice to have fixed rate sensors in combination with 
rate-of-rise sensors, providing good all round heat 
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protection. Thermoelectric effect sensors detect a change 
in electric resistance in response to an increase in 
temperature. These sensors are typically "hot wire" 
anemometers used for sensing temperature changes in fluid 
flows, including ventilation ducts. 
Fiber optical heat detection is possible by use 
of monitoring the scattering of light down the fiber optic, 
which is proportional to the temperature sensed along the 
cable. The signals are immune to electromagnetic 
interference thereby ensuring integrity of readings from 
electrically noisy areas, for example around power cables 
and transformers. The system can continue to operate in the 
event of a fiber break by exploiting the signal processing 
techniques. The system can reconstitute the temperature 
profile of the entire fiber length regardless of the 
position of the break. Depending on the nature of the break 
a few measurement points in the immediate vicinity of the 
break may be lost. In the case of multiple breaks, the 
length accessible to the system will continue to be 
measured. The optical fiber temperature sensing system has 
wide ranging applications especially where small changes in 
temperature need to be detected, like pipe leakages, 
overheating of sensitive equipment, and magazine areas. 
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Figure 76.   Principle of Fiber Optical Detector[1] 
 
The High Performance Optical Detector has 
sensitivity to both hot, fast, "Clean" burning fires 
(domain of the ion-chamber detector) and cold, slow 
smoldering fires (domain of the optical detector). [1] The 
High Performance Optical Detector senses the flaming fires 
that generate a significant rise in air temperature 
together with a small increase in visible smoke. To sense 
this temperature rise, two thermistors are arranged in a 
similar fashion to that found in a standard rate-of-rise 
heat detector. One thermistor is mounted so as to be 
exposed to the air while the second is shielded inside the 
detector's body. If the temperature rises slowly then the 
thermistor temperature will be approximately equal and no 
adjustment to optical sensitivity occurs. If however the 
air temperature changes very rapidly, the exposed 
thermistor will heat more quickly than the reference 
thermistor (heat shielded by the detector body) and a 
temperature difference will be established. The electrical 
circuit senses that the exposed thermistor is hotter than 
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the reference thermistor and reduces the alarm threshold of 
the optical sensor accordingly. If there is smoke present 
at a level above the reduced threshold then an alarm will 
be raised. Otherwise the detector will remain in its 
enhanced sensitivity state, without giving an alarm until 
the temperature stabilizes. The High Performance Optical 
offers a significant performance improvement over standard 
optical detectors, with a much more uniform performance, 
across open cellulose fires (wood), and liquid fires 
(heptanes). 
 
Figure 77.   High Performance Optical Detector[1] 
The use of this detector that contains no radio-
active material, together with its systems design 
flexibility, now offers the ship operator a cost effective, 
stable, false-alarm-free alternative to the ion- chamber 
detector. 
f. Smart Microsensors 
A smart microsensor is a miniature voltammetric / 
electro catalytic (V/EC) microsensor made of ceramic-
metallic (cermet) materials that identify many different 
gases by their electrical signatures. [2] 
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Figure 78.   Smart Microsensor[2] 
The micro sensor’s intelligent pattern 
recognition system can be trained to recognize a wide 
variety of gases and gas mixtures. The microsensor is 
inexpensive to produce (< 25 cents per microsensor), and is 
proving rugged enough to survive in hostile, high-
temperature environments. The microsensor can be remotely 
cleaned and does not require electrolyte replenishment or 
replacement. Compared with conventional sensors, power 
requirements are low (milliwatts). The neural network 
signature processing is scalable and can be implemented on 
equipment from a microcontroller up to a larger PC. 
g. Humidity Detectors 
Humidity sensor contains a capacitive element 
that changes value in response to the relative humidity in 
the air. An integrated circuit timer translates this 
capacitance into a digital frequency. 
h. Liquid Level Detectors 
Typical flooding detectors are open/closed 'dry' 
contact type switches operating by a float mechanism. A 
number of these sensors can be mounted at various heights 
within a tank or compartment to determine the liquid level. 
These switches are either on or off, and the level of 
desired accuracy dictates the number of sensors. "Wet" type 
contact switches use the fluid level to complete an 
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electrical circuit and provide the alarm. These sensors are 
not as desirable as the dry contact switches. Continuous 
reading tank level sensors are available and operate by a 
detecting a resistance float sensor along a shaft, 
providing readings accurate to within one-half inch. These 
sensors typically monitor normal tank levels. These 
continuous level sensors can also monitor for excessive 
liquid loss indicating a damage situation, or provide 
unmanned filling operations. The open/closed contact 
switches can also be utilized for detecting actuator and 
access status. Fiber optical sensors have also been 
developed to provide this detection. 
i. Conclusions 
Other than fire detection, compartments will also 
be monitored for humidity and temperature, to calculate 
heat stress. Paint lockers and pump rooms will be monitored 
for explosive gases and lack of oxygen. Sewage spaces will 
be monitored for hydrogen sulfide gas. Air conditioning and 
refrigeration rooms will be monitored for refrigerants and 
low oxygen levels. Other appropriate monitoring will be 
conducted in spaces subjected to localized hazards. 
Monitoring confined areas subject to toxic gas or oxygen 
deficiency will prevent unwanted exposures of the crew to 
these hazards. Immediate notification to control stations 
will prevent unaware watch standers from entering the 
compartments 
3. Installed Firefighting Systems 
The proposed fire suppression systems, FM-200, carbon 
dioxide, AFFF, and water mist will be implemented on the 
HSAC. Active damage control measures will be required to 
keep the damage contained and from progressing through out 
the ship. Fire extinguishing methods include the use of a 
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ship-wide water mist sprinkler system, AFFF flooding, FM 
200 system and carbon dioxide flooding. Independent 
extinguishing agents, such as carbon dioxide flooding for 
the paint locker and FM 200 for the electronics equipment 
compartments will protect specialized spaces. Water mist 
sprinklers will protect machinery spaces. Combinations of 
the water mist sprinklers and AFFF sprinklers will be used 
to combat fuel fires in the machinery spaces, hangar bay, 
and cargo deck. The type of fire suppression systems 
installed in each type of compartment is shown below in 
Table 11. 
Table 11.   Installed DC Systems 
Compartment FM200 CO2 Water AFFF 
Machinery Spaces X X 
Engine enclosures X   
Magazine Areas   
Elect Equip Rooms X   
Hanger X X 
Flight Deck  X 
CIC X   
Bridge X   
Cargo Deck X X 
Berthing X   
Galley X  X 
Passageways X   
Paint Lockers X   
Pump rooms X   





a. Installed Firefighting System Descriptions 
The following is a description of the systems 
that will be installed in the spaces referenced in the 
previous section.  
(1) FM-200 Fire Suppression Systems 
FM-200, heptafluoropropane, is one of the 
new Halon alternative agents now in use to protect 
essential applications traditionally protected by Halon 
1301. This agent has many similar characteristics to Halon 
1301 and is safe in normally occupied areas. FM-200 systems 
are available in spheres or cylinders. [3] 
(2) Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression Systems 
Clean agent carbon dioxide systems, have 
been an industry standard for many decades and are still 
the preferred agent in many applications. There are several 
common local application systems, which are utilized to 
extinguish fires in dip tanks, quench tanks and industrial 
operations where spilled fuel is a possibility. Local 
application systems are also popular in the marine market, 
especially in engine compartments. 
(3) Water Mist System 
Water mist systems extinguish fires 
primarily by removing heat from the materials involved in 
the combustion process. Water is applied to the fire in 
very fine droplets, which appear to the observer as a dense 
fog. The ratio of droplet surface area to water volume is 
large and conversion to steam occurs very efficiently. The 
latent heat of vaporization, which is a physical phenomenon 
associated with the change of state of water to a gas 
(steam), removes heat from the fire and the steam produced 
also helps to smother the fire by displacing oxygen in the 
vicinity of the fire. [5] 
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Water mist systems are also safer for people 
and the environment. These systems only use potable or 
natural seawater, with no adverse side effects. Lower flow 
rates equate to less cleanup than traditional water 
sprinkler systems. Tests have shown that properly designed 
water mist systems can effectively extinguish a wide 
variety of exposed and shielded Class B hydrocarbon pool, 
spray, and cascading pool fires. A general reluctance to 
provide water extinguishing for class "C" fires exists 
because of fears of conductivity. 
The Navy sponsored a program at the Applied 
Physics Laboratory/Johns Hopkins University (APL/JHU) to 
evaluate the effects of water mist on energized electrical 
equipment. Equipment selected for testing consisted of 3 
phase-450 VAC motors, motor controllers and switchboards 
that were representative of equipment to be installed in 
the machinery spaces of LPD-17. The objective was to 
determine potential for equipment damage and to identify 
personnel electric shock hazards resulting from the 
discharge of mist onto energized equipment. Results showed 
that the conductivity of salt free potable water is very 
low. Shock hazards could only exist after a sustained mist 
flow of sufficient duration to cause plating out or pooling 
of water on equipment surfaces. There was essentially no 
current leakage for motors or motor controllers. Shock 
hazard with switchboards is negligible within the first 15 
minutes if the boards are clean and properly grounded. The 
summary conclusion relative to LPD-17 is the probability of 
creating a shock hazard is low and that watch standers in 
the space would not have to evacuate prior to mist 
activation even if all equipment is energized. Water mist 
systems have been successfully tested on telecommunications 
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switchgear equipment, consisting primarily of vertically 
mounted circuit boards. The results of a multi-year water 
mist research and development program by the Naval Research 
Laboratory, Chesapeake Beach Detachment says that large 
fires are easier to extinguish than small fires, due mainly 
to the displacement of oxygen by the expansion of the water 
mist to steam, obstructed fires become more difficult to 
extinguish with increased water droplet horizontal travel 
distance, well-ventilated fires are difficult, but not 
impossible, for water mist and water mist performs superior 
to gases in well ventilated scenarios. Deep-seated Class A 
fires are difficult to totally extinguish, though surface 
flaming is suppressed, and mist enhances room tenability by 
cooling and smoke scrubbing. The system effectively 
extinguishes flammable liquid pool fires as well as spray 
fires, which could ignite from a ruptured hose or pipe in a 
process using flammable liquids. Water mist applications 
include, but are not limited to, engine and generator set 
enclosures, machinery spaces with incidental storage of 
flammable liquids, oil pumps, gear boxes, and drive shafts. 
(4) Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) 
Systems 
Aqueous Film Forming Foams (AFFF) is based 
on combinations of fluoro-chemical surfactants, hydrocarbon 
surfactants, and solvents. These agents require a very low 
energy input to produce high quality foam. AFFF agents 
suppress fire by separating the fuel from the air (oxygen). 
Depending on the type of foam system, this is done in 
several ways: Foam blankets the fuel surface smothering the 
fire, the fuel is cooled by the water content of the foam, 
or the foam blanket suppresses the release of flammable 
vapors that can mix with the air. They can be applied 
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through a wide variety of foam delivery systems. This 
versatility makes AFFF an obvious choice for handling of 
flammable liquids. 
b. Other Considerations 
Although not implemented on the HSAC, other 
installed equipment may be substituted depending on vendor 
climate and cost considerations. Therefore descriptions of 
gear that could be substituted are described below.  
(1) NAFS-III 
NAFS-III consists of HCFC mixed by 82 % 
HCF22, 9.5% HCFC124, 4.75% HCFC123. It is able to 
extinguish fires in the B and C rating classes and 
electrical goods. HCFC exists in gas form after spraying 
and extinguishing. There is no liquid or solid residue, no 
remaining trace, and therefore no stain results. This type 
of fire suppression is good for oil stores, paint lockers, 
flammable chemical stores and electronics equipment 
compartments. 
(2) Inergen Fire Suppression Systems 
Inergen is another new alternative agent 
replacing traditional Halon 1301. Inergen is a high-
pressure agent and is stored in cylinders similar to Carbon 
Dioxide. This agent is comprised of three naturally 
occurring gases nitrogen, argon and carbon dioxide. The 
system is laid out with a central bank of cylinders 
manifolded together and the agent is dispersed through a 
pressure reducer and a piping system. Critical areas that 
require non-water based extinguishing agent that is 
electrically nonconductive, safe for use in human occupied 
facilities, and not damage sensitive electronic equipment. 
The strategy of fire extinguishment employed by an Inergen 
system is like no other modern suppression system in use 
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today. An Inergen system lowers the oxygen content of the 
protected area to a point sufficient to sustain human life, 
but insufficient to support combustion. 
(3) FE-13 Fire Suppression Systems 
FE-13, trifluromethane, is the safest of the 
three most commonly used clean agents (FE-13, FM-200 and 
Inergen). Systems are typically designed at 16-21% 
concentrations but FE-13 has no exposure restrictions until 
concentrations reach 30% or higher. The ability to design 
at higher than required concentrations, makes FE-13 an 
ideal agent for occupied areas, where very rapid 
extinguishments is desired. [4] Two other characteristics 
make this a unique agent that should be seriously 
considered for our clean agent requirements. First, nozzles 
can be located at heights of up to 25 feet as compared to 
only 12 feet for FM-200 systems. Second, due to its low 
boiling point, FE-13 can be used in temperatures as low as 
40° F. As with other clean agents, FE-13 can be used in any 
area with high valued electronics such as computer 
facilities, battery rooms and telecommunications 
facilities. It also has many industrial applications 
including unheated storage areas. 
4. Chemical, Biological and Radiation (CBR) System 
HSAC will be capable of performing launching and 
recovering of the aircraft for all types of CBR 
contaminated environments. Long-range detection systems for 
chemical, biological and radioactive agents will be 
installed on HSAC. Also, portable chemical and biological 
mass spectrometers, joint chemical agent detectors, radiac 
equipment, and CBR protective clothes will be available at 
each damage control locker, and hangar bay. A collective 
protection system will protect the manned areas against CBR 
179 
warfare in HSAC. All aircraft will be decontaminated in the 
elevators, which are a part of the collective protection 
system, after recovery. In case of emergency, one elevator 
will be adequate to operate and decontaminate the 
contaminated aircraft, although for redundancy purposes two 
of the elevators will have the capability. 
5.  Personal Locator Device (PLD) 
The ship’s crew will be issued a PLD. The PLD is a 
kind of electronic bracelet, transmitting the identity of 
the crew. Receivers around the ship will detect the signals 
from the PLDs, and a data network will be connected to the 
damage control data network. There will be three modes of 
operation of PLD: (1) personal location, (2) personal 
paging, and (3) emergency notification. From the damage 
control displays, the location of each person will be 
monitored. Emergency notification mode will be used by the 
crewmember him/herself, if he/she is in an emergency 
situation, to notify the watch stander.[8] 
6. Crew Egression 
Five on each side of the ship, a total of ten, throw 
over board life rafts with twenty-five personnel capacity, 
will be installed. The total capacity of the life rafts is 
250, being ten percent more than the crew size. They will 
be evenly distributed and will be inside a shield to reduce 
their contribution to radar cross section.  
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Figure 79.   A Typical Life Raft for HSAC[9] 
7. Ship Numbering System 
All crew members must be able to operate key Damage 
Control (DC) equipment and fittings in order to effectively 
control/stop damage.  Therefore, it is essential that 
drills incorporating the use of all fittings be conducted 
to train and keep personnel proficient in their operation.  
In order to locate and operate DC fittings, everyone must 
have a clear understanding of shipboard compartmental and 
DC fitting numbering. 
All compartments and fittings on the HSAC will be 
numbered according to appropriate Navy standards. A full 
description of the numbering to be used can be found in 
Appendix IX. 
8. Battle Stations 
For a ship to survive under battle conditions, it must 
be able to rapidly man battle stations and set material 
condition zebra and also to be able to operate under these 
conditions for an extended period.  Also, there are 
evolutions that assume that the ship is at General Quarters 
before it can be accomplished.  The HSAC must train 
personnel in manning battle stations and making initial 
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preparations for action.  Use the appropriate damage 
control exercise, "Manning Battle Stations", to evaluate 
personnel performance. In depth view of battle stations, 
Salvage ship, and Abandon ship information can be found in 
Appendix IX. 
9. Conditions of Readiness 
The setting of material condition is the process 
of securing the appropriate damage control fittings at 
designated times.  After damage, there exists a strong 
possibility of the spreading of fire, smoke, and flooding.  
The proper setting of material condition will enhance the 
Damage Control organization's ability to contain and 
control damage. Material Conditions of readiness 
descriptions can be found in Appendix IX. 
10.  Damage Control Total Ship Survivability 
The concept of Total Ship Survivability has been 
formalized from recent events and conclusions drawn from 
the Falkland Islands and Desert Storm Conflicts.  The HSAC 
as a whole must be able to combat casualties either 
inflicted by weapon payloads or by internal forces and 
maintain mission integrity.  
The casualty response will be prioritized to restore 
vital systems and\or combat fires and flooding. Vital 
systems include electrical power (60 Hz and 400 Hz), 
firemain, chilled water, dry air (and others).  
a. Ship's Priorities 
(1) Peacetime 
i.. Return to port 




(2) Wartime (Battle conditions) - in 
descending order 
i. Fight: Maintain/Restore Combat Systems to 
prevent further damage by being able to detect 
the next threat and being able to neutralize 
that threat. If the ship loses its ability to 
detect and engage, then it becomes a useless 
floating target. 
ii. Move: If the ship does lose its detect and 
engage ability, then it must make all efforts 
to regain the ability to maneuver. If the ship 
maintains the ability to maneuver, then it may 
be able to evade further damage and also 
deceive the enemy by mimicking a fighting 
warship in order to land and off load cargo. 
iii. Float: If the ship is unable to maintain 
the ability to maneuver, then the crew’s only 
hope is to maintain the ship floating until 
rescue can be affected. 
Considerations for Damage Control Ship Survivability 
can be found in Appendix IX. 
11. Introduction to Firefighting 
The HSAC design has to embrace a wide range of 
sometimes conflicting requirements. Were it possible to 
design a fire proof ship, it would be prohibitively 
expensive. A major requirement is to contain systems and 
equipment in the minimum of space. This in itself can 
create problems in the event of a fire. Cost and weight 
restraints also play a part in reaching a compromise. As a 
result, warships contain a number of high risk compartments 
such as magazines, machinery spaces, fuel tanks, control 
and operations spaces, where a hit could seriously affect 
the ship’s capability to move or fight. In the event of a 
fire on board ship there is no where to go and no fire 
department to handle the situation. The fire must be 
controlled and extinguished. Shipboard personnel must be 
trained to do this. As the saying goes "YOU CAN RUN, BUT 
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YOU CAN'T HIDE". In the event of a shipboard fire there 
isn't even anywhere to run. The objectives of a Damage 
Control Organization will be to: Take preliminary actions 
taken to prevent damage, minimize and localize damage, and 
Restore space or equipment to use. 
Firefighting perspective that needs to be understood 
is that preliminary actions are most important. The best 
situation is not to have a fire, and prevention. Prevention 
for eliminating the risk of a fire would be but not limited 
to: 
• Good Housekeeping 
• Proper stowage of flammables/explosives 
• Fire Marshall program 
• General maintenance 
• Watchststander training 
• DC Organization training 
• All hands training 
• Embarked troop training 
Terms and organization for Shipboard Firefighting can 
be found in Appendix IX. 
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G. HABITABILITY 
The habitability analysis was conducted based on the 
definitions and instructions given in the Shipboard 
Habitability Design Criteria Manual [1&2]. The HSAC has at 
least one berth per permanently assigned crewmember and 
surge troops. Berths are permanently installed. Officers, 
CPOs and crew are accommodated in separate berthing 
compartments.  Embarked Marine Officers, SNCOs/Troop are 
accommodated in separate berthing compartments as well. The 
berthing space configuration of the HSAC allows female 
crewmember berthing accommodations to be separate. 
Individual staterooms with private heads are provided for 
the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. Officers and 
CPO are accommodated in double tier bunks. Crew/Troop/SNCOs 
are accommodated in three tier bunks. The number of berths 
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per tier does not exceed three. The berthing space 
allocation for officers includes additional space for 
unobstructed walking and working areas. The initial 
estimate of berthing space allocation and habitability 
weights are tabulated in Table 12 and Table 13. 
Table 12.   Accommodation Arrangement 
Number Area/Person (ft2) Area (ft2)
Commanding Officer 1 180 180
Executive Officer 1 100 100
Officers (Ship's company) 5 88 440
Officers (Surge) 26 33 858
CPO (Ship's company) 10 33 330
Crew (Ship's company) 49 24 1176
SNCO/Troop (Surge) 234 24 5616
Officer Wardroom N/A N/A 215
CPO/Enlisted Mess N/A N/A 500
Galley N/A N/A 370
Stores, Offices, Workshops N/A N/A 600
Medical Facility N/A N/A 600
Total Area Required 10985  
Table 13.   Habitability Weight Estimation 
Approximate Quantitiy Approximate Weight (lbs) Total  (lbs)
People 66 180 11,880
Berth (CO/XO) 2 200 400
Two-tier Berth (Officer / CPO) 50 300 15,000
Sit-up Berth (Crew / Troop / SNCO) 279 450 125,550
Stowage 100 180 18,000
Table 35 80 2,800
Chair 140 30 4,200
Dishwasher 10 150 1,500
Washing Machine 10 150 1,500
Dryer 10 150 1,500
Refregirator/Freezer 10 360 3,600
Television, big screen 2 210 420
Television, table model 2 60 120
Toilet 40 35 1,400





TOTAL : 1,167,390 
The officer berthing arrangement is as follows. 
 
USN Berthing: 
• (1) CO cabin 
• (1) XO stateroom 
• (4) 2 person staterooms 
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• Private and shared heads 
USMC Berthing: 
• (5) 6 person bunkrooms 
• Shared heads 
 
Figure 80.   Typical CO Stateroom Arrangement  
 
Figure 81.   Typical Officer (USN) Stateroom Arrangement  
 
The CPO/SNCO berthing arrangement is as follows. 
 
CPO Berthing 
• (2) 6 person bunkrooms 
• Semi-private heads 
•  
•  USMC SNCO Berthing 
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Figure 82.   Typical CPO Stateroom Arrangement  
 
The U.S. Navy’s Sit-Up berth has been selected for 
installation aboard the HSAC for Crew/Troop/SNCO berthing. 
The sit-up berth improves quality of life at sea by 
allowing the occupant to sit upright in the bank when not 
sleeping, with ample space to read, write or relax, as 
shown in Figure 83. Features include forty percent more 
stowage space than a classical berth, a pneumatic lift 
assist for opening and closing the rack, a stowage area for 
boots and Marine battle helmets, towel bars, and stirrup 
steps to aid ingress and egress. Each occupant also enjoys 
the benefit of a writing/reading surface, electrical 
outlet, mirror, individual fan unit, and a small shelf for 
personal items. The height and width dimensions are the 
same as for the traditional module, however the sit-up 




Figure 83.   Sit-up Berth (Ref [3]) 
 
Ship’s Crew Berthing: 
• (1) 36 person compartment 
• (1) 24 person compartment  
• (1) 12 person compartment (Women-at-Sea 
determined compartment size) 
• Three tiers per berth  (Sit-up Berth) 
• (4) Shared heads (one assigned to females) 
•  Embarked Marine (Troop/SNCO) Berthing: 
• (3) 69 person compartments 
• Three tiers per berth  (Sit-up Berth) 
• (3) Shared heads 
 
 
Figure 84.   Typical Crew Berthing Arrangement 
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The HSAC has stowage available per person in 
accordance with NAVSEA requirements. For troop hand-carried 
weapons, helmets and field packs, secure stowage is 
available on HSAC. There are separate sanitary facilities 
for males and females associated with berthing spaces. The 
sanitary spaces are placed on the same level as the 
berthing space they support. All water closets are enclosed 
completely and have a privacy door and the showers are of 
the individual stall type. All berthing, messing, medical, 
electronics and necessary control spaces are air 
conditioned. Fluorescent lighting is the main source of 
general illumination in living and work spaces. 
 The values listed in Table 14 are recommended 
quantities of potable water required aboard ship. Depending 
on the ship type, and the operating area, these values may 
change.  
Table 14.   Recommended Amounts of Potable Water Aboard Ship 
(Ref [5]) 
Type of use Gallons per man per day
Drinking Water 0.5 – 1.0
Galley and Scullery 1.5 – 4.0
Personal and Hygiene 5.0 – 20.0
Laundry 5.0 – 10.0
TOTAL 12.0 – 35.0  
The HSAC is capable of providing thirty gallons per 
day per ship’s company of satisfactory quality distilled 
habitability water. It is also capable of providing twenty 
one gallons per day per embarked troop of satisfactory 
quality distilled habitability water. For habitability 
purposes, the HSAC has stowage for an additional 40 gallons 
per accommodation. There are water coolers provided for 
both living and work spaces. Sufficient number of water 
heaters is provided to make certain an adequate supply of 
hot water to all showers and washbasins. Separate water 
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heaters that run at a higher temperature are provided for 
workspaces (galley, laundry, etc). There is also automatic 
potable water disinfection equipment installed on the HSAC. 
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H. REDUCED MANNING ANALYSIS 
Whenever new ships are designed, analysis of reduced 
manning becomes more important than ever in the design of 
the ship. It is important because it provides potential 
benefits in operating cost reduction and increasing quality 
of crew’s ship life. Besides that, automation technology 
starts to be more dependable and stable than ever also. In 
manning determination every person is justified by the work 
they are required to perform. The work is established by 
the system/equipment/function on board which is the product 
of a design. As the automation increase, fewer personnel 
are required to operate and maintain the ship and its 
systems. The crew size required for given ship design is 
the sum of all personnel needed to function simultaneously 
to meet the most demanding ship's condition of readiness 
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over a sustained period of time. This figure shows the 
general procedure for reduced manning analysis in the Navy. 
 
 
Figure 85.   Reduced Manning Procedure 
The TSSE team followed almost the same procedure to 
get actual numbers for ship company in general aspect. 
First, required watch stations were determined to begin the 
analysis. To determine what the required watch stations 
are, the watch station bills were used. They were found by 
applying not only the concept of low maintenance design of 
equipment, but also the progressed automation of our 
design. The number for all required repair personnel were 
determined as 11. The determination of this number was 
based on the above criterias and that operators could work 
as a maintenance personnel also. To provide enough 
information and support reducing manning, the following 
approaches were used. Self-diagnostic software, automation 
(computerized) of combat systems, condition based 
maintenance and development of the training which increase 
the quality level of the crews.  
In the self-diagnostic software, the problems in the 
computers can be solved by running a diagnostic and 
refining them. This software reduces the time required for 
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repairment and the number of personnel who will maintain 
the system. The idea of automation leads to increasing 
level of use of the computers and softwares. This idea is 
also valid in the automation of combat systems and 
engineering. Condition based maintenance is an idea that 
decreases the redundant maintenance requred for the system. 
This type of maintenance accomplishes this duty by 
controlling the systems and measuring the values extracted 
from them. If a measurement of the system comes to the 
limit, maintenance will be performed at the first step. 
This will prevent the time consumption which is required to 
wait for the regular maintenance time. Finally, the last 
maintenance will be done by ship maintenance. However, less 
people will be required because the maintenace is 
conditional.  
Furthertmore, wide area network system will be used to 
reduce the manning. This system provides enough information 
to other system computers and determines where the problem 
is. Therefore the network will reduce the reaction time for 
the problem and also repair work. It is very convinient for 
our analysis of reduced manning. Finally, the subject of 
the training of the crews will be performed for them to 
increase the ability of skills and reaction times when they 
run into more important problems (damages, maintenance 
problems etc.). The training program will make the crew be 
ready in every bad situation of the ship and so will help 
reduce manning. Engineering training team will be not 
necessary to give this program and will be eliminated.  
After the above aspects are applied, the TSSE team 
reached the final numbers for ship company. The following 
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shows the tabulation of the rank, section watch, GQ and the 
personnel numbers in detailed and total numbers.  
Table 15.   Manning Breakdown 
STATION DESCRIPTION Rank
3 Section 






CO O 1 1 1
XO/OPS O 1 1 1
SHIP CONTROL
PILOT HOUSE
OFFICER OF THE DECK (OOD) O/CPO 3 3 3 AOPS/OSC/AUXO
PETTY OFFICER OF THE DECK (POOD) E 3 3 3 QM
COMMAND AND CONTROL
TACTICAL ACTION OFFICER O 3 3 3 CHENG/CSO/OPS
CIC WATCH OFFICER CPO/E 3 3 3 EWC/OSC/OS1
TACTICAL INFORMATION COORDINATOR E 3 3 3 Maint during non-GQ
SURFACE WARFARE COORDINATOR O 1 1 0 Non GQ OOD
AIR DEFENSE COORDINATOR O 1 1 0 Non GQ OOD
RADIO CENTRAL
COMMS WATCH CPO/E 3 3 3 Off w atch conduct maint / 1 ITC
COMBAT SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT ROOM
COMBAT SYS MAINTENANCE CENTRAL
CSOOW CPO/E 3 3 3 GMC/ETC/FC1










BOFORS LOADER DRUM ROOM
MOUNT CAPTAIN/LOCAL OPERATOR E 1 1 1 Act as maint tech non-Cond I
VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYS
VLS MONITOR/TECH E 1 1 1 Act as maint tech non-Cond I
ENGINEERING CONTROL
CENTRAL CONTROL STATION
EOOW CPO/E 3 3 3 EMC/GSMC/GSM1
PROP PLANT CTL CONSOLE OPER E 3 3 3 MM Off w atch conduct maint
ELEC PLANT CTL CONSOLE OPER E 3 3 3 EM Off w atch conduct maint
ROVING WATCH/TECHNICIAN E 3 3 3 Off w atch conduct maint
DAMAGE CONTROL 
DAMAGE CONTROL CENTRAL
DAMAGE CONTROL ASSISTANT (DCA O 1 1 0 CHENG
REPAIR 2
REPAIR LOCKER OFFICER CPO 1 1 0 Non-GQ EOOW
ON-SCENE LEADER E 1 1 1 DC
#1 NOZZLEMAN E 1 1 0 Non-GQ CCS Tech
#1 HOSEMAN E 1 1 0 Non-GQ Comms
#1 HOSEMAN E 1 1 1 BM
#1 PLUGMAN E 1 1 1 BM
ELECTRICIAN E 1 1 0 Non-GQ EPCC
#1 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 0 MS
#2 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 0 MS
#3 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 1 GM/FC
#4 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 0 SK
REPAIR 5
REPAIR LOCKER OFFICER CPO 1 1 0 Non-GQ EOOW
ON-SCENE LEADER E 1 1 1 DC
#1 NOZZLEMAN E 1 1 0 Non-GQ CCS Tech
#1 HOSEMAN E 1 1 0 Non-GQ Comms
#1 HOSEMAN E 1 1 0 MM
#1 PLUGMAN E 1 1 0 MM
ELECTRICIAN E 1 1 0 Non-GQ EPCC
#1 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 0 MS
#2 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 0 MS
#3 UTILITY MAN E 1 1 1 GM/FC













HCO O 1 1 0 Off Watch OOD
LSE O 1 1 0 Air Det
CHOCK AND CHAIN #1 E 1 1 0 PN
CHOCK AND CHAIN #2 E 1 1 0 YN
HELO FIRE FIGHTING TEAM
ON SCENE LEADER (OSL) CPO 1 1 1 DCC
HOT SUITMAN #1 E 1 1 0 REP 2/5
HOT SUITMAN #2 E 1 1 0 REP 2/5
NOZZLE E 1 1 0 REP 2/5
HOSE E 1 1 1 BM
HOSE E 1 1 1 BM
PLUGMAN E 1 1 0 REP 2/5
NOZZLE E 1 1 0 REP 2/5
HOSE E 1 1 1 BM
HOSE E 1 1 1 BM
PLUGMAN E 1 1 0 REP 2/5
MEDICAL
CORPSMAN [IDC] CPO 1 1 1 HMC
CORPSMAN E 1 1 1 HM
MESSING
SENIOR MESS SPECIALIST E 1 1 1 MS1
MESS SPECIALIST E 6 6 6 MS
SUPPLY SUPPORT
STOCK CONTROL SUPERVISOR E 1 1 1 SK1
LOCATE/ISSUE CLERK E 3 3 3 SK
ADMIN
SHIPS OFFICE E 2 2 2 PN/YN
Total 95 49
DEPARTMENTS O CPO E TOTAL
COMMAND 2 0 0 2
COMBAT SYSTEMS 1 2 9 12
ENGINEERING 2 3 12 17
OPERATIONS 2 4 16 22
MEDICAL 0 1 1 2
SUPPLY/ADMIN 0 0 11 11
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
Our ship design can be operated with no disturbing the 
ambiance. For this purpose, following two systems will be 
used. 
1. Oil-Water Separators 
There will always exist water of bilge in the ships. 
There are several reasons for bilge water. Main and 
auxiliary engines of the ship will cause this situation. 
Furthermore the air condition systems will drain water to 
the bilge. Therefore the ships need oil water separators to 
minimize this discharge. NAVSEA identified a membrane 
ultra-filtration as the most progressing technology for 
shipboard applications. This system has following 
capabilities. 
A. It is compatible with the Navy’s existing Oil-Water 
Separator system. 
B. It is adaptable to space and ship integration 
constraints. 
C. It can make the existing discharge requirement of 
fifteen-ppm oil meet consistently. 
D. It has capability to meet the future discharge 
constraints. 
 
Bilge water flows to the waste holding tank (oily). 
Then it flows to the Oil-Water Separator. The separator 
creates two discharges which will flow to the membrane and 
will be held in the waste oil tank. One of them is effluent 
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which flows to the membrane. The other is concentrated 
waste oil which is held in the waste oil tank. The ultra-
filtration process allows water and dissolved particles 
from the Oil-Water Separator effluent to pass through a 
semi-permeable ceramic membrane. The filtration membrane 
system (ultra-filtration) makes the influent concentrate 
from the Oil-Water Separator. This membrane system is very 
affordable for the maintenance purposes, and because it is 
an automated system, it requires low manning. 
2. CHT System 
Urinals, waste drains from showers, laundries and soil 
drains from water will be accepted by this system. This 
system consists of different functional elements. The 
followings are these functional elements which will be used 
in this system. 
a. Transfer element 
There are two marine sewage pumps connected in 
parallel for each tank. The discharges of these pumps 
depend on the position of the discharge valve. The 
discharge locations are tender, barge or shore facility. 
The direct discharge location is the overboard.  
b. Holding Element 
Tanks must be durable for the time period 12 
hours. This depends on the ship design process. Each CHT 
tank will have inside surfaces without stiffeners. 
According to the Naval Ship’s Technical Manual chapter, 
each surface of CHT tank must be covered or coated. Each 
tank will have ventilation to the air and an orifice for 
overflow to the sea. Besides that, tanks have manholes for 
maintenance and control in any situation. The ventilation 
system will not allow the gases which are coming from CHT 
tanks to the other machine parts like compressors.  
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c. Collecting Element 
This element has diverter valves. The way of the 
soil and waste depends on the position of these valves. 
Overboard and CHT tank will be these ways for discharge. 
Wastes will be separate from soil drains until they reach 
their overboard diverter valves. Then they will be 
combined. The gravity is the forcing factor for the drains 
above the waterline. The drains below the waterline will be 
ejected by CHT system. There must exist also garbage drains 
which are connected to the waste drains. They have the 
slope 3 in/ft. While the garbage grinder performs the 
seawater for flushing, the waste downstream of this will be 
of copper-nickel alloy.  
Smaller CHT system will be used for our ship 
design which will have relatively small tank capacity. CHT 
system can be used in any of the three different operation 
modes. These modes will be determined according to the 
following situations. 
A. While the ship is at port, CHT system will 
collect, hold and transfer all discharge which 
will be consisting of soil and waste drains to 
the shore facility. 
B. While the ship is at the sea, if the areas are 
free from the restricted ones, CHT system will 
divert discharges from soil and waste drains 
overboard.  
C. There are restricted zones for transiting. For 
this situation, CHT system will just collect and 
hold the discharges from soil drains. 
 
1. References 
[1] TSSE Project Report 2001 
 





J. COST AND WEIGHT ESTIMATION 
Using parametric weight design estimation equations, a 
first order light ship weight, total deadweight, and total 
ship weight was calculated and shown in the summary Table 
16 below.  The light ship weight calculations estimate the 
weight of the ship’s structural components, machinery, 
outfit and hull engineering weight, and a weight margin.  
The total deadweight of the ship estimates the ship’s cargo 
weight, fuel oil weight, lube oil weight, freshwater 
weight, the weight of the crew and their effects, and the 
weight of the provisions. The detail of the calculations is 
in Appendix X. 
Table 16.   Ship Weight Summary 
 
Based on the ship’s first order weight estimation, the 
acquisition cost of the Joint ACCESS could be determined 
using a weight scaled model similar to that employed in the 
2003 SEA SWATH, 2002 TSSE SEA FORCE and 2001 TSSE SEA 
4966 Total 
820 Payload 
235 6% Margin 
1022 Liquids & 
164Armament 700 
159Outfit and 600 
302Auxiliary Systems 500 
112Command and 400 
118Electric Plant 300 
91Propulsion Plant 200 
1943Hull Structure 100 
Weight Name Group 
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ARCHER studies.  This model used CER’s from the S-CVX study 
conducted in 1998.  
The Joint ACCESS model incorporates non-traditional 
weight fractions, high cost for specialized equipment 
required to meet the ship’s missions, and one time costs 
for Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) that is presently 
under development. Cost estimates for Joint ACCESS are 
summarized in the table below.  Appendix X shows the total 
cost of the twelfth ship of production assuming a learning 
curve exponent of 0.95. 












476Total (For 1 Ship) 
80Combat System 
230Propulsion and Electric Distribution 
156Ship Construction 
























V. DESIGN EVALUATION 
The design met the requirements set by SEA-6 and the 
TSSE Faculty.  In addition, it produced a robust multi-
mission capable self-sustaining vessel that: 
• Can augment the MPF(F) by accommodating the 
embarked troops and cargo from the FLS and/or 
CONUS to the Sea Base. 
• Transit 2640nm @34kts fully loaded with 15% fuel 
remaining. 
• Furthermore, it has defensive and offensive combat 
capabilities. 
The extensive capabilities of this HSAC lead the team 
to name it the “Joint ACCESS” for it allows joint forces to 
quickly and forcefully access areas of the world from a 
distant Sea Base, which no current vessel can do.  
Specifically, the Joint ACCESS delivers a joint force’s 
amphibious combat cargo while providing expeditionary 
support.  These capabilities are built into the ship’s name 
as Figure 86 demonstrates. 
 





A. PRIMARY MISSION EVALUATION 
The Joint ACCESS satisfies the high speed assault 
connector requirements as shown in Table 18. 
Table 18.   Design Requirement Satisfaction 
Top Level Requirements Joint ACCESS Capability 
Carry two BLTs (~8000LT of 
Cargo). 
A system of twelve ships can 
transport 9600LT of cargo.   
Transport the two BLTs 200nm 
in one 10 hour period 
Each ship can make the 200nm 
trip at 43kts fully loaded in 
less than 8 hours and can 
offload in 2 hours. 
Interface with the Sea Base 
and the beach. 
RO-RO capable stern gate and 
a flight deck with elevator 
allow for cargo exchange at 
the Sea Base.  35m floating
bow ramp allows for cargo 
loading/unloading at the 
beach. 
Support amphibious operations 
ashore in addition to payload 
delivery. 
Flexible combat systems suite 




Self-sustaining for up to 10 
days and can transit 3380nm 
@20kts 
Conduct secondary missions. Flight deck, flight deck 
elevator, helicopter hangar 
and large flexible cargo 
areas allow multi-mission 
capabilities. 
205 
In addition to satisfying the above requirements, the 
Jint ACCESS can effectively augment the MPF(F) ships during 
seabasing operations.  The Joint ACCESS has the facilities 
to embark 260 troops and their gear and transport them from 
the forward logistics site or CONUS to the Sea Base.  Thus 
the system of 12 Joint ACCESS vessels can arrive at the Sea 
Base ready to deploy the two BLTs ashore.  This ability not 
only reduces the number of cargo transfers required at the 
Sea Base, but also greatly decreases the time needed for 
employment. 
B. SECONDARY MISSIONS 
In addition to the capabilities inherent in the Joint 
ACCESS, the ship integrates well with supporting forces. 
Multiple support missions can be conducted. These include 
but are not limited to: 
1. Special Operations Support 
The Joint ACCESS will provide mobility for the support 
and sustainment of SOF in support of the Global War on 
Terrorism and other traditional SOF missions.  While 
operating in low-threat environments, the Joint ACCESS will 
embark SOF elements, along with mobility assets and 
unmanned vehicles to interdict terrorists, weapons of mass 
destruction, and other high-value targets. 
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Figure 87.   Example Special Operations Support Loadout 
2. Embassy and High Asset Reinforcement 
As a potential crisis develops, the Joint ACCESS will 
rapidly deploy a security force, with embarked rotary-wing 
assets, to reinforce a threatened embassy or high asset 
without reliance on host nation basing or over flight 
rights. 
3. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
The Joint ACCESS’ high-speed, its capability to 
operate in austere, degraded and minor port environments, 
its interface with the beach, as well as its ability to 
carry multi-mission Conex boxes, make it ideally suited for 
supporting HA/DR missions.   Because infrastructure at the 
crisis site is often destroyed or severely degraded, the 
capability of the Joint ACCESS to deliver supplies to the 
shore absent port services, tugs, or other infrastructure, 




Figure 88.   Example Humanitarian and Evacuation 
Operations Loadout 
4. Theater Security Cooperation 
With the growing importance of theater engagement 
activities as a critical element of the Global War on 
Terrorism, the Joint ACCESS will provide a platform well 
suited for executing these engagement missions.  As naval 
forces shift to a surge response posture, forward based 
Joint ACCESS’ will fill the void left by the decrease in 
the availability of other platforms to conduct engagement 
activities throughout the world. The access provided by the 
Joint ACCESS is especially important in the conduct of port 
visits and combined training in less developed countries 
that lack developed infrastructure. 
5. Maritime Interdiction 
The modularity of the Joint ACCESS’ and their ability 
to operate independently in the littoral environment will 
enable them to be rapidly configured to conduct these 
supporting operations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The 2004 TSSE design team acknowledges that it was 
unable to perform a thorough analysis on all the technical 
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issues that exist with every ship design.  However, the 
team believes that to achieve the HSAC mission, 
displacement craft such as the Joint ACCESS need to be 
researched and implemented. 










2004 Capstone Design Project 
 
Sea Connector in Support of Joint Expeditionary 
Warfare 
 
1. TASK.  Your TSSE capstone design project is to examine 
the concepts associated with the use of “sea connectors” in 
support of expeditionary warfare.  From this examination 
you will produce a design for a ship to enable effective 
deployment of forces from the sea base to the theater of 
operations. The purpose of your design is to produce a Sea 
Connector that is able to fight in a littoral environment. 
 
2. OBJECTIVES.  The objectives for this project include: 
A. Applying to this project all you have learned in all 
your previous education. 
B. Performing the analysis necessary to define the 
concept of employment needed to meet a broadly-defined 
need. 
C. Learning first-hand the ship-impact of requirements, 
cost and performance tradeoffs within technical and 
acquisition constraints. 
D. Increasing your familiarity with the process of 
evaluating a military need and determining how best to 
meet it. 
E. Obtaining experience in the process of translating 
broad military requirements to mission-based ship 
requirements and to specific design tasks resulting 
from those requirements. 
F. Practicing technical teamwork in an interdisciplinary 
design effort where the quality of the product is 
greatly affected by team dynamics. 
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G. Internalizing the systems approach to a Naval ship as 
a single engineering system satisfying mission 
requirements. 
H. Exploring innovative ideas which may prove useful to 
those working on similar projects, both inside and 
outside NPS. 
 
3. TEAM.  After an initial kickoff period in which the 
faculty will exert some leadership, you will function as a 
team in all aspects of this project.  As is the case in all 
team efforts of this nature, you will need to have a leader 
and you will have to assign the lead on various subtasks to 
individual team members.  However, to be successful (both 
as a design team and in the academic sense) it will be 
necessary for you to coordinate your efforts closely.  The 
faculty will expect all team members to be familiar with 
the major design decisions made by the team, and the 
reasons therefore.  We will expect each team member to be 
cognizant of the results and major features of subtasks 
performed by other team members as well, of course, as 
being fully familiar with the subtasks he had the lead on.  
You may expect to be quizzed on such matters. 
 
4. BACKGROUND.  All background information and documents 
are located in the \\kiska\tsse\2004\Background\Reading 
folder. Your first task is to familiarize yourselves with 
those documents.  
 
5. APPROACH.    
A. Phase I-a (July).  You are the "analysis team".  Your 
first task is to understand the concepts associated with 
seabasing and expeditionary warfare. Review and 
understand the logistics requirements from the SEA team.  
The goal is to determine a set of requirements for the 
Sea Connector ship. This will require you to consider 
such things as: threat analysis; existing combat systems 
capabilities of the Sea Base; and required combat systems 
capabilities. Furthermore, your ship must be flexible so 
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that it can assist in all aspects of expeditionary 
warfare including littoral combat and logistic support. 
Pay particular emphasis on the use of unmanned systems. 
As you develop your concept of operations, consider the 
role of the ship in non-expeditionary warfare scenarios. 
You must also establish desired interfaces with transfer 
assets (e.g. helos, boats, LCACs, etc.); survivability 
levels needed; etc. 
B. Phase I-b (August).  By the end of July you should have 
developed an initial concept of operations and have 
acquired desired payload requirements from the SEA team. 
You should also have a general idea of the desired combat 
system capabilities based on your threat analysis. You 
will then start exploring concepts for meeting the basic 
requirements.  By the end of this phase you will have 
reconciled in more detail the requirements for the basic 
ship and for its possible variants.  Ensure that your 
overall measure of effectiveness is computable and the 
SEA team agrees with your choice. Perform an analysis of 
alternatives to evaluate the optimum basic 
characteristics (including payload, speed, rough size) of 
your ship.  The faculty members will verify (or change) 
your intended approach to the basic design and its 
variants. 
C. Phase I-c (September). Refine the operational concept and 
conclude your analysis of alternatives. Identify a basic 
hull type and its rough dimensions and geometry. 
D. Phase III (September/October/November).  During phase III 
you will perform a more complete design of the basic 
concept and variants resulting from Phase II.  You will 
prepare a design report suitable for publication as part 
of an NPS technical report and you will make a formal 
presentation of your design to members of the NPS 
community and invited visitors.  At or before the 
beginning of Phase III you will receive from the faculty 
a list of required "deliverables" which must be included 
in your report or presentation or both. Past TSSE reports 
will provide you of a glimpse of what is expected; 
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however, this list is always subject to change in light 
of the unique requirements and expectations of each 
design effort. Your design report will become part of the 
overall SEI report of the integrated campus project. Do 
not underestimate the time needed for final report write-
up and formatting and preparation of the presentation; 
this will occupy you most of the month of December. 
Project presentation usually occurs around December 7th. 
 
6. FACULTY ROLE.  This is to be YOUR design.  Do not feel 
that you are competing with previous teams or designs. 
Normally, the faculty will avoid having undue influence.  
The design will NOT give preference to faculty ideas at the 
expense of the team’s ideas merely because of their faculty 
source.  On the other hand, the faculty will participate in 
discussions and try to assist you in reaching conclusions, 
consensus and feasible solutions.  In general, we will act 
like “coaches”, though to some degree we will also be team 
members.  We will, of course, act to avoid letting you call 
for the impossible or unreasonable.  After Phase I, the 
faculty will play two roles – members and coaches of the 
design team, as discussed above, but we will also, when the 
occasion calls for it, become the “seniors” of the design 
team, acting as the decision makers to consider changes to 
requirements if the design team should propose them.  Of 
course, our main objective is to maximize the utility of 
the project as a learning experience and we will always 
retain the right to change the rules as we think it 
necessary to achieve that objective.  The faculty will 
contribute to the process and will author some sections of 
the final report.  If we deem your report to be of 
sufficient quality, we will publish it as an NPS technical 
report, showing all of us as the authors.   
 
7. ADMINISTRATIVE.  Some administrative items: 
A. The six scheduled hours each week are considered 
mandatory class hours and you will be expected to be 
present for all of them.  We will occasionally use 
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the scheduled time for lectures or presentations by 
visitors or the faculty.  We do not consider the 
scheduled six hours per week to be sufficient for 
you to accomplish the necessary tasks to produce a 
quality design.  As in any other course, you are 
expected to devote between 1 and 2 additional hours 
for every scheduled hour on the project.  You should 
largely try to use the scheduled hours for 
coordination and group work and do much of your 
individual effort outside scheduled times. 
B. We will use both the assigned classroom and the 
Bullard workspace.  The latter will be shared by 
other students, so please be courteous.  
C. You will be expected to do library and other 
research; to make phone calls and contacts and 
request information from individuals outside NPS.  
Doing this is always a part of this kind of project 
in the “real world”.  The faculty can be of 
assistance in finding individuals and organizations 
who can help.  (While others will generally be glad 
to send information, answer questions, etc., don’t 
expect your request to go immediately to the top of 
their priority list – so timeliness in such efforts 
is extremely important.) 
 
8. GRADES.  As is the case with other courses, the 
faculty must assign you a grade for this project.  Frankly, 
we are strongly of the opinion that it is the team output 
that is most important and are inclined to give the project 
a grade and assign the same grade to all the team members.  
We fully recognize that individuals contribute to different 
degrees; that some work harder than others; that some 
facilitate progress while others may actually hinder it.  
But, as is true in life, the result is what counts and if 
the result is good, all associated with it bask in the glow 
– and vice versa.  (And learning to cope with the differing 
contribution levels of team members is one of the “real 
life” experiences we expect you to reap from this project.)  
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We are inclined to continue to give a single grade for the 
project to all participants.  However, we wish to be able 
to have greater insight into the individual contributions 
you are making and may, from time to time, request that you 
provide a summary of your personal, recent activities. 
 
9. AND, FINALLY.  As in any real design effort, this 
project is open-ended.  There is no pre-existing “right” 
answer.  Numerous designs could “work”.  We could spend a 
significant fraction of a career on this project, carrying 
it to increasing levels of completeness and sophistication.  
However, this is an academic exercise and we are limited by 
outside time constraints.  Our expectation is that you will 
work hard, strive for creativity and innovation, work 
cooperatively, honor commitments to team members and 
produce work which you are honestly proud of.  If you do 
that, we’ll take care of the rest. 
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APPENDIX II MISSION NEEDS STATEMENT 
HSAC Mission Needs Statement 
 
Primary Operational/Threat Environment 
1. Sea Base 
a. Loading/Unloading point for troops, cargo, etc. 
b. Defenses handled by Sea Base support ships 
2. Transit Zone 
a. Area of water possibly outside Sea Base’s defensive umbrella 




1. Low slow flyers 
2. Fighter aircraft 
iii. Small Boats 
iv. Submarines 
3. Unloading Zone 
a. Area of water between Transit Zone and Beach 
b. Approximately 1nm in distance 
c. Boat lane cleared prior to landing 
d. Threats: 




v. Small Arms Fire 
4. Beach 
a. Area to place troops, cargo, etc. ashore 
b. Prepped for assault prior to landing 
c. Threats: 
i. Hostile Beach 
ii. Missiles 





a. Primary Mission 
i. Deliver required cargo from the sea base to shore within a 
specified period of time (8-10 hours) 
ii. Support operations on/to the beach 
b. Secondary Mission(s) 
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i. Intel gathering 
ii. Humanitarian/NCO 
iii. Unmanned vehicle ‘command ship’ 
iv. Limited MIW 
v. MIO 
2. Threat Mitigation 
a. Missiles 
i. Detection 
ii. Self defense 
b. Aircraft 
i. Detection 
ii. Self defense 
iii. Both airframe and ordinance 
c. Small Boats 
i. Self defense 
ii. Attack 
d. Small Arms Fire 
i. Self defense 
ii. Project firepower ashore at short range 
e. Hostile Beach 









3. Interface with Sea Base 
a. Sea Base is located up to 200nm from shore. 
4. Able to facilitate loading and unloading of cargo with facilities ranging from 
a developed port to an undeveloped beach. 
5. Implement technologies that facilitate reduced manning. 
6. Meet U.S. Navy Combatant Ship Standards. 
7. Able to deliver the primary elements of a Joint MEB sized force. 
8. Able to operate with existing and future military forces. 
9. Meet mission requirements in up to sea state 5. 
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APPENDIX III REQUIREMENT GENERATION 
A. SHIP CHARACTERISTIC REQUIREMENTS 
29.73% Rank
Ship Characteristics Prioritized Requirements Weighting
1
Endurance for minimum one round trip 




Able to interface with developed and 
undeveloped ports, harbors and beaches 
to transfer cargo 9
2.675325 2
3 Able to interface with sea base and current Naval assets to transfer cargo 9
2.675325 2
4 Must meet mission requirements at Sea State 5 9 2.675325 2
5
Able to transit 2000nm in less than 8 days 
in sea state 5 (wave height 8-12 ft) without 
replenishment 7
2.080808 5
6 Able to operate in shallow water without degradation in performance 7
2.080808 5
7 Able to Replenish-at-Sea (RAS)
6
1.78355 7




Fuel and support rotary wing aircraft 















B. COMBAT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
16.38% Rank
Combat Systems Prioritized 
Requirements Weighting
1
Defend against and destroy small (less 
than 200ft long), high speed (in excess of 
40kts) surface craft 10
1.637807 1
2
Detect, track, and destroy up to 8 
simultaneous “leaker” missiles that 
escape defenses supplied by other fleet 
units 10
1.637807 1
3 Sustain hostile small caliber fire 9 1.474026 3
4 Provide suppressive fire for amphibious 
forces 9 1.474026 3
5 Communicate with U.S. and coalition 
forces via both secure and unsecure 8 1.310245 5
6 Provide a data link capability 8 1.310245 5
7
Maintain a CIC capable of collecting, 
processing, displaying, evaluating and 
disseminating tactical information 8
1.310245 5
8 Conduct evasive torpedo maneuvers 7 1.146465 8
9 Employ ASW countermeasures 7 1.146465 8
10 Detect, track, and identify UAV, low slow 
flyers, attack aircraft 7 1.146465 8
11 Provide Naval Surface Fire Support 
(NSFS) for amphibious forces 7 1.146465 8
12 Detect, track, and identify surface threats 
to the horizon 6 0.982684 12
13 Provide for surface defense of Area of 
Assault (AOA) 6 0.982684 12
14
Defend against and engage hostile UAVs 
and low slow flyers (less than 200kts) 5
0.818903 14
15 Conduct Electronic Protection 
Operations 4 0.655123 15
16 Deconflict potentially hostile craft from 
friendly and neutral shipping 3 0.491342 16
17 Detect underwater mines 3 0.491342 16
18 Avoid underwater mines 2 0.327561 18
19
Fuel and support rotary wing aircraft 
supporting amphibious operations both 








C. PAYLOAD INTERFACING REQUIREMENTS 




The HSAC System of Systems must provide 




The HSAC System of Systems must provide 
minimum deck area of 98,163 square feet 
(including EFV transport). 10
5.38961 1
3 The HSAC must be capable of offloading cargo to beach and/or unimproved pier. 10 5.38961 1
4
The HSAC must be capable of interfacing 




The HSAC cargo area must be dimensioned 
to a minimum height requirement to handle 
and store a standard 20ton TEU (8'6") 8
4.311688 5
6
THE HSAC must be capable of providing 
interfaces and services to payload (i.e. 
electrical power, data-link, fueling) 1
0.538961 6
















D. ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP) REQUIREMENT 
GENERATION 
CS Payload Ship
CS 1 0.333333 0.5
Payload 3 1 2
Ship 2 0.5 1
Sum 6 1.833333 3.5
CS Payload Ship Avg Percent
CS 0.166667 0.181818 0.142857 0.163781 16.38%
Payload 0.5 0.545455 0.571429 0.538961 53.90%



























E. FINAL OPERATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Requirement TeamValue RanTeam
1 The HSAC System of Systems must provide minimum lift 
capacity of 7,963 tons (including EFV transport). 10
5.39 1
Payload
2 The HSAC System of Systems must provide minimum deck 
area of 98,163 square feet (including EFV transport). 10
5.39 1
Payload
4 The HSAC must be capable of offloading cargo to beach 
and/or unimproved pier. 10
5.39 1
Payload
3 The HSAC must be capable of interfacing with LPD, LHA, LHD, 









1 Endurance for minimum one round trip from sea base to 
beach at full load and full speed 10
2.97 1
Ship
2 Able to interface with developed and undeveloped ports, 
harbors and beaches to transfer cargo 9
2.68 2
Ship
3 Able to interface with sea base and current Naval assets to transfer cargo 9
2.68 2
Ship




5 Able to transit 2000nm in less than 8 days in sea state 5 (wave 
height 8-12 ft) without replenishment 7
2.08 5
Ship












9 Fuel and support rotary wing aircraft supporting amphibious 
operations both day and night 6
1.78 7
Ship
1 Defend against and destroy small (less than 200ft long), high 
speed (in excess of 40kts) surface craft 10
1.64 1
CS
2 Detect, track, and destroy up to 8 simultaneous “leaker” missiles that escape defenses supplied by other fleet units 10
1.64 1
CS








7 Communicate with U.S. and coalition forces via both secure and unsecure channels 8
1.31 5
CS




9 Maintain a CIC capable of collecting, processing, displaying, 

































14 Defend against and engage hostile UAVs and low slow flyers 
(less than 200kts) 5
0.82 14
CS




11 Able to transit 2000nm in less than 10 days in up to sea state 8 (wave height 25-40ft) without replenishment 2
0.59 11
Ship
5 THE HSAC must be capable of providing interfaces and 
services to payload (i.e. electrical power, data-link, fueling) 1
0.54 6
Payload
16 Deconflict potentially hostile craft from friendly and neutral shipping 3
0.49 16
CS








19 Fuel and support rotary wing aircraft supporting amphibious operations both day and night 1 0.16 19 CS
 
223 
APPENDIX IV ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE DATA 
A. OVERALL MOP RESULTS FOR ALL COMBINATIONS 
 
2 ships 3 ships 4 ships
Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH
30 0.342191 0.449848 0.387279 0.38479 0.426827 0.442271 0.485414 0.343801 0.42984 0.387121 0.376368 0.415776 0.627776 0.452178 0.348871 0.421113 0.391037 0.373974 0.412369 0.589141 0.436414
35 0.377021 0.449548 0.386855 0.404311 0.447522 0.347952 0.453666 0.377128 0.431442 0.387181 0.392421 0.435057 0.57083 0.428763 0.381164 0.424002 0.391462 0.387636 0.430813 0.541209 0.418008
40 0.408567 0.452919 0.392445 0.416887 0.465315 0.281379 0.438972 0.407249 0.436518 0.393129 0.402279 0.452047 0.53883 0.419628 0.41032 0.430218 0.397681 0.395964 0.447377 0.515975 0.412241
45 0.437378 0.459179 0.112771 0.424876 0.481608 0.233838 0.434471 0.434763 0.444303 0.403015 0.408956 0.468001 0.523089 0.419104 0.436972 0.439018 0.407772 0.402265 0.463206 0.505157 0.414136
50 0.463961 0.467752 0.125301 0.430924 0.497275 0.198932 0.436559 0.460205 0.454243 0.415671 0.415135 0.483659 0.517947 0.424179 0.461672 0.449867 0.420588 0.409044 0.478948 0.503643 0.421036
5 ships 7 ships 10 ships
Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30 0.275451 0.312919 0.314196 0.28576 0.317034 0.436347 0.324023 0.291113 0.319738 0.328084 0.294926 0.322713 0.419594 0.323275 0.319575 0.339899 0.354667 0.316175 0.339637 0.417491 0.335356
35 0.304634 0.323033 0.321749 0.30163 0.344973 0.421384 0.327652 0.319518 0.342495 0.33768 0.319592 0.361843 0.435067 0.346576 0.347201 0.351833 0.362894 0.329356 0.374694 0.422133 0.353037
40 0.331662 0.335356 0.333362 0.314533 0.363817 0.413479 0.331671 0.345838 0.343886 0.347766 0.321663 0.372004 0.410319 0.339481 0.37283 0.365758 0.374999 0.34176 0.393257 0.422391 0.361177
45 0.356997 0.349386 0.347695 0.326737 0.382313 0.414992 0.340801 0.370559 0.358624 0.362261 0.334267 0.390515 0.414914 0.350181 0.396964 0.381201 0.389703 0.35523 0.411875 0.429703 0.373297
50 0.381033 0.364765 0.363947 0.339745 0.400873 0.422562 0.353284 0.394081 0.374634 0.378638 0.348239 0.409226 0.424739 0.363854 0.420007 0.397835 0.406238 0.370463 0.430812 0.441516 0.388051
15 ships 20 ships
Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH Hydrofoil HYSWAS SES Monohull Catamaran Trimaran SWATH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30 0.403291 0.419602 0.437716 0.381057 0.426697 0.491821 0.419973 0.469671 0.493421 0.505792 0.45618 0.499312 0.57552 0.494325
35 0.407435 0.40545 0.417811 0.365189 0.41984 0.455274 0.396339 0.474546 0.478343 0.4853 0.44015 0.492529 0.534782 0.468535
40 0.409043 0.393854 0.402963 0.351175 0.412936 0.431045 0.379645 0.476765 0.465946 0.47002 0.424849 0.485446 0.507713 0.450348
45 0.408529 0.385906 0.391949 0.347896 0.405857 0.420309 0.37051 0.476631 0.457087 0.458488 0.419003 0.47821 0.494835 0.440026
50 0.407327 0.378146 0.383412 0.344294 0.400095 0.409754 0.361815 0.475784 0.448682 0.449683 0.415616 0.472034 0.482762 0.430454   
B. MOP RESULTS OF THE MEDIUM SIZE SHIPS 
 
5 7 10 5 7 10 5 7 10 5 7 10 5 7 10
Payload Weight 2,3 long tons 1750 1293 950 1750 1293 950 1750 1293 950 1750 1293 950 1750 1293 950
30 KNOTS Hydrofoil Hydrofoil Hydrofoil HYSWAS HYSWAS HYSWAS SES SES SES Monohull Monohull Monohull CatamaranCatamaranCatamaran
Survivability 6.26275 6.990406 8.237655 5.518328 6.314631 7.626102 6.678555 7.367351 8.578601 5.849811 6.616026 7.90071231 6.271048 7.006234 8.261482
Felexibility 5.038719 5.470441 6.160724 6.008667 6.350925 6.95746 7.715597 7.901518 8.363655 7.218355 7.449274 7.95197086 6.761027 6.538736 6.392819
TF 12.33618 11.97033 11.58314 17.73388 16.22895 14.77279 13.3597 13.11404 12.81033 12.51988 11.47568 10.3148463 15.62549 14.67526 13.69084
MOP 0.275451 0.291113 0.319575 0.312919 0.319738 0.339899 0.314196 0.328084 0.354667 0.28576 0.294926 0.31617543 0.317034 0.322713 0.339637
35 KNOTS
Survivability 7.063234 7.791234 9.038817 6.324161 7.120577 8.432166 7.497973 8.185565 9.395649 6.657655 7.425483 8.71225123 7.08671 7.822445 9.078281
Felexibility 5.838053 6.269304 6.959127 6.800505 7.142606 7.748976 8.507569 8.693988 9.156607 8.012527 8.242249 8.74339909 8.553903 8.731362 9.185178
TF 13.04779 12.58896 12.10865 16.16928 16.16928 13.42454 11.45606 11.45606 10.99197 11.6332 11.6332 9.10134847 15.20482 15.20482 13.16297
MOP 0.304634 0.319518 0.347201 0.323033 0.342495 0.351833 0.321749 0.33768 0.362894 0.30163 0.319592 0.3293558 0.344973 0.361843 0.374694
40 KNOTS
Survivability 7.865135 8.593408 9.841255 7.130514 7.927053 9.238776 8.31975 9.005974 10.21475 7.469541 8.239523 9.52900853 7.905224 8.641542 9.898008
Felexibility 6.63544 7.066314 7.755775 7.591617 7.933544 8.539727 9.298565 9.485549 9.948709 8.803698 9.031819 9.53095081 9.345482 9.522675 9.976204
TF 13.50132 12.95789 12.39497 14.8669 13.56537 12.31265 10.03078 9.851912 9.630955 10.38611 9.092667 7.78605887 14.64803 13.6131 12.57013
MOP 0.331662 0.345838 0.37283 0.335356 0.343886 0.365758 0.333362 0.347766 0.374999 0.314533 0.321663 0.34175968 0.363817 0.372004 0.393257
45 KNOTS
Survivability 8.668116 9.396618 10.64468 7.9374 8.734078 10.04594 9.144074 9.828784 11.03608 8.28607 9.058785 10.3516414 8.726562 9.463519 10.72067
Felexibility 7.43134 7.8619 8.551069 8.381982 8.723715 9.329697 10.08851 10.27612 10.73989 9.591419 9.81751 10.3141378 10.13578 10.31268 10.7659
TF 13.75192 13.13516 12.50202 13.76728 12.54987 11.3808 8.923929 8.767607 8.574524 9.04743 7.796755 6.58719462 14.04395 13.00954 11.97777
MOP 0.356997 0.370559 0.396964 0.349386 0.358624 0.381201 0.347695 0.362261 0.389703 0.326737 0.334267 0.35523001 0.382313 0.390515 0.411875
50 KNOTS
Survivability 9.471978 10.20068 11.44892 8.744838 9.541666 10.8537 9.971165 10.65421 11.85984 9.107862 9.883913 11.1807928 9.550769 10.28845 11.54636
Felexibility 8.226031 8.656316 9.345231 9.171575 9.513098 10.11885 10.87731 11.06561 11.53007 10.37523 10.59884 11.0924825 10.92476 11.10134 11.55421
TF 13.84684 13.16859 12.47834 12.82753 11.685 10.59007 8.039773 7.901715 7.731111 7.795064 6.653131 5.58654092 13.44146 12.42356 11.41724






C. COST MODEL 
 
# ships Combat System Cost Cost/ship   
1 50 50   
2 98 49   
3 141 47   
4 180 45   
5 215 43   
7 280 40   
10 350 35   
15 450 30   
20 540 27   
     
 
      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     





















D. COST CALCULATION 
Figure 89.    
Excel work to calculate the cost according to the new 
cost 
 
Learning curve=0.9        
  HYSWAS-2 Monohull-2 Catamaran-2 HYSWAS-3 Catamaran-3 Trimaran-3
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
30  0.44984773 0.38478972 0.426826788 0.429840363 0.415775549 0.62777641
35  0.44954772 0.40431136 0.447521768 0.431442471 0.435056994 0.5708295
40  0.45291902 0.41688715 0.465314781 0.436517769 0.452046917 0.53882951
45  0.45917945 0.42487634 0.481607985 0.444303049 0.468000619 0.5230886
50  0.46775168 0.43092426 0.497275097 0.454242516 0.483658605 0.51794713
test1  0.45584912 0.41235777 0.463709284 0.439269234 0.450907737 0.55569423
test2  0.45584912 0.41235777 0 0.439269234 0 0 
test3= Average MOP  0.45584912 0.41235777 0.463709284 0.439269234 0.450907737 0.55569423




 152533994 147933994 209533994.1 166400991.2 228500991.2 215600991
Combat System 
adjusted cost  250533994 245933994 350533994.1 307400991.2 369500991.2 356600991
Learning curve 
Adjusted Cost  238007294 233637294 333007294.4 281395480.7 338241944.6 326433259
        
Cost of nth ship   125266997 122966997 175266997.1 102466997.1 123166997.1 118866997
 2 112740297 110670297 157740297.3 92220297.35 110850297.3 106980297
 3 106001683 104055409 148311982.1 86708186.3 104224650.2 100585964
 4 101466268 99603267.6 141966267.6 82998267.61 99765267.61 96282267.6
 5 98082395.4 96281525.9 137231731.4 80230298.1 96438123.24 93071280.3
 6 95401514.5 93649868.1 133480783.9 78037367.67 93802185.2 90527368 
 7 93192111.1 91481031.1 130389502.8 76230100.51 91629820.67 88430845 
 8 91319640.8 89642940.8 127769640.8 74698440.85 89788740.85 86654040.8
 9 89699258.5 88052310 125502487.1 73372986.31 88195522.94 85116445.3
 10 88274155.8 86653373.3 123508558.3 72207268.29 86794310.92 83764152.3
 11 87004508.3 85407037.5 121732134.2 71168710.85 85545947.98 82559372.2
 12 85861363.1 84284881.3 120132705.5 70233630.91 84421966.68 81474631.2
 13 84823039.6 83265622.2 118679937.9 69384293.95 83401049.84 80489356.6
 14 83872900 82332928 117350552.5 68607090.46 82466838.61 79587760.5
 15 82997910.1 81474003.6 116126312.7 67891358.54 81606517.19 78757474.6
 16 82187676.8 80678646.8 114992676.8 67228596.76 80809866.76 77988636.8
 17 81433785.6 79938597.6 113937871.8 66611922.23 80068613.95 77273262.5
 18 80729332.7 79247079 112952238.4 66035687.68 79375970.64 76604800.8
 19 80068586.8 78598465 112027757.5 65495204.97 78726301.64 75977813 
























APPENDIX V CARGO DESIGN DATA 
A. TWO BATTALION LANDING TEAM COMPOSITION 
Landing 
Priority















Rifle Co 1 
(Rein) 233 EFV-P 12 72,879 874,548 360.0 4320.0
     AA Plt
2 Tank Plt 1 8 M1A1 2 133,815 267,630 387.0 774.0
8 M1A1 w/TWMP 2 141,075 282,150 506.8 1013.6
3
Rifle Co 2 
(Rein) 233 EFV-P 12 72,879 874,548 360.0 4320.0
     AA Plt
4 Tank Plt 2 8 M1A1 2 133,815 267,630 387.0 774.0
8 M1A1 w/TWMP 2 141,075 282,150 506.8 1013.6
5 A Command 143 EFV-P 10 71,344 713,440 360.0 3600.0





Rifle Co 3 
(Rein) 233 EFV-P 12 72,879 874,548 360.0 4320.0
     AA Plt
7 Tank Plt 3 16 M1A1 4 133,815 535,260 387.0 1548.0
8 Tank Co Hq 8 ABV 2 1,350 2,700 468.0 936.0
Det, CEB 
Co 4 AVLB 1 93,194 93,194 468.0 468.0
Det, Engr 
Spt Plt 8 M1A1 2 133,815 267,630 387.0 774.0
        
(ABV&ACE) 5 M88A2 1 141,173 141,173 340.5 340.5
Det, AT Plt, 
Tank Bn 4 M9 ACE 4 37,799 151,197 215.3 861.0
8
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101Trlr 2 12,118 24,236 185.3 370.7
3
M998 HMMWV 
w/M116 Trlr 1 12,778 12,778 196.1 196.1
3
MRC JTRS 
HMMWV 2 8,720 17,440 64.8 129.7
4
M1043 
HMMWV 1 10,158 10,158 109.8 109.8
18
M1045 
HMMWV 6 9,918 59,508 109.2 655.2
9 M998 HMMWV 3 8,918 26,754 109.3 327.9




HMMWV 10 10,158 101,580 109.8 1097.9
TACP 32
M1045 
HMMWV 8 10,218 81,744 109.2 873.6
9 M998 HMMWV 3 8,918 26,754 109.3 327.9
SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BY LANDING SEQUENCE PRIORITY
MPF(F) MEB SEA BASED MANEUVER ELEMENT (SURFACE)
NOTE:  UNITS LISTED ARE PER BATTALION TASK FORCE.  FOR SURFACE, WEIGHTS AND AREAS ARE 






w/M101 Trlr 1 11,770 11,770 140.9 140.9
10 B Command 18 EFV-P 1 72,454 72,454 360.0 360.0
Det, AA Plt 12 EFV-C 1 67,551 67,551 360.0 360.0
Arty Bn LNO 
Tm 4
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101 Trlr 1 12,118 12,118 185.3 185.3
NGLO Team 9
MRC JTRS 
HMMWV 3 9,170 27,510 64.8 194.5
11 LAR Co B 84 LAV 25 14 28,685 401,590 173.3 2425.5
4 LAV AT 4 30,624 122,496 171.5 686.0
6 LAV C2 1 29,121 29,121 174.6 174.6
2 LAV L 3 29,429 88,287 173.5 520.6
3 LAV M 2 30,047 60,094 172.2 344.4





HMMWV 2 10,158 20,316 109.8 219.6
12 M998 HMMWV 3 9,218 27,654 109.3 327.9
12
MRC JTRS 




1 Trlr 1 10,870 10,870 140.9 140.9
13
Det, Arty 
Btry C (3 
Guns) 3
M1043 
HMMWV 1 9,858 9,858 109.8 109.8
12
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101 Trlr 3 12,118 36,354 185.3 556.0
24 MTVR w/LW155 3 46,208 138,624 214.4 643.1
9
MTVR w/M105 
Trlr 3 53,068 159,204 310.6 931.9
6
MRC JTRS 
HMMWV 2 9,170 18,340 64.8 129.7
14
Avenger 
Section 10 Avenger 5 13,613 68,065 116.5 582.3
3
MRC JTRS 
HMMWV 1 9,170 9,170 64.8 64.8
15
Arty Btry C (-
) (3 Guns) 4
M1043 
HMMWV 1 10,158 10,158 109.8 109.8
Det, CBR 
Plt, HQ Btry 4
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101 Trlr 1 12,118 12,118 185.3 185.3
3
MRC JTRS 
HMMWV 1 9,170 9,170 64.8 64.8
4 MTVR 1 45,008 45,008 214.4 214.4
24 MTVR w/LW155 3 46,208 138,624 214.4 643.1
15
MTVR w/M105 
Trlr 5 53,068 265,340 310.6 1553.1
3
MTVR w/M149 
WB 1 50,308 50,308 307.8 307.8
2 4K Forklift 2 12,004 24,008 106.2 212.3
4
M1035 











w/MK155 3 52,541 157,623 339.0 1017.1





(Veh/Pers) 18 M998 HMMWV 6 8,918 53,508 109.3 655.7
9
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101 Trlr 3 11,818 35,454 185.3 556.0
6
MRC JTRS 






HMMWV 2 8,590 17,181 106.3 212.5
8 M997 HMMWV 2 11,550 23,101 122.4 244.9
21 M998 HMMWV 7 8,918 62,426 109.3 765.0
3
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101 Trlr 1 11,818 11,818 185.3 185.3
19
Inf Bn DS 
CSS Co B 2 4K Forklift 2 12,004 24,008 106.2 212.3
10 M1043 2 10,458 20,916 109.8 219.6
10 M997 HMMWV 2 11,850 23,701 122.4 244.9
24 M998 HMMWV 6 9,218 55,308 109.3 655.7
8 Contact Truck 2 22,200 44,400 214.4 428.8
16
M998 HMMWV 
w/M101 Trlr 4 12,118 48,472 185.3 741.4
3
MRC JTRS 








































3116 474 5,209,148.8 17,520,088.4 29,189.3 98,163.3










B. SIX SHIP CARGO DISTRIBUTION 
Distribution of one battalion landing team on six HSAC 
ships: 
 
Vehicle SHIP 1 SHIP 2 SHIP 3 SHIP 4 SHIP 5 SHIP 6
qty qty qty qty qty qty
Humvee 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700 17 137700
EFV 9 655911 8 583032 8 583032 8 583032 8 583032 8 583032
M1A2 2 278160 3 417240 3 417240 2 278160 2 278160 2 278160
LAV 5 145000 4 116000 4 116000 4 116000 4 116000 4 116000
ABV 0 0 0 0 1 139080 1 139080
AVLB 0 0 0 1 93194 0 0
M9ACE 0 0 1 37799 1 37799 1 37799 1 37799
M88A2 0 1 140000 0 0 0 0
ITV 1 7900 1 7900 1 7900 2 15800 1 7900 2 15800
AVENGER 1 8300 0 1 8300 1 8300 1 8300 1 8300
MTVR 4 164000 3 123000 3 123000 3 123000 3 123000 3 123000
LW155 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200 1 9200
M105 2 10720 2 10720 1 5360 1 5360 1 5360 1 5360
MK155 0 0 1 6405 1 6405 1 6405 0
M101 2 5678 2 5678 4 11356 2 5678 4 11356 3 8517
M149 0 0 0 0 0 1 2600
M116 0 0 0 0 1 2360 0
AN/TPQ 1 43756 0 0 0 0 0
FORKLIFT 1 10000 0 1 10000 1 10000 0 1 10000
CONTACT TRUCK 0 0 0 2 40000 0 0
TOTAL PAYLOAD (LB) 1476325 1550470 1473292 1469628 1465652 1474548


















C. CARGO VERTICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY CALCULATIONS 
VERTICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY CALCULATIONS FOR ONE 





Vehicle weight # of Total Height Vehicle weight*vcg
(lbs) vehicles weight (lb) (m) VCG (m) (lb*m)
Humvee 8100 17 137700 2.5908 10.7954 1486527
EFV 72879 9 655911 3.188208 7.094104 4653101
M1A2 139080 2 278160 2.886456 6.943228 1931328
LAV 29000 5 145000 2.68986 10.84493 1572515
ABV 139080 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
AVLB 93194 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M9ACE 37799 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M88A2 140000 0 3.1242 11.0621 0
ITV 7900 1 7900 1.6764 10.3382 81671.78
AVENGER 8300 1 8300 2.642616 10.82131 89816.86
MTVR 41000 4 164000 2.846832 10.92342 1791440
LW155 9200 1 9200 2.261616 10.63081 97803.43
M105 5360 2 10720 2.490216 10.74511 115187.6
MK155 6405 0 1.880616 10.44031 0
M101 2839 2 5678 2.112264 10.55613 59937.72
M149 2600 0 1.941576 10.47079 0
M116 2360 0 0.6096 9.8048 0
AN/TPQ 43756 1 43756 2.5908 10.7954 472363.5
FORKLIFT 10000 1 10000 3.090672 11.04534 110453.4
CONTACT TRUCK 20000 0 2.846832 10.92342 0
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LB) 1476325 12462145
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LT) 659.0737











Vehicle weight # of Total Height Vehicle weight*vcg
(lbs) vehicles weight (lb) (m) VCG (m) (lb*m)
Humvee 8100 17 137700 2.5908 10.7954 1486527
EFV 72879 8 583032 3.188208 7.094104 4136090
M1A2 139080 3 417240 2.886456 6.943228 2896992
LAV 29000 4 116000 2.68986 10.84493 1258012
ABV 139080 0 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
AVLB 93194 0 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M9ACE 37799 0 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M88A2 140000 1 140000 3.1242 11.0621 1548694
ITV 7900 1 7900 1.6764 10.3382 81671.78
AVENGER 8300 0 0 2.642616 10.82131 0
MTVR 41000 3 123000 2.846832 10.92342 1343580
LW155 9200 1 9200 2.261616 10.63081 97803.43
M105 5360 2 10720 2.490216 10.74511 115187.6
MK155 6405 0 0 1.880616 10.44031 0
M101 2839 2 5678 2.112264 10.55613 59937.72
M149 2600 0 0 1.941576 10.47079 0
M116 2360 0 0 0.6096 9.8048 0
AN/TPQ 43756 0 0 2.5908 10.7954 0
FORKLIFT 10000 0 0 3.090672 11.04534 0
CONTACT TRUCK 20000 0 0 2.846832 10.92342 0
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LB) 1550470 13024495
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LT) 692.1741
VCG of CARGO= 8.400353  
SHIP 3
Vehicle weight # of Total Height Vehicle weight*vcg
(lbs) vehicles weight (lb) (m) VCG (m) (lb*m)
Humvee 8100 17 137700 2.5908 10.7954 1486527
EFV 72879 8 583032 3.188208 7.094104 4136090
M1A2 139080 3 417240 2.886456 6.943228 2896992
LAV 29000 4 116000 2.68986 10.84493 1258012
ABV 139080 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
AVLB 93194 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M9ACE 37799 1 37799 2.886456 10.94323 413643.1
M88A2 140000 0 3.1242 11.0621 0
ITV 7900 1 7900 1.6764 10.3382 81671.78
AVENGER 8300 1 8300 2.642616 10.82131 89816.86
MTVR 41000 3 123000 2.846832 10.92342 1343580
LW155 9200 1 9200 2.261616 10.63081 97803.43
M105 5360 1 5360 2.490216 10.74511 57593.78
MK155 6405 1 6405 1.880616 10.44031 66870.17
M101 2839 4 11356 2.112264 10.55613 119875.4
M149 2600 0 1.941576 10.47079 0
M116 2360 0 0.6096 9.8048 0
AN/TPQ 43756 0 2.5908 10.7954 0
FORKLIFT 10000 1 10000 3.090672 11.04534 110453.4
CONTACT TRUCK 20000 0 2.846832 10.92342 0
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LB) 1473292 12158929
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LT) 657.7196
VCG of CARGO= 8.252898 
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SHIP 4
Vehicle weight # of Total Height Vehicle weight*vcg
(lbs) vehicles weight (lb) (m) VCG (m) (lb*m)
Humvee 8100 17 137700 2.5908 10.7954 1486527
EFV 72879 8 583032 3.188208 7.094104 4136090
M1A2 139080 2 278160 2.886456 6.943228 1931328
LAV 29000 4 116000 2.68986 10.84493 1258012
ABV 139080 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
AVLB 93194 1 93194 2.886456 10.94323 1019843
M9ACE 37799 1 37799 2.886456 10.94323 413643.1
M88A2 140000 0 3.1242 11.0621 0
ITV 7900 2 15800 1.6764 10.3382 163343.6
AVENGER 8300 1 8300 2.642616 10.82131 89816.86
MTVR 41000 3 123000 2.846832 10.92342 1343580
LW155 9200 1 9200 2.261616 10.63081 97803.43
M105 5360 1 5360 2.490216 10.74511 57593.78
MK155 6405 1 6405 1.880616 10.44031 66870.17
M101 2839 2 5678 2.112264 10.55613 59937.72
M149 2600 0 1.941576 10.47079 0
M116 2360 0 0.6096 9.8048 0
AN/TPQ 43756 0 2.5908 10.7954 0
FORKLIFT 10000 1 10000 3.090672 11.04534 110453.4
CONTACT TRUCK 20000 2 40000 2.846832 10.92342 436936.6
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LB) 1469628 12671778
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LT) 656.0839
VCG of CARGO= 8.622439 
SHIP 5
Vehicle weight # of Total Height Vehicle weight*vcg
(lbs) vehicles weight (lb) (m) VCG (m) (lb*m)
Humvee 8100 17 137700 2.5908 10.7954 1486527
EFV 72879 8 583032 3.188208 7.094104 4136090
M1A2 139080 2 278160 2.886456 6.943228 1931328
LAV 29000 4 116000 2.68986 10.84493 1258012
ABV 139080 1 139080 2.886456 10.94323 1521984
AVLB 93194 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M9ACE 37799 1 37799 2.886456 10.94323 413643.1
M88A2 140000 0 3.1242 11.0621 0
ITV 7900 1 7900 1.6764 10.3382 81671.78
AVENGER 8300 1 8300 2.642616 10.82131 89816.86
MTVR 41000 3 123000 2.846832 10.92342 1343580
LW155 9200 1 9200 2.261616 10.63081 97803.43
M105 5360 1 5360 2.490216 10.74511 57593.78
MK155 6405 1 6405 1.880616 10.44031 66870.17
M101 2839 4 11356 2.112264 10.55613 119875.4
M149 2600 0 1.941576 10.47079 0
M116 2360 1 2360 0.6096 9.8048 23139.33
AN/TPQ 43756 0 2.5908 10.7954 0
FORKLIFT 10000 0 3.090672 11.04534 0
CONTACT TRUCK 20000 0 2.846832 10.92342 0
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LB) 1465652 12627935
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LT) 654.3089







Vehicle weight # of Total Height Vehicle weight*vcg
(lbs) vehicles weight (lb) (m) VCG (m) (lb*m)
Humvee 8100 17 137700 2.5908 10.7954 1486527
EFV 72879 8 583032 3.188208 7.094104 4136090
M1A2 139080 2 278160 2.886456 6.943228 1931328
LAV 29000 4 116000 2.68986 10.84493 1258012
ABV 139080 1 139080 2.886456 10.94323 1521984
AVLB 93194 0 2.886456 10.94323 0
M9ACE 37799 1 37799 2.886456 10.94323 413643.1
M88A2 140000 0 3.1242 11.0621 0
ITV 7900 2 15800 1.6764 10.3382 163343.6
AVENGER 8300 1 8300 2.642616 10.82131 89816.86
MTVR 41000 3 123000 2.846832 10.92342 1343580
LW155 9200 1 9200 2.261616 10.63081 97803.43
M105 5360 1 5360 2.490216 10.74511 57593.78
MK155 6405 0 1.880616 10.44031 0
M101 2839 3 8517 2.112264 10.55613 89906.58
M149 2600 1 2600 1.941576 10.47079 27224.05
M116 2360 0 0.6096 9.8048 0
AN/TPQ 43756 0 2.5908 10.7954 0
FORKLIFT 10000 1 10000 3.090672 11.04534 110453.4
CONTACT TRUCK 20000 0 2.846832 10.92342 0
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LB) 1474548 12727305
TOTAL PAYLOAD WEIGHT(LT) 658.2804










D. WEIGHT AND BUOYANCY CALCULATIONS 
BOW RAMP WEIGHT AND BOUYANCY CALCULATIONS 
 
Bow Ramp Section Specifications: 
L = 5 meters 
W = 5 meters 
D = 1.7 meters 
 
Ramp is comprised of eight sections as described 
above, seven of which will experience buoyancy forces when 
the ramp is fully deployed. 
 
Density of Aluminum:   32700    al kg mρ =  
Density of Steel:    37850steel kg mρ =  
Aluminum to Steel Density Ratio: 0.34al
steel
ρ
ρ =  






ρ = =  
HSAC Bow Ramp Structure Density (estimate half 
steel/half aluminum construction): 
3 30.34 14.14 9.5       estimated lb lbft ftρ
 = =    
Bow Ramp Weight: 
( )( )( ) 3 3Total Volume (8 sections)= 40 5 1.6 320 11300.7m ft= =  
( )( )( ) 3 3Total Volume (7 floating sections)= 35 5 1.6 280 9888.1m ft= =  
( )3 3Weight of 40 meter ramp (8 sections) = 11300.7 9.5 107357 47.93lbft lb LTft  = =  
 
( )3 3Weight of 35 meter ramp (7 floating sections) = 9888.1 9.5 93937 41.94lbft lb LTft  = =  
 
Bow Ramp Draft Unloaded: 
( ) 39888.1 9.5 93937 41.94lbft lb LTft ∆ = = =    
236 
( ) 3 3 341.94 35 1467.8 41.56ftLT ft mLT ∇ = = =    




T mm m= =  
 
Maximum desired draft = 1.0m 
 
Desired cargo capacity = two M1A2 tanks, at 62.1LT 
each 
 
Bow Ramp Calculated Draft with 124.2LT load: 
 
124.2 41.94 166.1load structure LT LT LT+∆ = + =  
























E. OFFLOAD RATE CALCULATIONS 
It was assumed that a vehicle starting all the way at 
the stern of the HSAC could traverse the full length of the 
ship and fully deployed bow ramp at 5mph or 2.24m/s. 
Length of ship = 149m 
Length of deployed ramp = 35m 
Total travel distance = 184m 
Time to traverse total distance = 184 82.14
2.24 ms
m s=  
The above calculated offload time is the absolute 
worst case time for a vehicle leaving the ship.  Vehicles 
closer to the bow have to travel a shorter distance than 
those closer to the stern.  In addition, the EFVs and LAVs 
can exit out the stern instead of using the bow ramp.  Thus 
using this worst case time for all the loaded vehicles 
should produce a reasonable estimate for the offload time.  
It is also important to note that the initial vehicles to 
disembark will be unsecured from sea while the ramp is 
being deployed.  Then as the initial vehicles leave the 
remaining vehicles are unsecured in preparation for their 
departure. 
Vehicles loaded = 47 
Worst-case offload time = 47*82.14 3860.50 1.072s s hours= =  
Buffer added for extenuating events = 1 hour 



























APPENDIX VI HULL CALCULATIONS 






Draft FP 4.500 m Heel zero GM(Solid) 9.823 m 
Draft MS 4.500 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.000 m 
Draft AP 4.500 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 9.823 m 
Trim 0.00 deg. Wave No KMT 14.843 m 
































    LIGHT SHIP 3,810.00 68.300f 0.000 6.000u 



















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 
JP1.P 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958p 1.419 0.985 
JP1.S 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958s 1.419 0.985 
JP2.P 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609p 0.618 0.985 
JP2.S 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609s 0.618 0.985 
JP3.P 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640p 0.598 0.985 
JP3.S 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640s 0.598 0.985 
JP4.P 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191p 1.182 0.985 
JP4.S 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191s 1.182 0.985 
Subtotals: 100.00% 819.94 60.901f 0.000 1.994  
  














FW1.P 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046p 1.235 0.985 
FW1.S 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046s 1.235 0.985 
Subtotals: 100.00% 227.10 101.504f 0.000 1.235  
  














WB1.P 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985 
WB1.S 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985 




























HULL Intact 1.025 4,967.53 69.697f 0.000 2.791 0.950 





Draft is from Baseline. 























0.000 0.000        
0.100 7.931 71.742f 0.066 71.879f 1.448 594.657 4,301.723 11.345 
0.200 26.676 71.930f 0.128 72.115f 2.298 1236.824 2,662.185 10.214 
0.300 53.994 72.064f 0.191 72.266f 3.148 1991.351 2,118.908 11.013 
0.400 88.723 72.179f 0.254 72.407f 3.790 2764.115 1,790.833 10.221 
0.500 129.726 72.282f 0.316 72.541f 4.410 3571.172 1,583.115 9.960 
0.600 176.907 72.370f 0.379 72.675f 5.024 4418.229 1,436.810 9.990 
0.700 230.252 72.448f 0.442 72.697f 5.632 5340.515 1,334.797 10.075 
0.800 289.045 72.518f 0.505 72.853f 6.122 6198.808 1,234.630 9.749 
0.900 352.723 72.583f 0.567 72.922f 6.604 7099.704 1,159.147 9.524 
1.000 421.163 72.640f 0.630 72.971f 7.074 8001.117 1,094.377 9.388 
1.100 494.273 72.689f 0.692 73.012f 7.538 8913.863 1,039.184 9.323 
1.200 572.004 72.732f 0.754 73.039f 7.996 9832.132 990.753 9.314 
1.300 654.215 72.768f 0.817 73.009f 8.426 10787.380 950.656 9.228 
1.400 740.324 72.800f 0.879 73.023f 8.799 11680.080 909.863 9.053 
1.500 830.113 72.826f 0.941 73.033f 9.160 12561.960 872.959 8.905 
1.600 923.496 72.846f 1.002 73.046f 9.508 13418.780 838.447 8.788 
1.700 1020.400 72.861f 1.064 72.961f 9.867 14350.160 811.684 8.702 
1.800 1120.783 72.869f 1.125 72.900f 10.215 15251.660 785.604 8.641 
1.900 1224.653 72.870f 1.187 72.818f 10.563 16167.050 762.304 8.603 
2.000 1331.987 72.862f 1.248 72.725f 10.896 17087.560 740.952 8.553 
2.100 1442.453 72.847f 1.310 72.621f 11.190 18001.750 720.976 8.436 
2.200 1555.860 72.824f 1.371 72.483f 11.480 18934.830 703.219 8.328 
2.300 1672.158 72.793f 1.432 72.318f 11.767 19890.510 687.471 8.233 
2.400 1791.323 72.753f 1.493 72.129f 12.054 20868.730 673.422 8.153 
2.500 1913.357 72.705f 1.554 71.913f 12.341 21874.400 660.966 8.088 
2.600 2038.269 72.648f 1.615 71.674f 12.631 22912.690 650.011 8.035 
2.700 2166.087 72.582f 1.676 71.409f 12.923 23987.520 640.436 7.995 
2.800 2296.835 72.506f 1.738 71.117f 13.220 25109.100 632.296 7.966 
2.900 2430.443 72.421f 1.799 70.786f 13.494 26287.780 625.651 7.899 
3.000 2566.675 72.325f 1.860 70.438f 13.755 27486.140 619.510 7.824 
3.100 2705.507 72.219f 1.921 70.068f 14.016 28726.340 614.289 7.755 
3.200 2846.944 72.104f 1.982 69.689f 14.274 29991.040 609.519 7.694 
3.300 2991.049 71.977f 2.043 69.228f 14.547 31391.950 607.275 7.642 
3.400 3137.848 71.838f 2.104 68.784f 14.815 32789.630 604.664 7.598 
3.500 3287.456 71.686f 2.166 68.214f 15.116 34404.420 605.560 7.634 
3.600 3440.279 71.521f 2.227 67.695f 15.453 35827.530 602.625 8.075 
3.700 3596.557 71.344f 2.289 67.229f 15.803 37098.040 596.939 8.703 
3.800 3756.353 71.160f 2.351 66.782f 16.151 38316.600 590.385 9.414 
3.900 3919.581 70.968f 2.414 66.334f 16.494 39505.680 583.429 10.178 
4.000 4086.282 70.770f 2.476 65.874f 16.847 40708.030 576.729 10.987 
4.100 4256.575 70.565f 2.539 65.399f 17.211 41945.430 570.551 11.823 
4.200 4430.531 70.352f 2.602 64.921f 17.578 43179.730 564.345 12.661 
4.300 4608.139 70.134f 2.666 64.482f 17.943 44373.480 557.666 13.446 
4.400 4789.379 69.913f 2.730 64.074f 18.304 45520.370 550.509 14.180 
4.500 4974.211 69.689f 2.794 63.697f 18.661 46620.790 542.950 14.867 




Hydrostatic Properties at   Trim = 0.00,  Heel = 0.00






























VCB m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Displ.MT x 1000  -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
MT/cm Imm. x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0
Mom/Deg Trim x 10000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
KML  x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
KMT  x 10  1.0 1.5
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DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950
JP1.P 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958p 1.419 0.985
JP1.S 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958s 1.419 0.985
JP2.P 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609p 0.618 0.985
JP2.S 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609s 0.618 0.985
JP3.P 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640p 0.598 0.985
JP3.S 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640s 0.598 0.985
JP4.P 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191p 1.182 0.985
JP4.S 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191s 1.182 0.985
Subtotals: 100.00% 819.94 60.901f 0.000 1.994  
  














FW1.P 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046p 1.235 0.985
FW1.S 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046s 1.235 0.985
Subtotals: 100.00% 227.10 101.504f 0.000 1.235  
  














WB1.P 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985
WB1.S 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985




















Tank Capacities for JP1.P containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.82 10.00% 7.86 6.68 35.409f 1.163p 0.635 19.52 
1.04 20.00% 15.73 13.37 34.551f 1.359p 0.787 37.77 
1.21 30.00% 23.59 20.05 33.975f 1.488p 0.902 54.28 
1.36 40.00% 31.45 26.74 33.533f 1.586p 0.998 70.72 
1.49 50.00% 39.32 33.42 33.173f 1.667p 1.083 87.31 
1.60 60.00% 47.18 40.10 32.864f 1.736p 1.160 102.38 
1.71 70.00% 55.04 46.79 32.599f 1.798p 1.231 115.07 
1.81 80.00% 62.91 53.47 32.377f 1.855p 1.297 127.09 
1.91 90.00% 70.77 60.15 32.191f 1.908p 1.359 138.97 
1.98 98.00% 77.06 65.50 32.063f 1.948p 1.407 148.43 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for JP2.P containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.26 10.00% 4.80 4.08 49.951f 0.797p 0.169 11.44 
0.37 20.00% 9.60 8.16 49.279f 0.984p 0.243 21.65 
0.47 30.00% 14.40 12.24 48.966f 1.112p 0.303 30.65 
0.56 40.00% 19.21 16.33 48.792f 1.213p 0.357 40.11 
0.65 50.00% 24.01 20.41 48.683f 1.299p 0.407 50.36 
0.72 60.00% 28.81 24.49 48.606f 1.377p 0.453 60.12 
0.80 70.00% 33.61 28.57 48.542f 1.445p 0.497 68.21 
0.87 80.00% 38.41 32.65 48.491f 1.505p 0.539 75.88 
0.93 90.00% 43.21 36.73 48.450f 1.559p 0.579 83.55 
0.99 98.00% 47.05 40.00 48.422f 1.599p 0.610 89.86 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0




Tank Capacities for JP3.P containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.22 10.00% 5.17 4.40 65.997f 0.783p 0.135 11.29 
0.34 20.00% 10.34 8.79 65.998f 0.993p 0.209 22.84 
0.45 30.00% 15.51 13.19 65.999f 1.127p 0.270 32.14 
0.54 40.00% 20.68 17.58 65.999f 1.232p 0.326 42.43 
0.63 50.00% 25.86 21.98 65.999f 1.322p 0.378 53.64 
0.71 60.00% 31.03 26.37 65.999f 1.403p 0.426 64.09 
0.79 70.00% 36.20 30.77 65.999f 1.473p 0.472 71.87 
0.86 80.00% 41.37 35.16 65.999f 1.534p 0.515 79.95 
0.93 90.00% 46.54 39.56 65.999f 1.589p 0.558 88.31 
0.99 98.00% 50.68 43.08 65.999f 1.630p 0.590 95.19 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0




Tank Capacities for JP4.P containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.42 10.00% 14.03 11.92 83.978f 1.092p 0.254 29.34 
0.66 20.00% 28.05 23.84 83.985f 1.357p 0.399 58.64 
0.87 30.00% 42.08 35.77 83.989f 1.541p 0.522 81.03 
1.06 40.00% 56.10 47.69 83.990f 1.680p 0.633 104.42 
1.23 50.00% 70.13 59.61 83.992f 1.797p 0.736 129.70 
1.40 60.00% 84.16 71.53 83.992f 1.897p 0.832 147.46 
1.56 70.00% 98.18 83.46 83.993f 1.983p 0.924 165.16 
1.71 80.00% 112.21 95.38 83.994f 2.058p 1.013 183.53 
1.86 90.00% 126.23 107.30 83.994f 2.127p 1.099 202.52 
1.97 98.00% 137.45 116.84 83.994f 2.179p 1.165 217.99 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for FW1.P containing FRESH WATER (1.000) 
 

















0.52 10.00% 11.35 11.35 100.189f 1.048p 0.353 27.59 
0.75 20.00% 22.71 22.71 100.788f 1.279p 0.495 52.54 
0.95 30.00% 34.06 34.06 101.041f 1.444p 0.613 73.38 
1.12 40.00% 45.42 45.42 101.187f 1.571p 0.718 93.83 
1.29 50.00% 56.77 56.77 101.278f 1.678p 0.815 115.56 
1.44 60.00% 68.13 68.13 101.346f 1.771p 0.907 133.58 
1.59 70.00% 79.48 79.48 101.400f 1.851p 0.993 149.68 
1.73 80.00% 90.84 90.84 101.442f 1.922p 1.077 165.87 
1.87 90.00% 102.19 102.19 101.476f 1.987p 1.157 182.61 
1.98 98.00% 111.28 111.28 101.498f 2.035p 1.219 196.38 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for WB1.P containing WATER BALLAST (1.025) 
 

















0.91 10.00% 5.39 5.52 114.566f 0.879p 0.744 10.89 
1.11 20.00% 10.77 11.04 115.493f 1.009p 0.880 21.20 
1.26 30.00% 16.16 16.56 116.113f 1.094p 0.983 30.28 
1.39 40.00% 21.55 22.09 116.576f 1.159p 1.069 38.22 
1.51 50.00% 26.93 27.61 116.914f 1.215p 1.146 45.75 
1.62 60.00% 32.32 33.13 117.170f 1.267p 1.216 53.28 
1.72 70.00% 37.71 38.65 117.370f 1.315p 1.280 60.14 
1.82 80.00% 43.09 44.17 117.533f 1.359p 1.342 66.53 
1.91 90.00% 48.48 49.69 117.669f 1.400p 1.400 72.70 
1.98 98.00% 52.79 54.11 117.762f 1.431p 1.444 77.58 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 0.5
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for DS1.P containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















2.81 10.00% 8.17 6.94 48.086f 5.275p 2.658 5.52 
3.09 20.00% 16.34 13.89 48.065f 5.317p 2.804 6.74 
3.35 30.00% 24.50 20.83 48.054f 5.348p 2.942 7.87 
3.60 40.00% 32.67 27.77 48.048f 5.375p 3.076 9.06 
3.84 50.00% 40.84 34.71 48.042f 5.399p 3.204 9.98 
4.08 60.00% 49.01 41.66 48.036f 5.419p 3.330 10.22 
4.31 70.00% 57.18 48.60 48.031f 5.433p 3.453 10.47 
4.54 80.00% 65.34 55.54 48.028f 5.445p 3.574 10.71 
4.77 90.00% 73.51 62.49 48.025f 5.456p 3.694 10.88 
4.95 98.00% 80.05 68.04 48.023f 5.463p 3.790 10.88 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
FSM m-MT x 10  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  2.0 3.0 4.0




Tank Capacities for DS2.P containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















2.81 10.00% 8.20 6.97 65.999f 5.286p 2.656 5.73 
3.08 20.00% 16.40 13.94 65.999f 5.326p 2.801 6.84 
3.35 30.00% 24.61 20.91 65.999f 5.355p 2.939 7.98 
3.60 40.00% 32.81 27.89 66.000f 5.382p 3.072 9.17 
3.84 50.00% 41.01 34.86 66.000f 5.405p 3.201 10.00 
4.07 60.00% 49.21 41.83 66.000f 5.424p 3.326 10.25 
4.31 70.00% 57.41 48.80 66.000f 5.438p 3.449 10.49 
4.54 80.00% 65.61 55.77 66.000f 5.449p 3.571 10.73 
4.77 90.00% 73.82 62.74 66.000f 5.459p 3.691 10.88 
4.95 98.00% 80.38 68.32 66.000f 5.466p 3.787 10.88 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
FSM m-MT x 10  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  2.0 3.0 4.0




Tank Capacities for JP1.S containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.82 10.00% 7.86 6.68 35.409f 1.163s 0.635 19.52 
1.04 20.00% 15.73 13.37 34.551f 1.359s 0.787 37.77 
1.21 30.00% 23.59 20.05 33.975f 1.488s 0.902 54.28 
1.36 40.00% 31.45 26.74 33.533f 1.586s 0.998 70.72 
1.49 50.00% 39.32 33.42 33.173f 1.667s 1.083 87.31 
1.60 60.00% 47.18 40.10 32.864f 1.736s 1.160 102.38 
1.71 70.00% 55.04 46.79 32.599f 1.798s 1.231 115.07 
1.81 80.00% 62.91 53.47 32.377f 1.855s 1.297 127.09 
1.91 90.00% 70.77 60.15 32.191f 1.908s 1.359 138.97 
1.98 98.00% 77.06 65.50 32.063f 1.948s 1.407 148.43 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for JP2.S containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.26 10.00% 4.80 4.08 49.951f 0.797s 0.169 11.44 
0.37 20.00% 9.60 8.16 49.279f 0.984s 0.243 21.65 
0.47 30.00% 14.40 12.24 48.966f 1.112s 0.303 30.65 
0.56 40.00% 19.21 16.33 48.792f 1.213s 0.357 40.11 
0.65 50.00% 24.01 20.41 48.683f 1.299s 0.407 50.36 
0.72 60.00% 28.81 24.49 48.606f 1.377s 0.453 60.12 
0.80 70.00% 33.61 28.57 48.542f 1.445s 0.497 68.21 
0.87 80.00% 38.41 32.65 48.491f 1.505s 0.539 75.88 
0.93 90.00% 43.21 36.73 48.450f 1.559s 0.579 83.55 
0.99 98.00% 47.05 40.00 48.422f 1.599s 0.610 89.86 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0




Tank Capacities for JP3.S containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.22 10.00% 5.17 4.40 65.997f 0.783s 0.135 11.29 
0.34 20.00% 10.34 8.79 65.998f 0.993s 0.209 22.84 
0.45 30.00% 15.51 13.19 65.999f 1.127s 0.270 32.14 
0.54 40.00% 20.68 17.58 65.999f 1.232s 0.326 42.43 
0.63 50.00% 25.86 21.98 65.999f 1.322s 0.378 53.64 
0.71 60.00% 31.03 26.37 65.999f 1.403s 0.426 64.09 
0.79 70.00% 36.20 30.77 65.999f 1.473s 0.472 71.87 
0.86 80.00% 41.37 35.16 65.999f 1.534s 0.515 79.95 
0.93 90.00% 46.54 39.56 65.999f 1.589s 0.558 88.31 
0.99 98.00% 50.68 43.08 65.999f 1.630s 0.590 95.19 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0




Tank Capacities for JP4.S containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















0.42 10.00% 14.03 11.92 83.978f 1.092s 0.254 29.34 
0.66 20.00% 28.05 23.84 83.985f 1.357s 0.399 58.64 
0.87 30.00% 42.08 35.77 83.989f 1.541s 0.522 81.03 
1.06 40.00% 56.10 47.69 83.990f 1.680s 0.633 104.42 
1.23 50.00% 70.13 59.61 83.992f 1.797s 0.736 129.70 
1.40 60.00% 84.16 71.53 83.992f 1.897s 0.832 147.46 
1.56 70.00% 98.18 83.46 83.993f 1.983s 0.924 165.16 
1.71 80.00% 112.21 95.38 83.994f 2.058s 1.013 183.53 
1.86 90.00% 126.23 107.30 83.994f 2.127s 1.099 202.52 
1.97 98.00% 137.45 116.84 83.994f 2.179s 1.165 217.99 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for FW1.S containing FRESH WATER (1.000) 
 

















0.52 10.00% 11.35 11.35 100.189f 1.048s 0.353 27.59 
0.75 20.00% 22.71 22.71 100.788f 1.279s 0.495 52.54 
0.95 30.00% 34.06 34.06 101.041f 1.444s 0.613 73.38 
1.12 40.00% 45.42 45.42 101.187f 1.571s 0.718 93.83 
1.29 50.00% 56.77 56.77 101.278f 1.678s 0.815 115.56 
1.44 60.00% 68.13 68.13 101.346f 1.771s 0.907 133.58 
1.59 70.00% 79.48 79.48 101.400f 1.851s 0.993 149.68 
1.73 80.00% 90.84 90.84 101.442f 1.922s 1.077 165.87 
1.87 90.00% 102.19 102.19 101.476f 1.987s 1.157 182.61 
1.98 98.00% 111.28 111.28 101.498f 2.035s 1.219 196.38 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for DS1.S containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















2.81 10.00% 8.17 6.94 48.086f 5.275s 2.658 5.52 
3.09 20.00% 16.34 13.89 48.065f 5.317s 2.804 6.74 
3.35 30.00% 24.50 20.83 48.054f 5.348s 2.942 7.87 
3.60 40.00% 32.67 27.77 48.048f 5.375s 3.076 9.06 
3.84 50.00% 40.84 34.71 48.042f 5.399s 3.204 9.98 
4.08 60.00% 49.01 41.66 48.036f 5.419s 3.330 10.22 
4.31 70.00% 57.18 48.60 48.031f 5.433s 3.453 10.47 
4.54 80.00% 65.34 55.54 48.028f 5.445s 3.574 10.71 
4.77 90.00% 73.51 62.49 48.025f 5.456s 3.694 10.88 
4.95 98.00% 80.05 68.04 48.023f 5.463s 3.790 10.88 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
FSM m-MT x 10  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  2.0 3.0 4.0




Tank Capacities for DS2.S containing DIESEL OIL (0.850) 
 

















2.81 10.00% 8.20 6.97 65.998f 5.286s 2.656 5.73 
3.08 20.00% 16.40 13.94 65.999f 5.326s 2.801 6.84 
3.35 30.00% 24.61 20.91 65.999f 5.355s 2.939 7.98 
3.60 40.00% 32.81 27.89 66.000f 5.382s 3.072 9.17 
3.84 50.00% 41.01 34.86 66.000f 5.405s 3.201 10.00 
4.07 60.00% 49.21 41.83 66.000f 5.424s 3.326 10.24 
4.31 70.00% 57.41 48.80 66.000f 5.438s 3.449 10.49 
4.54 80.00% 65.61 55.77 66.000f 5.449s 3.571 10.73 
4.77 90.00% 73.82 62.74 66.000f 5.459s 3.691 10.88 
4.95 98.00% 80.38 68.32 66.000f 5.466s 3.787 10.88 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
FSM m-MT x 10  0.0 0.5 1.0
VCG m x 1  2.0 3.0 4.0




Tank Capacities for WB1.S containing WATER BALLAST (1.025) 
 

















0.91 10.00% 5.39 5.52 114.566f 0.879s 0.744 10.89 
1.11 20.00% 10.77 11.04 115.493f 1.009s 0.880 21.20 
1.26 30.00% 16.16 16.56 116.113f 1.094s 0.983 30.28 
1.39 40.00% 21.55 22.09 116.576f 1.159s 1.069 38.22 
1.51 50.00% 26.93 27.61 116.914f 1.215s 1.146 45.75 
1.62 60.00% 32.32 33.13 117.170f 1.267s 1.216 53.28 
1.72 70.00% 37.71 38.65 117.370f 1.315s 1.280 60.14 
1.82 80.00% 43.09 44.17 117.533f 1.359s 1.342 66.53 
1.91 90.00% 48.48 49.69 117.669f 1.400s 1.400 72.70 
1.98 98.00% 52.79 54.11 117.762f 1.431s 1.444 77.58 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 10  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 0.5
VCG m x 1  0.0 1.0 2.0




Tank Capacities for WT1.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















2.92 10.00% 45.81 43.52 17.464f 0.000 2.553 510.07 
3.32 20.00% 91.63 87.05 16.051f 0.000 2.846 982.15 
3.60 30.00% 137.44 130.57 14.913f 0.000 3.054 1,431.73 
3.84 40.00% 183.26 174.10 14.088f 0.000 3.222 1,848.83 
4.05 50.00% 229.07 217.62 13.518f 0.000 3.367 2,214.23 
4.26 60.00% 274.89 261.15 13.102f 0.000 3.498 2,526.59 
4.45 70.00% 320.70 304.67 12.784f 0.000 3.620 2,797.96 
4.64 80.00% 366.52 348.19 12.533f 0.000 3.736 3,023.28 
4.82 90.00% 412.33 391.72 12.330f 0.000 3.846 3,208.13 
4.96 98.00% 448.98 426.54 12.192f 0.000 3.931 3,323.89 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
VCG m x 1  2.0 3.0 4.0




Tank Capacities for WT2.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















1.50 10.00% 77.52 73.64 33.136f 0.000 1.092 699.78 
2.02 20.00% 155.04 147.29 32.001f 0.000 1.431 1,280.86 
2.46 30.00% 232.55 220.93 31.478f 0.000 1.702 1,770.35 
2.86 40.00% 310.07 294.57 31.173f 0.000 1.942 2,164.57 
3.24 50.00% 387.59 368.21 30.973f 0.000 2.164 2,485.08 
3.60 60.00% 465.11 441.86 30.829f 0.000 2.374 2,719.30 
3.96 70.00% 542.63 515.50 30.721f 0.000 2.575 2,904.02 
4.31 80.00% 620.14 589.14 30.635f 0.000 2.770 3,004.84 
4.66 90.00% 697.66 662.78 30.566f 0.000 2.960 3,051.63 
4.93 98.00% 759.68 721.70 30.521f 0.000 3.110 3,075.58 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
VCG m x 1  1.0 2.0 3.0




Tank Capacities for WT3.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















0.99 10.00% 90.80 86.26 48.422f 0.000 0.610 773.94 
1.56 20.00% 181.60 172.52 48.252f 0.000 0.946 1,387.53 
2.06 30.00% 272.40 258.79 48.184f 0.000 1.235 1,913.28 
2.52 40.00% 363.21 345.05 48.144f 0.000 1.499 2,276.50 
2.95 50.00% 454.01 431.31 48.119f 0.000 1.746 2,609.98 
3.37 60.00% 544.81 517.57 48.101f 0.000 1.982 2,805.03 
3.79 70.00% 635.61 603.83 48.088f 0.000 2.210 2,994.00 
4.19 80.00% 726.41 690.10 48.077f 0.000 2.433 3,035.25 
4.60 90.00% 817.21 776.36 48.069f 0.000 2.651 3,074.17 
4.92 98.00% 889.86 845.37 48.063f 0.000 2.823 3,083.69 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 1000  0.0 0.5 1.0
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
VCG m x 1  1.0 2.0 3.0




Tank Capacities for WT4.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















0.95 10.00% 91.83 87.24 65.999f 0.000 0.566 776.61 
1.52 20.00% 183.66 174.48 66.000f 0.000 0.905 1,392.13 
2.03 30.00% 275.50 261.72 66.000f 0.000 1.196 1,920.47 
2.49 40.00% 367.33 348.97 66.000f 0.000 1.462 2,283.05 
2.93 50.00% 459.16 436.21 66.000f 0.000 1.711 2,614.21 
3.36 60.00% 551.00 523.45 66.000f 0.000 1.950 2,810.21 
3.77 70.00% 642.83 610.69 66.000f 0.000 2.181 2,997.68 
4.18 80.00% 734.66 697.93 66.000f 0.000 2.405 3,036.60 
4.59 90.00% 826.49 785.17 66.000f 0.000 2.625 3,075.70 
4.92 98.00% 899.96 854.97 66.000f 0.000 2.799 3,083.69 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 1000  0.0 1.0
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
VCG m x 1  1.0 2.0 3.0




Tank Capacities for WT5.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















0.95 10.00% 91.80 87.21 83.990f 0.000 0.567 776.03 
1.52 20.00% 183.60 174.42 83.993f 0.000 0.905 1,391.14 
2.03 30.00% 275.41 261.64 83.994f 0.000 1.196 1,919.18 
2.49 40.00% 367.21 348.85 83.995f 0.000 1.462 2,281.62 
2.93 50.00% 459.01 436.06 83.996f 0.000 1.712 2,612.71 
3.36 60.00% 550.81 523.28 83.996f 0.000 1.951 2,808.67 
3.77 70.00% 642.62 610.49 83.996f 0.000 2.181 2,996.22 
4.18 80.00% 734.42 697.70 83.997f 0.000 2.406 3,035.28 
4.59 90.00% 826.22 784.91 83.997f 0.000 2.626 3,074.51 
4.92 98.00% 899.66 854.68 83.997f 0.000 2.800 3,082.63 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 1000  0.0 1.0
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
VCG m x 1  1.0 2.0 3.0




Tank Capacities for WT6.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















1.06 10.00% 85.40 81.13 101.018f 0.000 0.683 666.12 
1.63 20.00% 170.79 162.25 101.327f 0.000 1.019 1,198.45 
2.12 30.00% 256.20 243.39 101.455f 0.000 1.307 1,656.80 
2.58 40.00% 341.60 324.52 101.533f 0.000 1.568 1,991.83 
3.01 50.00% 427.00 405.65 101.584f 0.000 1.813 2,300.42 
3.42 60.00% 512.40 486.78 101.624f 0.000 2.046 2,494.05 
3.82 70.00% 597.80 567.91 101.654f 0.000 2.271 2,680.45 
4.22 80.00% 683.20 649.04 101.680f 0.000 2.489 2,754.38 
4.61 90.00% 768.60 730.17 101.702f 0.000 2.703 2,813.38 
4.92 98.00% 836.92 795.08 101.717f 0.000 2.871 2,848.23 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 1000  0.0 0.5
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
VCG m x 1  1.0 2.0 3.0




Tank Capacities for WT7.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















1.58 10.00% 58.52 55.59 117.084f 0.000 1.191 307.58 
2.11 20.00% 117.03 111.18 117.907f 0.000 1.523 559.60 
2.56 30.00% 175.55 166.77 118.275f 0.000 1.794 791.56 
2.96 40.00% 234.06 222.36 118.497f 0.000 2.036 993.02 
3.34 50.00% 292.58 277.95 118.650f 0.000 2.258 1,182.10 
3.69 60.00% 351.09 333.54 118.765f 0.000 2.468 1,339.93 
4.03 70.00% 409.61 389.13 118.857f 0.000 2.667 1,488.46 
4.36 80.00% 468.12 444.72 118.932f 0.000 2.858 1,613.89 
4.69 90.00% 526.64 500.31 118.997f 0.000 3.044 1,718.14 
4.94 98.00% 573.45 544.78 119.043f 0.000 3.188 1,795.57 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
FSM m-MT x 1000  0.0 1.0 2.0
VCG m x 1  1.0 2.0 3.0




Tank Capacities for WT8.C containing CE (0.950) 
 

















2.54 10.00% 16.92 16.07 132.002f 0.000 2.158 35.48 
3.01 20.00% 33.84 32.15 132.622f 0.000 2.472 71.58 
3.36 30.00% 50.76 48.22 133.012f 0.000 2.711 108.16 
3.67 40.00% 67.68 64.29 133.300f 0.000 2.913 143.95 
3.93 50.00% 84.60 80.37 133.532f 0.000 3.090 179.65 
4.18 60.00% 101.52 96.44 133.725f 0.000 3.251 215.69 
4.40 70.00% 118.44 112.52 133.893f 0.000 3.400 250.57 
4.61 80.00% 135.36 128.59 134.040f 0.000 3.539 284.91 
4.81 90.00% 152.27 144.66 134.172f 0.000 3.669 319.27 
4.97 98.00% 165.81 157.52 134.268f 0.000 3.769 346.85 




Part Long.(m) Trans.(m) Vert.(m) 



















Weight MT x 100  0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
FSM m-MT x 100  0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
VCG m x 1  2.0 3.0 4.0




D. CROSS CURVES OF STABILITY 
 
Righting Arms(heel) for VCG = 0.00 
Trim zero at heel = 0 (RA Trim = 0) 
 
 
Displ (MT) 5.000s 10.000s 15.000s 20.000s 25.000s 30.000s 35.000s 
1000.000 0.761s 1.588s 3.309s 5.309s 7.068s 8.459s 9.466s 
1250.000 0.742s 1.654s 3.360s 5.181s 6.793s 8.128s 9.164s 
1500.000 0.726s 1.731s 3.394s 5.078s 6.580s 7.864s 8.916s 
1750.000 0.714s 1.810s 3.417s 4.992s 6.409s 7.648s 8.714s 
2000.000 0.712s 1.885s 3.432s 4.919s 6.268s 7.469s 8.546s 
2250.000 0.726s 1.954s 3.439s 4.855s 6.150s 7.320s 8.406s 
2500.000 0.754s 2.015s 3.443s 4.799s 6.050s 7.193s 8.290s 
2750.000 0.792s 2.067s 3.444s 4.750s 5.964s 7.087s 8.192s 
3000.000 0.836s 2.112s 3.443s 4.706s 5.890s 6.997s 8.110s 
3250.000 0.883s 2.152s 3.441s 4.668s 5.825s 6.922s 8.041s 
3500.000 0.933s 2.186s 3.438s 4.634s 5.768s 6.858s 7.983s 
3750.000 0.984s 2.216s 3.435s 4.604s 5.718s 6.803s 7.933s 
4000.000 1.033s 2.242s 3.431s 4.576s 5.672s 6.757s 7.891s 
4250.000 1.080s 2.265s 3.427s 4.551s 5.631s 6.716s 7.856s 
4500.000 1.124s 2.284s 3.424s 4.528s 5.596s 6.682s 7.828s 
4750.000 1.164s 2.302s 3.420s 4.507s 5.564s 6.652s 7.807s 
5000.000 1.202s 2.318s 3.417s 4.488s 5.536s 6.627s 7.793s 
 
Displ (MT) 40.000s 45.000s 50.000s 55.000s 60.000s Arm Angle 
1000.000 10.197s 10.915s 11.635s 12.299s 12.830s   
1250.000 10.001s 10.790s 11.536s 12.227s 12.742s   
1500.000 9.843s 10.697s 11.475s 12.170s 12.660s   
1750.000 9.707s 10.622s 11.444s 12.133s 12.583s   
2000.000 9.588s 10.555s 11.422s 12.104s 12.519s   
2250.000 9.485s 10.496s 11.404s 12.079s 12.466s   
2500.000 9.392s 10.448s 11.385s 12.055s 12.420s   
2750.000 9.311s 10.403s 11.361s 12.029s 12.382s   
3000.000 9.239s 10.360s 11.330s 11.998s 12.346s   
3250.000 9.181s 10.317s 11.292s 11.961s 12.311s   
3500.000 9.137s 10.277s 11.248s 11.917s 12.274s   
3750.000 9.101s 10.239s 11.199s 11.867s 12.232s   
4000.000 9.070s 10.203s 11.148s 11.809s 12.181s   
4250.000 9.043s 10.169s 11.094s 11.746s 12.122s   
4500.000 9.018s 10.135s 11.040s 11.678s 12.055s   
4750.000 8.997s 10.102s 10.985s 11.608s 11.981s   
5000.000 8.979s 10.068s 10.930s 11.535s 11.901s   





































E. FLOODABLE LENGTH 
 
 
Displacement: 4973.88MT    Water Specific Gravity: 1.025     Draft: 4.50 m 
L: 69.698f     T: 0.000     V: 7.000 m 










125.404f 47.19 3.654f 3.48 
122.925f 44.96 3.600f 3.65 
119.200f 44.28 3.565f 3.85 
115.475f 44.90 3.464f 4.04 
111.750f 46.29 3.367f 4.20 
108.025f 48.38 3.261f 4.36 
104.300f 50.94 3.151f 4.59 
100.575f 53.99 3.031f 4.73 
96.850f 57.33 2.894f 4.91 
93.125f 60.94 2.739f 5.08 
89.400f 65.04 2.574f 5.10 
85.675f 69.61 2.381f 4.99 
81.950f 74.52 2.144f 4.75 
78.225f 80.02 1.849f 4.47 
74.500f 86.22 1.448f 4.31 
70.775f 93.14 0.918f 4.74 
67.050f 100.98 0.203f 4.34 
63.325f 107.29 1.215a 3.33 
59.600f 100.62 1.913a 4.15 
55.875f 94.13 2.484a 4.68 
52.150f 87.79 2.979a 5.11 
48.425f 81.64 3.431a 5.58 
44.700f 75.62 3.811a 6.12 
40.975f 69.86 4.168a 6.60 
37.250f 64.43 4.514a 7.08 
33.525f 59.37 4.843a 7.57 
29.800f 54.53 5.171a 8.04 
































145.491f 0.000 0.000 0.00 0 
145.000f 0.000 0.084 0.02 0 
144.000f 0.000 0.523 0.32 0 
143.000f 0.000 1.187 1.18 -1 
142.000f 0.000 2.009 2.78 -3 
141.000f 0.000 2.959 5.26 -7 
140.000f 0.000 4.019 8.75 -14 
139.000f 0.000 5.178 13.35 -25 
138.000f 0.000 6.408 19.14 -41 
137.500f 0.000 7.050 22.51 -51 
137.500f 30.000    
137.000f 30.000 7.691 11.20 -59 
136.000f 30.000 9.015 -10.45 -60 
136.000f 30.020    
135.000f 30.091 10.365 -30.82 -39 
134.000f 30.212 11.736 -49.91 2 
133.000f 30.381 13.116 -67.79 60 
132.000f 30.592 14.499 -84.47 137 
131.000f 30.843 15.880 -100.00 229 
130.000f 31.128 17.259 -114.41 336 
129.000f 31.442 18.630 -127.75 458 
128.000f 31.780 19.978 -140.06 591 
127.000f 32.138 21.307 -151.37 737 
126.000f 32.516 22.626 -161.73 894 
125.000f 32.910 23.930 -171.17 1061 
124.000f 33.311 25.193 -179.72 1236 
123.000f 33.725 26.442 -187.42 1420 
122.000f 34.151 27.677 -194.30 1611 
121.000f 34.572 28.861 -200.39 1808 
120.000f 35.001 30.035 -205.73 2011 
119.000f 35.433 31.185 -210.34 2219 
118.000f 35.860 32.292 -214.24 2432 
117.000f 36.292 33.388 -217.48 2648 
116.000f 36.716 34.438 -220.07 2866 
115.000f 37.137 35.458 -222.05 3087 
114.000f 37.557 36.457 -223.44 3310 
113.000f 37.959 37.396 -224.27 3534 
112.000f 38.362 38.321 -224.57 3759 
111.000f 38.750 39.196 -224.37 3983 
110.000f 39.126 40.035 -223.69 4207 
109.000f 39.495 40.848 -222.56 4430 
108.000f 39.841 41.600 -221.01 4652 
107.000f 40.182 42.336 -219.05 4872 
106.000f 40.499 43.013 -216.72 5090 
105.000f 40.805 43.660 -214.03 5306 
104.000f 41.095 44.269 -211.02 5518 
103.000f 41.363 44.828 -207.70 5728 
102.000f 41.623 45.367 -204.09 5933 
101.000f 41.850 45.835 -200.23 6136 
100.000f 42.069 46.285 -196.13 6334 
99.000f 42.263 46.682 -191.81 6528 
98.000f 42.440 47.043 -187.30 6717 
97.000f 42.601 47.369 -182.61 6902 
96.000f 42.734 47.641 -177.78 7083 
95.000f 42.860 47.895 -172.80 7258 
94.000f 42.949 48.078 -167.72 7428 
93.000f 43.033 48.249 -162.55 7593 
92.000f 43.087 48.360 -157.30 7753 
91.000f 43.126 48.443 -152.01 7908 
90.000f 43.144 48.483 -146.68 8057 
89.000f 43.151 48.502 -141.34 8201 
273 
88.000f 43.151 48.508 -135.98 8340 
87.000f 43.151 48.513 -130.62 8473 
86.000f 43.151 48.518 -125.26 8601 
85.000f 43.151 48.523 -119.89 8724 
84.000f 43.151 48.529 -114.51 8841 
83.000f 43.151 48.534 -109.13 8953 
82.000f 43.151 48.539 -103.74 9059 
81.000f 43.151 48.545 -98.35 9160 
80.000f 43.151 48.550 -92.96 9256 
79.000f 43.151 48.555 -87.55 9346 
78.000f 43.151 48.560 -82.15 9431 
77.000f 43.151 48.566 -76.74 9511 
76.000f 43.151 48.571 -71.32 9585 
75.000f 43.151 48.576 -65.89 9653 
74.000f 43.151 48.582 -60.46 9716 
73.000f 43.151 48.587 -55.03 9774 
72.520f 43.151 48.590 -52.42 9800 
72.000f 43.151 48.597 -49.59 9827 
71.000f 43.151 48.637 -44.13 9873 
70.000f 43.151 48.707 -38.60 9915 
69.000f 43.151 48.801 -33.00 9951 
68.000f 43.151 48.914 -27.29 9981 
67.000f 43.151 49.042 -21.46 10005 
66.000f 43.151 49.181 -15.50 10024 
65.000f 43.151 49.324 -9.40 10036 
64.000f 43.151 49.470 -3.16 10042 
63.000f 43.151 49.615 3.24 10042 
62.000f 43.151 49.756 9.77 10036 
61.000f 43.151 49.890 16.45 10023 
60.000f 43.151 50.014 23.25 10003 
59.000f 43.151 50.128 30.17 9976 
58.000f 43.151 50.229 37.19 9943 
57.000f 43.151 50.317 44.32 9902 
56.000f 43.151 50.392 51.52 9854 
55.000f 43.151 50.460 58.80 9799 
54.000f 43.149 50.524 66.14 9736 
53.000f 43.147 50.583 73.54 9667 
52.000f 43.128 50.616 81.01 9589 
51.000f 43.099 50.630 88.51 9505 
50.000f 43.064 50.631 96.06 9412 
49.000f 42.998 50.586 103.64 9312 
48.000f 42.933 50.537 111.24 9205 
47.000f 42.837 50.440 118.84 9090 
46.000f 42.732 50.326 126.44 8967 
45.000f 42.607 50.179 134.02 8837 
44.000f 42.461 49.997 141.58 8699 
43.000f 42.304 49.793 149.09 8554 
42.000f 42.114 49.538 156.54 8401 
41.000f 41.917 49.267 163.93 8241 
40.000f 41.682 48.935 171.23 8073 
39.000f 41.440 48.589 178.43 7899 
38.000f 41.153 48.172 185.52 7717 
37.000f 40.863 47.742 192.47 7528 
36.000f 40.523 47.234 199.26 7332 
35.000f 40.172 46.702 205.88 7129 
34.000f 39.778 46.101 212.31 6920 
33.000f 39.359 45.455 218.52 6705 
32.000f 38.906 44.748 224.49 6483 
31.000f 38.413 43.968 230.18 6256 
30.000f 37.902 43.146 235.58 6023 
29.000f 37.324 42.210 240.65 5785 
28.000f 36.723 41.218 245.34 5542 
27.000f 36.085 40.147 249.62 5294 
26.000f 35.383 38.950 253.43 5043 
25.000f 34.646 37.665 256.72 4787 
274 
24.000f 33.878 36.276 259.43 4529 
23.000f 33.065 34.738 261.47 4269 
22.000f 32.239 33.081 262.73 4007 
21.000f 31.500 31.445 263.12 3744 
20.000f 30.868 29.860 262.59 3481 
19.000f 30.370 28.328 261.06 3219 
18.000f 30.043 26.851 258.45 2959 
18.000f 30.000    
17.000f 30.000 25.441 254.59 2702 
16.000f 30.000 24.078 249.35 2450 
15.000f 30.000 22.763 242.77 2204 
14.000f 30.000 21.494 234.90 1965 
13.000f 30.000 20.281 225.79 1735 
12.000f 30.000 19.116 215.48 1514 
11.000f 30.000 17.990 204.04 1304 
10.000f 30.000 16.908 191.48 1106 
9.000f 30.000 15.882 177.88 922 
8.000f 30.000 14.897 163.27 751 
7.000f 30.000 13.949 147.69 595 
6.000f 30.000 13.044 131.19 456 
5.000f 30.000 12.184 113.80 333 
4.000f 30.000 11.359 95.57 229 
3.000f 30.000 10.568 76.54 142 
2.000f 30.000 9.828 56.74 76 
1.000f 30.000 9.121 36.21 29 
0.000 30.000 4.221 14.99 4 
0.500a 30.000 0.000 0.00 0 
0.500a 0.000    
 
Max. Shear 263.12 MT At 21.000f   
Max. Bending Moment 10042 MT-m at 64.000f (Hogging)  
275 
Longitudinal Strength
<---Aft  (Meters)  Fwd--->








Shear  x 3.5




F. INTACT STABILITY 
 
HSV – Multihull Stability Criteria 
 




Draft FP 4.512 m Heel zero GM(Solid) 7.213 m 
Draft MS 4.503 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.000 m 
Draft AP 4.494 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 7.213 m 
Trim 0.02/145.00 Wave No KMT 14.841 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 2,090.72 63.207f 0.000 4.229 






 Fluid Legend 
 
























    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 600.00 45.000f 0.000 6.500u 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 39.21 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 200.00 45.000f 0.000 11.000u 



















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
JP1.P 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958p 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP1.S 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958s 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP2.P 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609p 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP2.S 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609s 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP3.P 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640p 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP3.S 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640s 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP4.P 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191p 1.182 0.985 0.00 
JP4.S 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191s 1.182 0.985 0.00 
Subtotals: 100.00% 819.94 60.901f 0.000 1.994  0.00 
  















FW1.P 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046p 1.235 0.985 0.00 
FW1.S 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046s 1.235 0.985 0.00 
Subtotals: 100.00% 227.10 101.504f 0.000 1.235  0.00 
  















WB1.P 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985 0.00 
WB1.S 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985 0.00 





























HULL Intact 1.025 4,978.06 69.759f 0.000 2.795 0.950 





















0.00  0.01f 4.495 0.000 0.000 9.997 (1) Equil 
5.00s 0.10f 4.289 0.532 0.023 7.872 (1)  
10.00s 0.25f 3.925 0.989 0.090 5.750 (1)  
15.00s 0.42f 3.476 1.439 0.196 3.615 (1)  
20.00s 0.61f 2.935 1.875 0.341 1.490 (1)  
23.56s 0.76f 2.493 2.180 0.467 -0.005 (1) FldPt 
25.00s 0.82f 2.301 2.307 0.523 -0.602 (1)  
30.00s 1.03f 1.578 2.808 0.746 -2.622 (1)  
35.00s 1.22f 0.778 3.413 1.017 -4.533 (1)  
40.00s 1.38f -0.116 4.071 1.343 -6.316 (1)  
45.00s 1.58f -1.126 4.670 1.725 -7.976 (1)  
50.00s 1.80f -2.218 5.083 2.152 -9.528 (1)  
55.00s 2.04f -3.355 5.286 2.606 -10.975 (1)  
57.77s 2.18f -3.996 5.313 2.863 -11.731 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 2.29f -4.516 5.296 3.069 -12.309 (1)  
65.00s 2.54f -5.700 5.135 3.525 -13.513 (1)  
70.00s 2.79f -6.912 4.824 3.961 -14.571 (1)  
75.00s 3.05f -8.139 4.384 4.363 -15.472 (1)  
80.00s 3.30f -9.358 3.839 4.723 -16.216 (1)  
85.00s 3.52f -10.546 3.212 5.031 -16.800 (1)  
90.00s 3.72f -11.666 2.519 5.282 -17.235 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.467 0.438 Yes 



























   
280 




Draft FP 3.870 m Heel zero GM(Solid) 3.584 m 
Draft MS 4.047 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.013 m 
Draft AP 4.224 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 3.570 m 
Trim aft 0.35/145.00 Wave No KMT 12.388 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 1,309.39 57.690f 0.000 5.972 





 Fluid Legend 
 
























    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 600.00 45.000f 0.000 6.500u 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 3.92 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 200.00 45.000f 0.000 11.000u 



















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
Subtotals: 33.94% 278.29 57.030f 0.000 3.812  0.00 
  















FW1.P 10.00% 11.35 99.986f 1.056p 0.353 0.985 27.95 
FW1.S 10.00% 11.35 99.986f 1.056s 0.353 0.985 27.95 
Subtotals: 10.00% 22.71 99.986f 0.000 0.353  55.91 
  















WB1.P 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985 0.00 
WB1.S 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985 0.00 





























HULL Intact 1.025 4,196.66 69.241f 0.000 2.519 0.950 




Righting Arms vs Heel Angle 
 
Free Surface Adjustment 0.013 















0.00  0.14a 4.225 0.000 0.000 10.424 (1) Equil 
5.00s 0.04a 4.018 0.341 0.015 8.296 (1)  
10.00s 0.11f 3.640 0.776 0.063 6.176 (1)  
15.00s 0.30f 3.170 1.199 0.149 4.046 (1)  
20.00s 0.51f 2.604 1.599 0.271 1.926 (1)  
24.62s 0.73f 1.994 1.948 0.415 -0.002 (1) FldPt 
25.00s 0.75f 1.939 1.977 0.428 -0.160 (1)  
30.00s 1.00f 1.177 2.377 0.617 -2.183 (1)  
35.00s 1.24f 0.325 2.863 0.846 -4.106 (1)  
40.00s 1.45f -0.611 3.432 1.120 -5.898 (1)  
45.00s 1.68f -1.657 4.002 1.444 -7.548 (1)  
50.00s 1.93f -2.812 4.420 1.812 -9.070 (1)  
55.00s 2.21f -4.041 4.613 2.208 -10.470 (1)  
56.79s 2.32f -4.497 4.627 2.353 -10.941 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 2.52f -5.331 4.583 2.611 -11.737 (1)  
65.00s 2.84f -6.671 4.349 3.002 -12.859 (1)  
70.00s 3.16f -8.029 3.949 3.366 -13.833 (1)  
75.00s 3.46f -9.378 3.421 3.688 -14.658 (1)  
80.00s 3.72f -10.676 2.796 3.960 -15.340 (1)  
85.00s 3.94f -11.887 2.099 4.174 -15.889 (1)  
90.00s 4.09f -12.970 1.353 4.325 -16.314 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
A Free Surface Moment of 55.9 MT-m was used to adjust the VCG. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.415 0.386 Yes 
































Draft FP 4.522 m Heel zero GM(Solid) 6.164 m 
Draft MS 4.407 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.000 m 
Draft AP 4.292 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 6.164 m 
Trim fwd 0.23/145.00 Wave No KMT 13.651 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 1,890.71 65.133f 0.000 3.513 





 Fluid Legend 
 
























    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 600.00 45.000f 0.000 6.500u 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 39.21 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
JP1.P 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958p 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP1.S 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958s 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP2.P 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609p 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP2.S 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609s 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP3.P 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640p 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP3.S 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640s 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP4.P 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191p 1.182 0.985 0.00 
JP4.S 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191s 1.182 0.985 0.00 
Subtotals: 100.00% 819.94 60.901f 0.000 1.994  0.00 
  















FW1.P 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046p 1.235 0.985 0.00 
FW1.S 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046s 1.235 0.985 0.00 
Subtotals: 100.00% 227.10 101.504f 0.000 1.235  0.00 
  















WB1.P 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985 0.00 
WB1.S 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985 0.00 





























HULL Intact 1.025 4,778.19 70.803f 0.000 2.727 0.950 




















0.00  0.09f 4.293 0.000 0.000 10.110 (1) Equil 
5.00s 0.18f 4.083 0.492 0.021 7.986 (1)  
10.00s 0.34f 3.712 0.975 0.086 5.867 (1)  
15.00s 0.51f 3.253 1.448 0.191 3.735 (1)  
20.00s 0.71f 2.701 1.905 0.338 1.614 (1)  
23.87s 0.88f 2.210 2.249 0.478 -0.005 (1) FldPt 
25.00s 0.93f 2.054 2.353 0.524 -0.474 (1)  
30.00s 1.16f 1.318 2.864 0.751 -2.491 (1)  
35.00s 1.35f 0.504 3.478 1.027 -4.399 (1)  
40.00s 1.52f -0.402 4.147 1.359 -6.180 (1)  
45.00s 1.73f -1.427 4.761 1.748 -7.834 (1)  
50.00s 1.97f -2.544 5.196 2.184 -9.373 (1)  
55.00s 2.22f -3.718 5.418 2.649 -10.802 (1)  
58.05s 2.39f -4.455 5.453 2.939 -11.617 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 2.50f -4.932 5.438 3.124 -12.111 (1)  
65.00s 2.78f -6.180 5.278 3.593 -13.284 (1)  
70.00s 3.06f -7.455 4.959 4.040 -14.309 (1)  
75.00s 3.34f -8.732 4.510 4.455 -15.183 (1)  
80.00s 3.60f -9.992 3.959 4.825 -15.901 (1)  
85.00s 3.84f -11.197 3.325 5.143 -16.472 (1)  
90.00s 4.03f -12.326 2.627 5.403 -16.896 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.478 0.449 Yes 

































Draft FP 3.890 m Heel zero GM(Solid) 2.080 m 
Draft MS 3.942 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.014 m 
Draft AP 3.995 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 2.066 m 
Trim 0.11/145.00 Wave No KMT 10.775 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 1,109.39 59.981f 0.000 5.065 































    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 600.00 45.000f 0.000 6.500u 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 3.92 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
Subtotals: 33.94% 278.29 57.030f 0.000 3.812  0.00 
  















FW1.P 10.00% 11.35 100.130f 1.050p 0.353 0.985 27.69 
FW1.S 10.00% 11.35 100.130f 1.050s 0.353 0.985 27.69 
Subtotals: 10.00% 22.71 100.130f 0.000 0.353  55.39 
  















WB1.P 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985 0.00 
WB1.S 100.00% 55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985 0.00 





























HULL Intact 1.025 3,997.43 70.466f 0.000 2.443 0.950 





Righting Arms vs Heel Angle 
 
Free Surface Adjustment 0.014 















0.00  0.04a 3.996 0.000 0.000 10.548 (1) Equil 
5.00s 0.05f 3.801 0.285 0.012 8.415 (1)  
10.00s 0.21f 3.416 0.743 0.056 6.297 (1)  
15.00s 0.41f 2.932 1.192 0.141 4.172 (1)  
20.00s 0.63f 2.351 1.613 0.263 2.058 (1)  
24.95s 0.87f 1.676 2.004 0.420 0.000 (1) FldPt 
25.00s 0.87f 1.669 2.008 0.421 -0.022 (1)  
30.00s 1.14f 0.884 2.417 0.614 -2.037 (1)  
35.00s 1.39f 0.007 2.910 0.846 -3.953 (1)  
40.00s 1.62f -0.952 3.485 1.125 -5.738 (1)  
45.00s 1.86f -2.019 4.060 1.454 -7.380 (1)  
50.00s 2.13f -3.201 4.494 1.828 -8.888 (1)  
55.00s 2.43f -4.473 4.695 2.231 -10.266 (1)  
56.77s 2.55f -4.943 4.710 2.376 -10.722 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 2.76f -5.821 4.663 2.641 -11.504 (1)  
65.00s 3.11f -7.217 4.422 3.039 -12.594 (1)  
70.00s 3.44f -8.622 4.018 3.408 -13.539 (1)  
75.00s 3.74f -9.985 3.489 3.737 -14.349 (1)  
80.00s 4.00f -11.268 2.868 4.015 -15.033 (1)  
85.00s 4.19f -12.441 2.181 4.235 -15.592 (1)  
90.00s 4.30f -13.471 1.448 4.394 -16.037 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
A Free Surface Moment of 55.4 MT-m was used to adjust the VCG. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.420 0.391 Yes 

































Draft FP 4.340 m Heel zero GM(Solid) 1.873 m 
Draft MS 4.015 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.000 m 
Draft AP 3.689 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 1.873 m 
Trim fwd 0.65/145.00 Wave No KMT 9.669 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 1,180.29 70.441f 0.000 2.187 





 Fluid Legend 
 





















    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 39.21 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
JP1.P 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958p 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP1.S 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958s 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP2.P 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609p 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP2.S 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609s 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP3.P 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640p 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP3.S 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640s 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP4.P 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191p 1.182 0.985 0.00 
JP4.S 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191s 1.182 0.985 0.00 
Subtotals: 100.00% 819.94 60.901f 0.000 1.994  0.00 
  















FW1.P 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046p 1.235 0.985 0.00 
FW1.S 100.00% 113.55 101.504f 2.046s 1.235 0.985 0.00 





























HULL Intact 1.025 4,068.11 73.347f 0.000 2.475 0.950 




















0.00  0.26f 3.690 0.000 0.000 10.536 (1) Equil 
5.00s 0.34f 3.511 0.295 0.013 8.398 (1)  
10.00s 0.50f 3.119 0.801 0.059 6.283 (1)  
15.00s 0.70f 2.621 1.304 0.151 4.164 (1)  
20.00s 0.93f 2.024 1.780 0.286 2.058 (1)  
24.97s 1.18f 1.333 2.226 0.460 0.000 (1) FldPt 
25.00s 1.18f 1.328 2.229 0.461 -0.013 (1)  
30.00s 1.45f 0.531 2.710 0.676 -2.016 (1)  
35.00s 1.70f -0.353 3.283 0.937 -3.916 (1)  
40.00s 1.92f -1.318 3.934 1.251 -5.683 (1)  
45.00s 2.16f -2.398 4.548 1.622 -7.316 (1)  
50.00s 2.43f -3.596 5.008 2.040 -8.814 (1)  
55.00s 2.75f -4.889 5.236 2.488 -10.181 (1)  
57.47s 2.91f -5.558 5.263 2.715 -10.805 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 3.09f -6.259 5.235 2.947 -11.407 (1)  
65.00s 3.44f -7.668 5.035 3.397 -12.491 (1)  
70.00s 3.77f -9.071 4.677 3.821 -13.437 (1)  
75.00s 4.07f -10.415 4.198 4.210 -14.259 (1)  
80.00s 4.32f -11.678 3.630 4.552 -14.952 (1)  
85.00s 4.49f -12.817 2.994 4.841 -15.532 (1)  
90.00s 4.61f -13.821 2.307 5.073 -15.996 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.460 0.431 Yes 

































Draft FP 3.757 m Heel  stbd 4.49 deg. GM(Solid) 2.956 m 
Draft MS 3.478 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.019 m 
Draft AP 3.199 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 2.937 m 
Trim fwd 0.56/145.00 Wave No KMT 12.285 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 398.96 66.532f 0.011s 3.907 





 Fluid Legend 
 




















    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 3.92 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 




















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
Subtotals: 33.94% 278.29 57.030f 0.000 3.812  0.00 
  















FW1.P 10.00% 11.36 100.711f 0.878p 0.360 0.985 19.54 
FW1.S 10.00% 11.35 100.258f 1.267s 0.362 0.985 41.39 





























HULL Intact 1.025 3,287.67 73.561f 0.565s 2.193 0.950 




Righting Arms vs Heel Angle 
 
Free Surface Adjustment 0.019 















0.00  0.18f 3.282 -0.001 0.000 11.025 (1)  
5.00s 0.23f 3.162 0.027 0.001 8.858 (1)  
10.00s 0.41f 2.765 0.454 0.019 6.740 (1)  
15.00s 0.63f 2.228 0.927 0.079 4.633 (1)  
20.00s 0.89f 1.585 1.357 0.179 2.541 (1)  
25.00s 1.18f 0.837 1.743 0.315 0.487 (1)  
26.22s 1.25f 0.637 1.831 0.353 -0.007 (1) FldPt 
30.00s 1.49f -0.022 2.105 0.483 -1.504 (1)  
35.00s 1.80f -0.985 2.538 0.685 -3.395 (1)  
40.00s 2.10f -2.040 3.045 0.928 -5.157 (1)  
45.00s 2.39f -3.194 3.574 1.217 -6.767 (1)  
50.00s 2.71f -4.487 3.980 1.547 -8.220 (1)  
55.00s 3.08f -5.895 4.141 1.903 -9.523 (1)  
55.68s 3.13f -6.092 4.144 1.952 -9.689 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 3.45f -7.362 4.059 2.263 -10.687 (1)  
65.00s 3.81f -8.818 3.784 2.606 -11.725 (1)  
70.00s 4.11f -10.211 3.366 2.919 -12.650 (1)  
75.00s 4.36f -11.508 2.841 3.191 -13.466 (1)  
80.00s 4.54f -12.694 2.234 3.413 -14.171 (1)  
85.00s 4.66f -13.756 1.562 3.579 -14.761 (1)  
90.00s 4.71f -14.696 0.838 3.684 -15.227 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
A Free Surface Moment of 60.9 MT-m was used to adjust the VCG. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.353 0.324 Yes 
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Full Load - Departure 4979 4.512 4.503 4.494 6.700 7.628 -69.758 14.841 
Full Load - Arrival 4197 3.870 4.047 4.224 7.352 8.804 -69.257 12.388 
Half Load - Departure 4779 4.522 4.407 4.292 6.684 7.487 -70.794 13.651 
Half Load - Arrival 3997 3.890 3.942 3.995 7.325 8.694 -70.471 10.775 
Empty - Departure 4068 4.340 4.015 3.689 6.854 7.796 -73.323 9.669 











Draft FP 7.506 m Heel  stbd 3.00 deg. GM(Solid) 3.629 m 
Draft MS 5.596 m Equil Yes F/S Corr. 0.000 m 
Draft AP 3.686 m Wind 0.0 kn GM(Fluid) 3.629 m 
Trim fwd 3.81/145.00 Wave No KMT 11.711 m 












Light Ship 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088 
Deadweight 1,753.19 54.809f 0.000 4.792 






 Fluid Legend 
 

















    LIGHT SHIP 2,888.60 74.500f 0.000 10.088u 
    LOWER DECK CARGO 600.00 45.000f 0.000 6.500u 
    MISSION RELATED 
EXPANDABLES 
76.68 90.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    SHIP FORCES 17.36 74.500f 0.000 5.000u 
    STORES 39.21 50.000f 0.000 5.000u 
    UPPER DECK CARGO 200.00 45.000f 0.000 11.000u 




















DS1.P 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464p 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS1.S 100.00% 69.43 48.023f 5.464s 3.813 0.950 0.00 
DS2.P 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467p 3.810 0.950 0.00 
DS2.S 100.00% 69.72 66.000f 5.467s 3.810 0.950 0.00 
JP1.P 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958p 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP1.S 100.00% 66.84 32.033f 1.958s 1.419 0.985 0.00 
JP2.P 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609p 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP2.S 100.00% 40.81 48.417f 1.609s 0.618 0.985 0.00 
JP3.P 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640p 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP3.S 100.00% 43.96 66.000f 1.640s 0.598 0.985 0.00 
JP4.P 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191p 1.182 0.985 0.00 
JP4.S 100.00% 119.22 83.995f 2.191s 1.182 0.985 0.00 





























HULL Intact 1.025 6,813.58 79.413f 0.514s 3.543 0.950 
FW1.P Flooded 1.025 -116.39 101.504f 2.046p 1.235 0.985 
WB1.P Flooded 1.025 -55.21 117.785f 1.438p 1.455 0.985 
FW1.S Flooded 1.025 -116.39 101.504f 2.046s 1.235 0.985 
WB1.S Flooded 1.025 -55.21 117.785f 1.438s 1.455 0.985 
WT6.C Flooded 1.025 -875.36 101.721f 0.000 2.913 0.950 
WT7.C Flooded 1.025 -599.79 119.054f 0.000 3.223 0.950 
WT8.C Flooded 1.025 -173.43 134.291f 0.000 3.793 0.950 
SWT4.S Flooded 1.025 -8.73 21.228f 13.731s 4.549 0.950 
SWT5.S Flooded 1.025 -12.87 27.161f 13.725s 4.608 0.950 
SWT6.S Flooded 1.025 -16.72 33.104f 13.712s 4.663 0.950 
SWT7.S Flooded 1.025 -19.87 39.070f 13.703s 4.733 0.950 
SWT8.S Flooded 1.025 -22.32 45.047f 13.698s 4.821 0.950 
SWT9.S Flooded 1.025 -24.09 51.030f 13.693s 4.928 0.950 
SWT10.S Flooded 1.025 -25.07 57.005f 13.690s 5.056 0.950 
SWT11.S Flooded 1.025 -23.40 62.920f 13.689s 5.226 0.950 
SWT12.S Flooded 1.025 -17.67 68.785f 13.689s 5.467 0.950 
SWT13.S Flooded 1.025 -8.99 74.485f 13.690s 5.794 0.950 
SubTotals:   4,642.09 67.174f 0.225s 3.803  
 
Error: (H32722) Unable to evaluate (a) 
 
 
















0.00  1.52f 3.639 -0.231 0.000 9.234 (1)  
5.00s 1.52f 3.648 0.108 -0.005 6.997 (1)  
10.00s 1.58f 3.465 0.301 0.014 4.790 (1)  
15.00s 1.63f 3.221 0.508 0.049 2.572 (1)  
20.00s 1.65f 2.922 0.837 0.107 0.389 (1)  
20.95s 1.65f 2.854 0.946 0.121 -0.011 (1) FldPt 
25.00s 1.64f 2.497 1.568 0.209 -1.668 (1)  
30.00s 1.65f 1.899 2.504 0.384 -3.603 (1)  
35.00s 1.69f 1.174 3.449 0.644 -5.437 (1)  
40.00s 1.74f 0.350 4.293 0.983 -7.166 (1)  
45.00s 1.81f -0.537 4.912 1.386 -8.805 (1)  
50.00s 1.86f -1.449 5.284 1.833 -10.358 (1)  
55.00s 1.90f -2.354 5.430 2.302 -11.820 (1)  
303 
56.45s 1.90f -2.614 5.436 2.439 -12.226 (1) MaxRa 
60.00s 1.92f -3.255 5.398 2.775 -13.180 (1)  
65.00s 1.93f -4.153 5.224 3.240 -14.426 (1)  
70.00s 1.95f -5.053 4.936 3.684 -15.545 (1)  
75.00s 1.98f -5.961 4.550 4.099 -16.526 (1)  
80.00s 2.02f -6.884 4.077 4.476 -17.355 (1)  
85.00s 2.08f -7.827 3.523 4.808 -18.017 (1)  
90.00s 2.16f -8.782 2.897 5.089 -18.505 (1)  
Weight and C.G. used above include tank loads. 
The tank load centers were not allowed to shift with heel and trim changes. 
 
 
Unprotected Flood Points 
 
Name L,T,V (m) Height (m) 




Limit Min/Max Actual Margin Pass 
(18) Area from 0.00 deg to Flood or MaxRA >0.0290 m-R 0.121 0.092 Yes 




















































APPENDIX VII COMBAT SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
A. RWR TRADE OFF ANALYSIS 
1. Sensitivity Calculations 
The goal here is to determine the required RWR 
sensitivity, taking into consideration existing and 
potential future threats. The result of these calculations 
will be used to select the type of the RWR receiver. 
a. Calculation Parameters 
The RWR system must provide warning of threat 
radars both in search and track mode. For our purposes, the 
track mode will be examined, since it is the mode that 
poses the primary threat against the ship.  
We will assume that the tracking radar is used to 
illuminate the ship, in order to guide an RF guided Air-to-
Surface or a Surface-to-Surface missile. Because we are 
looking at both surface and air threats, we will consider 
the worst case scenario (the air threat) and use the AGM-84 
Harpoon (that has a range of about 100km) as the anti-ship 
missile threat. 
Hence, the range at which the desired RWR should 
detect the threat is 100km.  
Two threat situations will be examined: 
1. Conventional radar with peak power of 1KW and 
30dB antenna gain, operating at 10GHz. 
According to the frequency selected, this is a 
fire control radar) 
2. LPI radar with 0.1W of peak power and 30dB 
antenna gain, operating at 10GHz. (This is 
probably not the main fire control radar of the 






A simplified formula for the received power at 








π= , where 
Pt is the radar’s peak power 
Gt is the radar’s antenna gain 
Gr is the RWR’s antenna gain 
λ the wavelength (3cm in our case) 
R is the range of 100km between the tracking radar 
and the RWR 
c. Results 
For the conventional radar case: 
2 2
2 2 2
(1000)(1000)(1000)(0.03) 5.69 7 62.4 32
(4 ) (4 ) (100000)
t t r
r
PGGP E Watt dBw dBm
R
λ
π π= = = − = − = −
 
For the LPI radar case: 
2 2
2 2 2
(0.1)(1000)(1000)(0.03) 5.69 11 102.4 72
(4 ) (4 ) (100000)
t t r
r
PGGP E Watt dBw dBm
R
λ
π π= = = − = − = −
 
d. Conclusions 
It is evident that conventional radars can be 
detected at the desirable distances (100km) by a RWR with 
very low sensitivity (-32dBm). However, this is not the 
case for the LPI radars, where the required sensitivity is 
much lower (-72dBm).  
Because the use of LPI radar systems will become 
more widespread in the 2015 time frame, the RWR receiver 
that is selected for the HSAC will be capable of achieving 
a minimum sensitivity level of –72dBm.  
2. Type Selection 
The goal of this trade study is to determine which 
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) type will be used.  
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a. Available Options 
The following options were examined: 
1. Crystal Video Receiver 
2. Superheterodyne Receiver 
3. Digital IFM (Instantaneous Frequency 
Measurement) Receiver 
4. Channelized Receiver 
5. Digital Receiver 
Given the large number of available options, a 
different procedure will be followed in this trade study, 
aiming to eliminate those options that do not fulfill 
certain operational or technical requirements. 
b. Sensitivity Requirements 
As we have calculated in this part of this unit, 
the required sensitivity for our system must be at least –
72dBm. 
The table below lists the typical sensitivity of 
the available types of receivers. Those types of receivers 
with sensitivity less than –72dBm are written in bold. 
Table 19.   Typical sensitivities of the RWR options 
Receiver type Sensitivity 




Digital IFM Receiver -65dBm 
Channelized Receiver -85dBm 
Digital Receiver Better than –75dBm 
Hence, the Crystal Video, and the Digital IFM 
receiver types are rejected. 
c. Probability of Intercept Requirements 
We consider the Probability of Intercept (POI) as 
a very important requirement. A Probability of Intercept 
less than 100% would signify that threat emissions could 
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potentially remain undetected. Hence the remaining options 
are assessed in regards with their POI. 
The table in the next page lists the POI of the 
remaining types of receivers. Those types of receivers with 
POI < 100% are written in bold. 
Table 20.   POIs of the different RWR options 




Channelized Receiver 100% 
Digital Receiver ~100% 
Hence, the superheterodyne receiver types is 
rejected. 
d. Evaluation Criteria 
The following criteria were taken into 
consideration in the evaluation of the remaining options: 
1. Dynamic Range 
2. Frequency accuracy 
3. Technological potential 
4. Cost 
e. Discussion 
Next we examined the advantages and disadvantages 




• 70dB dynamic range 
• Frequency accuracy of 1MHz or less 
Disadvantages: 
• Based on Analog technology 





• More than 60dB dynamic range 
• Frequency accuracy up to few Hertz in Pulse 
Doppler sequence of pulses 
• Based on Digital technology 
• Very high cost (expected to decrease over time) 
 
f. Evaluation of Options 
Given that both the Channelized and the Digital 
Receiver types have similar performance characteristics the 
driving factor for the selection of one and not the other 
was the technology upon which they are based. 
The advantages that the digital technology offers 
(i.e. stability, reproducibility and programmability) are 
certainly very important factors. Of equal importance is 
the fact that one can safely predict significant advances 
in digital technology over the foreseeable future. In other 
words, it is expected that a digital system will be easier 
and cheaper to program, maintain and upgrade, while its 
cost is expected to be significantly reduced. 
g. Decision 
The Radar Warning Receiver of the SSPS will use a 
Digital Receiver type. 
B. RF JAMMER TARDE OFF ANALYSIS 
1. RF Jammer Calculations 
The goal here is to determine the jammer peak 
power that is required in order to protect our fighter from 
a ground threat, consisting of a radar-guided Surface to 
Air Missile (SAM). 
a. Calculation Parameters 
We assume that the SAM threat has a minimum 
firing range of 2km from the shore (threat countered right 
before the HSAC hits the beach). If the HSAC remains 
undetected up to this range, it is considered safe. 
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The threat radar parameters are: 
Pt=200KW (Peak Power) 
Gt=37dB (Antenna Gain) 
λ=0.1m (wavelength), i.e. Frequency 3GHz. 
We will assume that the SLQ-32 is operating in 
repeater mode. This means that it aims to present to the 
threat radar an alternate (false) target, whose RCS is 
bigger than the ship’s RCS. 
The following parameters are assumed for the 
jammer: 
Gj=10dB (antenna gain on transmit and receive) 
Pj is what we want to calculate 
Ge  is the repeater electronic gain 
Grep is the repeater overall gain 
(Gj*Ge*Gj:receive antenna, electronic gain, 
transmit antenna). 
We also assume a polarization mismatch of 45 
degrees between the radar and the jammer, which corresponds 
to a power loss factor Lp =2. 
b. Formulation 
If σ=10m2 is the fighter’s RCS, then the power 






π= ,  
with R being the range between the radar and the 
fighter (i.e. R=1km). 
The radar power at the receive side of the 











This is amplified by the electronic gain of the 
repeater, resulting in PJ=PR.Ge and is transmitted towards 
the radar. 
The power received at the radar is: 
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We will assume that the radar is jammed when α=5. 











Now the Jammer Power can be computed as: 
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where β is the repeater’s chopping factor 
(typical value β=0.5). 
Results 
Now we have all the parameters needed to solve 
for PJ. 
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We can see that the repeater jammer will be able 
to jam the threat SAM radar, providing protection of the 
fighter up to the 2km range, if its peak power is 797Watt. 
This is certainly feasible by today’s technology standards, 
since most repeaters can produce about 1KW pulses. 
C. DIRCM TARDE OFF ANALYSIS 
1. DIRCM Laser Power Calculation 
In what follows, the required peak power from a laser 
transmitter in order to successfully jam the seeker of an 
Infra-Red guided missile is calculated. 
a. Calculation Parameters 
The goal of the laser jammer is not to confuse 
the missile’s seeker by providing false target information 
(a task that would require less power and is not very 
efficient with year 2015 missile systems), but to inflict 
damage on the material itself of the detector. We will 
assume that the laser transmitter has a pulse width of 
0.1µsec and that the laser frequency is within the band of 
the IR missile detector. The laser damage threshold for a 
pulse of this duration varies inversely with the pulse 
duration. Hence, the damage threshold is Eo=10-7W/cm2. 
The IR seeker has a circular optical aperture of 
10cm in diameter while the transmittance of the optics is 
assumed το=0.7. The IR detector area is assumed to be Ad=10-
4cm2. The distance at which the damage is to be inflicted is 
R=1km (fair distance especially in the littoral), while the 
atmospheric transmittance is τa =0.9.  
The beamwidth of the laser beam is 5X10-
4rad=0.5mrad which corresponds to an angular sub tense of 
the laser beam Ωl=(5E-4)2=2.5X10-7Sr. 
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b. Formulation 
The power collected by the detector when the 
laser threshold is met is: 
e o dP E A=   










ατ τ= Ω  
where Ao is the area of the optical aperture and 
Pl the power of the laser jammer. 
Equating these two formulas, we get: 
2
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Ω= ⇒ =Ω  
c. Results 
In our case 
2 210( ) 78.53
2o
A cm cmπ= =  
Hence, converting everything to cm: 
7 4 2(10 )(10 )(2.5 7)(100000) 50.53
(0.9)(0.7)(78.53)l
EP KWatt
− −= =  
c. Conclusions 
The peak power required can be considered 
moderate and certainly achievable by the existing 
technology. It certainly demands a significant amount of 
complexity and sophistication in the laser pointing 
mechanism, given the fact that it will be placed in the 
unsteady platform of the HSAC, though. 
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It must be kept in mind that in order for this 
level of power to be effective, the pulse width was set to 
100nsec and the beamwidth to 0.5mrad. 
2. DIRCM System selection 
The goal of this trade study is to determine 
which type of Directed Infra-Red Counter Measures system 
will be used.   
a. Available Options 
The following options were examined: 
1. “Hot Brick” IR Jammers (electrically heated 
rods) 
2. Vapor Lamps 
3. Laser systems 
b. Evaluation Criteria 
The following criteria were taken into 
consideration in the evaluation of the options: 
1. Jamming techniques that can be implemented 




The following table contains the advantages and 











Table 21.   Advantages and Disadvantages of the Three MAWS 
Options 
 Hot Brick 
Jammers 
Vapor Lamps Laser 
Advantage
s 




• Modulation or 
barrage 
jamming 




• Modulation jamming. 
Physical destruction 
of the detector (in 
band) or the missile’s 
optical aperture (out 
of band) 
• Effective against 
all types of IR 
missiles 
• Greater power 
efficiency (less 
weight) 
• Information can be 
obtained regarding the 
type of reticle and 
rotation freq. used 



















• Poor power 
efficiency  
• Has no way of 
obtaining 
information 
about the type 
of IR seeker 
• Pointing 
mechanism  is 
needed when 





generation of IR 
missiles 
(staring arrays) 
• Has no way of 
obtaining 
information 
about the type 
of IR seeker 
 
• Pointing accuracy 
represents a challenge 
• Very precise 




d. Evaluation of Options 
Because we are looking at the year 2015 threat 
environment, it is critical that th MWAS is able to detect 
ALL types of IR guided missiles, including the latest 
generation, which uses staring type sensors (Focal Plane 
Arrays). These missiles are basically immune to 
conventional countermeasures (i.e. flares and IR chaff).  
As we can see from the table above, only the 
Laser systems can be considered as a serious counter 
measure against these missiles, while at the same time, the 
Laser systems perform equally well – if not better than the 
other two options- against older types of IR missiles. 
e. Decision 
The Laser countermeasures DIRCM system will be 
used for the DIRCM system of the SPS of our aircraft. 
D. EO SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
1. System Overview 
The Thermal Imaging Sensor System (TISS) AN/SAY-1 is a 
stabilized imaging system that will provide surface ships 
with a day and night, high-resolution, infrared, visual 
imaging, and laser range-finder capability to augment 
existing optical, electronic, and radar sensors. This fully 
integrated multi-sensor system will support surveillance, 
detection, identification, and tracking of low-observable 
surface and air targets, including floating mines, 
periscopes, close-in surface boats, low-flying aircraft, 
and cruise missiles. TISS will also provide combat and 
operational support functions such as low-visibility 
navigation, night low-visibility ship-handling, search and 




2. System Description 
The system that will be installed on the HSAC will be 
the Next Generation Thermal Imaging Sensor System, known as 
TISS II as it is the most advanced and up to date system in 
the U.S. Navy. It is a stabilized, multi-sensor 
Surveillance and Targeting System (S&TS). It features an 
advanced stabilization technology that results in 
exceptional stability, even when exposed to dynamic 
environments. This enables the use of high performance 
sensors with superior long-range capabilities onboard 
ships. 
This system can be used in navigation and search-and-
seizure operations, as well as in threat location and 
identification. It can provide high-quality video for 
surveillance and 3-D targeting data for use with existing 
weapon control systems. 
In addition, it can use coordinates supplied by the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to pinpoint 
targets. Upon locating and identifying the target, TISS is 
able to hand off information to a variety of weapons 
systems, providing precise direction and control for guns 
or missiles. All of the system sensors are bore sighted 
with an internal tool that allows in-mission precision 
alignment. A high performance tracker rounds out the 
system. The result is a state of the art detection, 
identification, tracking and engagement in daylight, at 
night, and even in adverse weather conditions.  
The system includes many automatic target tracking 
capabilities that can handle multiple targets. The tracker 
handles small targets, cluttered backgrounds, momentary 
obscurities (ship superstructure, clouds, etc.) and target 
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crossings. Its high resolution infrared (IR) and television 
(TV) systems offer the ability to detect, identify, and 
track objects in all climates and areas. Together with 
shipboard radar and other sensors, TISS provides a robust 
situation awareness capability and provides three 
dimensional track capabilities that can be used to provide 
target pointing.  
TISS II is envisioned to replace the Navy Mast-Mounted 
Sight (NMMS) as it is more advanced, smaller, and less 
expensive. 
3. Sensor Overview: 
For the purpose of this report, we will focus only on 
the optical sight that houses all the sensors. 
The Optical Sight houses the TISS sensors, the Thermal 
Control Unit (TCU), and an the Optical Bore sight Tool 
(OBT). Sight coverage encompasses 270± ° in the azimuth and 
30− ° to 85+ ° elevation, with slew rates of 60 / s°  in azimuth 
and elevation. The slew acceleration in azimuth as well as 
in elevation is of 260 / s . The total weight of the turret is 
about 130Lbs with a diameter of 18 inches. The line of 
sight (LOS) stability is less than 15 microradians. 
TISS is a lightweight, state-of-the- art sensor suite 
consisting of the following subsystems: 
• a high-resolution Thermal Imaging Sensor (TIS), 
• two Charged Coupled Devices (CCDs) daylight imaging 
Television Sensors (TVS), 
• an Eye-Safe Laser Range Finder (ESLRF).  
• it also incorporates an Automatic Video Tracker 
(AVT) that is capable of tracking up to two 
targets within the TISS field of view.  
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Figure 90.   TISS II System 
a. FLIR System Parameters: 
Table 21 illustrates the different FLIR system 
parameters. 
















In the Midwave option mode of operation1, the IR 
camera, also referred to as a thermal imager or Forward 
Looking Infrared (FLIR), weighs less than 30 lbs. and 
 
FLIR: provides IR video





consists of a HgCdTe staring focal plane array (FPA), an 
integrated dewar and linear Sterling Cooler, and a dual 
field of view (FOV) optical train. The high resolution FPA 
operating in the 3-5µm of the electromagnetic spectrum 
consists of a total of 640 x 480 pixels. The cooler 
provides a cool down time of less than 7 minutes for the 
FPA at an operating temperature of about 95K. The optics 
provides a narrow FOV of 2.2° x1.65° and a wide FOV of 
6.6°x4.95°.  For the other modes of operation, the FLIR 
specifications are outlined in Table 21.  The IR camera 
provides all weather and night time imaging capability. 
The FLIR provides thermal imagery with either 
white-hot or black-hot polarity, selectable by the 
operator. The FLIR has an automatic gain and level control 
(AGLC) system which optimize the display of targets; manual 
override is provided. The FLIR also contains a closed cycle 
cryogenics system which cools and maintains the FLIR 
detectors at their operating temperature. The FLIR also 
sends video signals to the AVT for target track processing.  
b. Laser System Parameters: 
For determining range of targets, TISS uses an 
eye-safe laser rangefinder (ESLRF), which provides a 5m±  
range accuracy to targets from 100m to 20,000m from the 
turret. The ESLRF provides high selectivity and prevents 
false returns from atmospheric aerosols, rain, and snow.  
Table 23.   Laser System Parameters 
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c. TV Camera Parameters: 
The different TV camera parameters are listed 
below: 
Table 24.    
Table 25.   TV Camera Parameters 
Two fixed FOV Charge Coupled Device (CCD) cameras 
provide low light and daytime imaging capability with a 
spectral response of 600 to 950 mm for haze penetration and 
twilight or dawn operations. The operating sensitivity of 
the narrow diagonal FOV (2.2°) is from 0.5 lux to 100,000 
lux to account for direct sunlight viewing. The operating 
sensitivity of the wide diagonal FOV (8°) is 0.5 lux for 
low light imaging. The low light capability is advantageous 
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for viewing of shipboard running lights and lights along 
the shore during nighttime operations. 
The TVS is capable of imaging floating mines, 
ships, boats, air targets, and submarine periscopes under 
clear visibility conditions (20 km). The TVS has an 
automatic gain and level control (AG/LC) which optimize the 
display of targets and minimize operator actions necessary 
to control the adjustments.  Manual adjustments can also be 
made.  The Automatic Video Tracker (AVT) processes the 
digital FLIR and/or TVS video data.  The sensors with TISS 
provide a complete visible situational awareness to CIC in 
day, night, or harsh weather conditions. 
4. Performance Evaluation: 
For EO systems, the basic measure of determining if 
the system meets mission requirements is to determine the 
range performance of the target. Generally, this can be 
done in two ways.  
The first method is based on theoretical calculations 
based on the specifications of the different sensors such 
as the FOV, effective focal length of the optics and the 
number of pixel dimensions in the FPA. Computer models such 
as the FLIR 92 and NAVTherm have been developed by the army 
to test the performance of IR systems. The final output in 
this case is the graph of the minimum resolvable 
temperature difference (MRTD) curve. A similar curve called 
the minimum resolvable contrast (MRC) is used to measure 
the performance of visible cameras where the contrast 
between the target and its background is plotted against 
the spatial frequency.  
The other method of obtaining the MRTD and MRC curves 
is to perform laboratory testing of the EO sensors using a 
323 
collimator that incorporates 4-bar charts, which can 
represent targets at various spatial frequencies.  
The sensor performance of the TISS has been 
successfully evaluated to meet the operational requirements 
of the system using both methods of testing. Figure 91 
shows an unclassified pictorial representation of the 
typical range performance of the TISS for various targets. 
Figure 91.   TISS Performance Evaluation 
5. Conclusion: 
TISS II is a very well tested, proven and now fielded 
EO sensor for the USN. It is functional and useful in 
various environments and conditions and provides early 
warning detection of threats that are essential to the 
success of the HSAC mission such as floating mines and 
small fast attack crafts. In addition, it can be used as a 
Navigation aid and a complimentary target identification 
system 
E. MISSILE TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS: 
Working in conjunction with future package designs and 
because we were looking for a missile that can handle both 
surface and air threats at ranges up to the middle defense 
layer, the following choices were analyzed for the choice 
Ra
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of the medium range missile: Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, 
Rolling Airframe Missile, and Standard Missile SM-2 Block 
III version for medium range. 
 


















Figure 92.   Missile trade-off-analysis results 
 
ESSM contributes to the Joint Vision 2010 concept of 
full-dimensional protection by enhancing ship self-
protection against air and surface threats that have 
"leaked" past outer air defenses. Given that some of the 
ships that will use ESSM are also platforms from which 
strike operations are executed, ESSM indirectly contributes 
to the concept of precision engagement. The ESSM will be 
the medium range of choice for the HSAC.  
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F. GUN TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 
 
The selection of the high rate of fire gun was based 
on the following criteria: firing rate, range and weight. 
The trade off analysis and the corresponding weightings of 
the different criteria are best described in Table 26 and 
Figure 93 below. 
Table 27.   Gun Trade-Off Analysis 
GUN TRADE OFF ANALYSIS
Gun Firing Rate Weight Range
5in 3 10 6
57mm 10 6 4
76mm 6 2 10
Weighting 40% 30% 30%
5in 1.2 3 1.8
57mm 4 1.8 1.2
76mm 2.4 0.6 3  
The selection of the high rate of fire gun was based 
on the following criteria: firing rate, range and weight. 
The trade off analysis and the corresponding weightings of 


















Figure 93.   Gun trade-off-analysis results 
From the trade-off analysis conducted above, the team 
decided to use the Mk 3 BOFORS 57 mm gun as the gun of 
choice for the HSAC. It was selected because of its high 
firing rate, small weight and volume, and good range for 
the purpose of defeating small boats and ASCMs. 
G. OPERATING STATEMENTS OF THE HPMADS  
The below operating statements are being used to give 
ball park figures on the ADS technology. Due to the nature 
and classification of the research, exact numbers and 
capabilities can not be given at this time. For more 
information on ADS, direct inquiries to the Air Force 
Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB. 
Active Denial Technology uses a transmitter producing 
energy at a frequency of 95Ghz and an antenna to direct a 
narrow focused beam of invisible beam towards a designated 
subject. Traveling at the speed of light, the energy 
reaches the subject and penetrates the skin to a depth of 
less than 1/64 of an inch. Almost instantaneously it 
produces a heating sensation that within seconds becomes 
intolerable and forces the subject to flee. The sensation 
immediately ceases when the individual moves out of the 
beam or when the system operator turns it off. Unofficial 
reports state that a 2-second burst from the system can 
heat the skin to a temperature of 130° F. At 50 °C, the 
pain reflex makes people pull away automatically in less 
than a second. Someone would have to stay in the beam for 
250 seconds before it burnt the skin,  
Despite this sensation, the beam does not cause injury 
because of the shallow penetration depth of energy at this 
wavelength and the low energy levels used. It exploits the 
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body’s natural defense mechanism that induces pain as a 
warning to help protect it from injury. The heat-induced 
sensation caused by this technology, is nearly identical to 
the sensation experienced by briefly touching an ordinary 
light bulb that has been left on for a while. Unlike a 
light bulb, however, active denial technology will not 
cause rapid burning.  The transmitter needs only to be on 










































APPENDIX VIII PROPULSION DATA 
A. TABLE FOR THE KAMEWA WATER JET S-SERIES 
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C. ADVANCED WATERJET FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (AWJ-21) 
 
Data that were utilized in the design were provided by 
Rolls-Royce. Please contact the TSSE faculty if you need 
access to the data. 
 
D. GAS TURBINE TRADE OFF 
 
Gas Turbines Power (MW) Power (HP) SFC l (ft) w (ft) h (ft) vol (ft^3) weight (lb) 
MT 30 36 48276.792 0.34 30.09 12.59 16.5 6250.74615 13596.5 
ICR WR21 25.2 33793.7544 0.337 26.25 8.67 15.83 3602.71013 111150 
LM 1600 14.92 20008.04824 0.376 18.84 10 6.67 1256.628 8200 
LM 2500 25.06 33606.01132 0.373 26.96 15.67 6.7 2830.50344 10300 
LM 2500+ 30.5 40901.1667 0.354 27.56 8.69 6.7 1604.62588 11545 
LM 6000 42.75 57328.6905 0.329 30.5 7 8.3 1772.05 18010 
 
   Assume efficiency 0.80 
V V Power Power   Power Power Total Power Total Power  Option 1 Option 2  
Kt m/s KW HP   KW HP KW HP  LM2500+ MT 30 LT/hr LT
10.95 5.64 706.27 947.12   882.83 1183.90 2882.83 3865.94  0.892 1.027 1.540 1.
16.43 8.45 2633.50 3531.58   3291.87 4414.48 5291.87 7096.52  0.697 0.780 2.210 2.
21.91 11.27 8292.58 11120.54   10365.73 13900.67 12365.73 16582.71  0.494 0.531 3.660 3.
27.39 14.09 13051.60 17502.48   16314.50 21878.11 18314.50 24560.15  0.422 0.444 4.622 4.
32.86 16.91 21077.68 28265.64   26347.10 35332.05 28347.10 38014.09  0.353 0.364 5.992 6.
38.34 19.72 32277.89 43285.35   40347.36 54106.69 42347.36 56788.73  0.397 0.416 10.076 10
43.82 22.54 47020.71 63055.81   58775.89 78819.77 60775.89 81501.80  0.343 0.353 12.490 12
49.30 25.36 64660.81 86711.56   80826.01 108389.46 82826.01 111071.49  
54.77 28.18 84677.50 113554.39   105846.88 141942.99 107846.88 144625.02  
60.25 31.00 106975.83 143456.94   133719.79 179321.18 135719.79 182003.20  
 
 Up to 32.8 kts  Up to 43.8 kts       
V Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 Option 2   Required fuel for the    Fuel at 33kts for the endurance 
Kt 1  LM2500+ 1  MT30 2 LM2500+ 2  MT30   endurance of 2600NM  LM2500+ MT 30 
10.95 1.540 1.772 1.540 1.772  365.5 474.1 488.9 
16.43 2.210 2.470 2.210 2.470  349.6   
21.91 3.660 3.927 3.660 3.927  434.3   
27.39 4.622 4.868 4.622 4.868  438.8   
32.86 5.992 6.180 5.992 6.180  474.1   
38.34     10.076 10.538  683.3   
43.82     12.490 12.838  741.1   
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V (Kts) LM2500+ MT 30 LM2500+ MT 30 Power    
10 0.759 0.821 0.800 0.900 5731.791    
15 0.641 0.684 0.675 0.750 7756.822    
20 0.475 0.492 0.500 0.540 14092.649    
25 0.422 0.438 0.445 0.480 18785.774    
30 0.380 0.383 0.400 0.420 27037.672    
35 0.358 0.351 0.377 0.385 38597.591    
        
        
 MT30 VS LM2500 +   LM2500+   
weight factor 0.300 0.150 0.350 0.200 sfc 0.215 kg/KW*hr
 volume weight sfc power/weight total weight 20 tn 
MT30 0.500 0.700 0.600 0.700 volume 67 m3 
LM2500+ 0.800 0.750 0.800 0.900    
        
weighted volume weight sfc power/weight total AWJ-21 4 tn 
MT30 0.150 0.105 0.210 0.140 0.605    
LM2500+ 0.240 0.113 0.280 0.180 0.813    


















































APPENDIX IX DAMAGE CONTROL DATA 
A. SHIP NUMBERING AND COMPARTMENT INDENTIFICATION 
1. Ship Numbering System 
a. Compartment Numbering 
Compartments are numbered for identification to 
facilitate location.  The identification number assigned 
locates each compartment specifically, and generally 
indicates the function and use of the compartment.  
Compartment numbers consist of four parts, separated by 
hyphens, in the following sequence: Deck Number, Frame 
Number, Position in relation to centerline of ship, and 
Compartment use. 
b. Deck Number 
The main deck is the basis for this numbering 
scheme and is numbered 1.  The first deck below the main 
deck is numbered 2, and so on.  The first horizontal 
division above the main deck is numbered 01, and the 
numbers continue consecutively for subsequent upper 
divisions boundaries. Compartments are numbered by the 
lowest deck within the space. 
c. Frame number  
The forward perpendicular is the basis for this 
numbering scheme and is numbered "0."  "Frames" are 
consecutively numbered, based on frame spacing, until the 
aft perpendicular is reached.  Forward of the forward 
perpendicular, frames are "lettered" starting from the 
perpendicular to the bullnose (A, B, C, etc.) while frames 
aft of the after perpendicular are "double lettered" to the 
transom (AA, BB, CC, etc.).  Compartments are numbered by 
the frame number of the foremost bulkhead of the 
compartment.  If this bulkhead is located between "frames," 
the number of the foremost "frame" within the compartment 
is used.  Fractional numbers are not used except where 
frame spacing exceeds four feet. 
d. Position in relation to centerline 
The ship's centerline is the basis for this 
numbering scheme.  Compartments located so that the 
centerline of the ship passes through them are assigned the 
number 0.  Compartments located completely to starboard of 
the centerline are given odd numbers, and those to port of 
centerline are given even numbers.  The first compartment 
outboard of the centerline to starboard is 1, the second is 
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3 and so forth.  Similarly, the first compartment outboard 
the centerline to port is 2, the second is 4 and so forth.  
There may be cases in which the centerline of the ship 
would pass through more than one compartment, all of which 
may have the same forward bulkhead number.  Whenever this 
occurs, that compartment having the portion of the forward 
bulkhead through which the centerline of the ship passes is 
assigned the number 0 and the other carry numbers 01, 02, 
03 etc. 
e. Compartment Use 
A capital letter is used to identify the assigned 
primary use of the compartment.  Only one capital letter is 
assigned, except that on dry and liquid cargo ships, a 
double letter identification is used to designate 
compartments assigned to carry cargo.  Examples of 
compartment use are storage areas, various tanks, and 
living quarters.  
2. Compartment / Fitting Identification 
a. Bull's eyes 
Bull's eyes shall be painted on a bulkhead of 
each compartment.  Each bull's eye shall contain the 
compartment number, the foremost and aftermost frame of the 
compartment, and the division responsible for the 
compartment. They should be positioned so that they are 
readily visible upon entry into the compartment.  Do not 
allow bull's eyes to be hidden behind file cabinets or 
doors. The letters shall be black, two inches in height, 
painted on a 12 inches high by 15 inches wide yellow or 
photo luminescent background. Remember, photo luminescent 
markings are prohibited where they may be visible from the 
weather. 
b. Compartment designation plates 
Compartment designation plates are located on the 
bulkhead above the access.  Where space is insufficient, 
the label plates shall be located on the bulkhead adjacent 
to the access on the side away from the hinges.  
Compartment designation plates shall list the numbers of 
the access fitting, the compartments on both sides of the 
access as well as the name of the compartment accessed. 
c. Frame and Bulkhead Label Plates 
One frame label plate shall be installed in 
compartments over 24 feet in fore-and-aft length and every 
24 feet of length of weather decks and hangar deck. A 
transverse bulkhead label plate shall be installed in 
compartments having a tightness requirement only if the 
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bulkhead cannot be identified by other means, such as an 
access label plate. 
d. Fitting Numbering 
Fittings are numbered in a similar fashion as 
compartments with the omission of the fourth number 
(compartment use).  More than one fitting may have the same 
three number designator (e.g. 3-150-0); so, to further 
identify each fitting, the type of fitting or the system 
the fitting belongs to must be included in the numbering.  
For Example: A valve in the firemain system:    
FM COV 3-150-0 
If a new fitting is installed in a system, it is 
issued a number using the above guidance.  If a valve 
currently has that number it is renumbered accordingly. 
 
B. BATTLE STATIONS 
1. Traffic Flow 
To rapidly man battle stations, all personnel must be 
able to transit the ship's passageways simultaneously 
without interference.  To accomplish this, a generic 
traffic flow scheme has been defined which is: 
UP AND FORWARD TO STARBOARD, DOWN AND AFT TO PORT  
It is understood that this may not be feasible for all 
areas of the ship (i.e. narrow passageways or only one on 
the Damage Control Deck). In these conditions, the DCA will 
determine local traffic control schemes. Also, 
consideration may be made on setting material condition 
(i.e. not shutting watertight doors on the Damage Control 
Deck until a certain time after GQ is called). 
2. Manned and Ready Report 
The senior person in charge of the Damage Control 
Repair Station (DCRS) is responsible for giving the manned 
and ready report.  A battle station may report manned and 
ready when the station has enough personnel to do the job.  
Although open to interpretation in some instances, this 
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definition allows personnel to be more readily available in 
less time.   
3. Battle Dress 
Battle dress has been proven to minimize the personnel 
injuries from minor effects from weapon hits.  It also 
serves as the basis for fire-fighting clothing.  Battle 
dress is not the same for all battle watch stations, but 
basic battle dress includes: 
• Long-sleeved shirt with sleeves rolled down 
and all buttons buttoned 
• Trousers with pant legs tucked into socks 
• Leather safety footwear 
• Anti-flash Gear, gas mask, life vest 
4. Distributed Stowage 
To rapidly allow the damage control teams to prepare 
for action, their damage control equipment has been moved 
into the passageways under the scheme of Distributed 
Stowage.  This scheme also divides these teams up so that 
not all of a given team and equipment are destroyed by a 
single weapon hit.  During non-GQ incidents, distributed 
stowage will reduce the time for team response as well as 
reducing the confusion around the repair station itself.  
By disbursing equipment throughout a repair station's area 
of responsibility, you achieve redundancy, improved 
reaction time, and survivability. Elements of the new 
stowage philosophy are: 
• Organize equipment by its function 
• Relocate appropriate equipment to the 
passageways 
• Relocate large equipment to the passageways 
and group, by function, near power and 
exhaust sources. 
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• Distribute teams and equipment by setting up 
port and starboard teams, fore and aft 
teams, and above and below deck teams. 
• Provide adjusting shelves for repair 
stations. 
• Utilize ship's shell by shelving and 
brackets. 
• Plan for improvements to equipment. 
 
C. SALVAGE SHIP OR SCUTTLE SHIP 
If the ship has sustained damage so extensively that 
her survival is in question, the C.O. may decide either to 
continue efforts to save her or to scuttle the ship to 
prevent its use by hostile forces. Before the C.O. can make 
this decision, he needs as much information as possible 
from the Tactical Action Officer (TAO), Chief Engineer 
(CHENG), and DCA. If the decision is to save the ship, all 
efforts to control damage must be prioritized and attacked 
aggressively. If the decision is to scuttle the ship, 
several evolutions must occur simultaneously. 
1. Abandon Ship and Emergency Destruction 
All personnel not involved with the emergency 
destruction of equipment or classified information report 
to their abandon ship stations. Personnel involved with 
emergency destruction will carry out procedures outlined in 
the Emergency Destruction Bill. Scuttle ship procedures 
must be carried out only after emergency destruction has 
been completed. Personnel involved with emergency 
destruction will now report to their abandon ship station 
and abandon ship will commence. Once abandon ship has 
commenced, the C.O. will order the ship scuttled. As soon 
as this order is heard, it must be done quickly, safely, 
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and completely as possible to prevent the ship from falling 
into enemy hands or to meet a tactical situation 
The Engineer Officer, under the supervision of the 
Executive Officer, is responsible for maintaining the 
Scuttle Ship Bill. The Engineer Officer is responsible for 
the main engineering spaces during Salvage and Demolition. 
The DCA is responsible for all spaces outside of main 
engineering 
a Scuttle Ship Bill (topics that will be addressed 
  (1) Purpose 
  (2) Responsibilities 
  i) Engineer Officer 
  ii) Damage Control Assistant 
  iii) Operations Officer 
  iv) Weapons Officer 
  v) First Lieutenant 
 (3) Information 
  i) Equipment used 
  ii) Communications used 
  iii) Personnel involved 
 (4) Procedures 
  i) Word passed 
  ii) Demolition of equipment 
  iii) Securing the detail 
  iv) Abandoning ship 
Certain other pieces of equipment should also be 
completely destroyed to prevent salvage by enemy forces. 
Among the more important pieces are the following: 
(1) All unclassified electronics equipment, weapons   
launchers and hoists. 
(2) Generators, switchboards, and gyro compasses. 




D. CONDITIONS OF READINESS AND OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS 
1. Material Conditions of Readiness 
X-RAY - Set when the ship is in almost no danger of 
attack or natural hazard, as when it is in a well protected 
harbor or secured at home base, in fair weather, during 
normal working hours. All closures and fittings classified 
X-RAY should be closed at all times. They are labeled with 
a black letter X. 
YOKE -  Set and maintained at sea, when entering or 
leaving port during peacetime, in port outside of normal 
working hours during peacetime, and in port during wartime.  
When material condition YOKE is set, both X-RAY and YOKE 
closures and fitting are secured. YOKE closures and 
fittings are labeled with a black Y. 
ZEBRA -  Set during General Quarters. It is also set 
when the ship is leaving or entering port during a time of 
war, or at any time the ship is in a damaging situation 
such as fire or flooding. When material condition ZEBRA is 
set all X-RAY, YOKE and ZEBRA closures and fittings are 
secured. ZEBRA closures and fittings are labeled with a red 
Z. 
2. Other Damage Control Classifications 
Circle X-Ray and Circle Yoke Assigned to fittings and 
closures that may be opened without special permission by 
personnel proceeding to or from battle stations, or as 
required for routine inspection, or access to vital spaces. 
They must be immediately closed and secured after passing 
through. 
Circle Zebra  In situations where the ship has 
material condition Zebra set for extended periods of time, 
the Commanding Officer can authorize the use of Circle 
Zebra closures and fittings to facilitate the feeding of 
the crew and to allow the use of selected sanitary spaces.  
They may be used in the same way as Circle X-Ray and Yoke 
fitting and closures. 
Dog Zebra Closures and fittings that are required to 
be secured when condition Zebra is set or during periods of 
darken ship. These fittings and closures are located in 
decks and bulkheads exposed to the weather. Therefore, they 
must be closed during darken ship to prevent light from 
showing outside the ship. 
William Closures and fittings that are open during 
all material conditions. William closures and fittings are 
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only secured to control damage or casualties and to effect 
repairs. 
Circle William Fittings that access ventilation that 
may be open and operating regardless of material condition 
of readiness. These fittings are required to be secured 
only to prevent the spread of the effects of damage or for 
CBR defense. 
3. Modified Material Conditions of Readiness 
Modified Yoke Same classification as condition Yoke 
except only X-Ray and Yoke fittings and closures below the 
waterline are closed. X-Ray and Yoke fittings and closures 
above the waterline may be open to improve accessibility 
and habitability. Commanding Officer's permission is 
required. 
Modified Zebra Same classification as condition Zebra 
except only X-Ray, Yoke and Zebra fittings and closures 
below the waterline are closed. X-Ray, Yoke and Zebra 
fittings and closures above the waterline may be open to 
improve accessibility and habitability. Commanding 
Officer's permission is required. 
 
E. SHIP SURVIVABLILITY 
1.  Damage Control Total Ship Survivability 
When a total ship repsonse is needed, all personnel 
must understand what needs to be done. This will require 
prior training and coordination between command stations. 
2. Considerations (Sources of Confusion) 
a. C3 - Command, Control, and Communications 
Command must make its priorities known to all and 
continuously update those priorities during action. A rigid 
chain of command must be maintained to ensure no 
duplication of effort while ensuring all action is taken. 
Controlling stations must be able to communicate and work 
together to ensure actions are coordinated. These stations 
include Combat Information Center (OIC: CICWO), Main 
Control (OIC: EOOW), and Damage Control Central (OIC: DCA).  
Also, to ensure that these stations easily work together, 
they must be looking at the same plan(s). Most ships have a 
Combat Systems Operational Sequencing System (CSOSS), 
Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS), and 
Damage Control Book and Diagrams. A valve in a system (like 
Chilled Water) will have a Damage Control number and a 
CSOSS number and an EOSS number. Before a casualty can be 
effectively combated, these three numbers must be reduced 
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to a single identifier. It is suggested that the DC number 
is used since it can be used to locate the valve. 
Communications must be clear at all times. This may require 
alternate means, especially if a controlling station must 
be evacuated due to damage or smoke. 
b. Intense Heat and Heavy Smoke 
The intense heat produced by burning fuel from a 
weapon will prevent fire fighting teams from approaching 
close enough for extinguishment. Also, damage inflicted by 
the weapon may render installed fire fighting systems 
inoperative. Until those teams are able to contain this 
fire; heat and smoke will continue to be produced and 
unless these products are controlled, the ship as a whole 
may become untenable. The proper use of containment 
strategies and smoke control will be the only way for the 
ship to continue in its operation. The above actions may 
require non-damage control personnel to take action (like 
OS's) thus they must also be trained in the how and why of 
smoke control and fire containment. The possibility of 
using installed ventilation systems to purge ship of smoke 
should be considered. Portable blowers found aboard ship do 
not have the capability to move vast quantities of smoke. 
c. Personnel Casualties 
The shock from weapon impact and detonation and 
then the fire ball that follows may injure a large number 
of personnel. The injuries will range from localized minor 
burns to an array of internal injuries. The number and 
extent of these casualties may quickly overcome the medical 
department. With a large number of minor personnel 
casualties, the damage control teams will be needed to 
assist the medical department. Their knowledge of basic 
first aid will be of great importance. 
d. System(s) Restoration 
Electrical power is probably the overall first 
priority since it supplies fire fighting water (electric 
driven fire pumps), lighting, basic communication systems, 
and electronic gear. Even though most power is 440 VAC, 
three phase, 60 Hz, 400 Hz power must NOT be forgotten.  
Even if electronics have supply (60 Hz) power, they will 
not work if they do not have gyro input (a 400 Hz load) or 
synchro power which is mainly 400 Hz. The best possible 
pre-damage electrical system line-up must be determined 
(split plant vs. parallel operation). Combat System support 
systems (chilled water, dry air, electronic cooling 
systems, and possibly firemain) must be restored rapidly 
and in a prioritized order. Controlling stations must know 
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this order and act accordingly. Again, pre-damage system 
alignment should be determined. 
e. Material Stowage 
Prior to going into battle, it is advised that a 
ship performs Strip Ship. This evolution will remove 
materials unnecessary for combat. The removal of these 
materials will reduce the amount of secondary fires 
produced as well as the smoke.  Other actions to ensure all 
stowed material is securely held in place shall also be 
taken. Special concern should be directed towards removal 
of hazardous materials (HAZMAT). Paint lockers and other 
flammable liquid storerooms should be emptied as much as 
possible.  Engineering plant chemicals should be protected 
as much as possible. Damage control equipment must be 
distributed throughout the ship to reduce the loses from a 
single weapon hit. Thoughtful decisions on where this 
equipment should be placed will reduce the response time of 
damage control parties.  Distributing of personnel should 
also be considered. Equipment should also be stowed topside 
to outfit personnel trying to regain access into the ship 
after being driven out by heat and smoke. 
3. Pre-damage Actions 
a. Knowledge 
The crew’s goal is to know as much as possible of 
your ship and its systems. Another goal should be to teach 
as many people as possible this knowledge (i.e. Embarked 
solders/marines). Ensure all hands have basic first aid 
training, also basic damage control training, more than the 
bare minimum qualification. Look at "superstructure" 
personnel as assets for damage control efforts.  Vertical 
fire spread can be stopped by quick and proper action by 
these personnel. 
b. Damage Containment Strategies 
A preplan will be established to confine damage 
to a localized area. With this already thought out, it will 
be mentally easier to deal with the damage. The staging of 
DC equipment at strategic locations will allow these 
strategies to be rapidly put into place. The establishment 
of pre-damage system alignment will give personnel 
information needed to base casualty response to restore the 
systems to battle readiness. 
4. General Emergencies 
The ship may experience emergencies that are not best 
handled by the crew going to General Quarters.  These 
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situations may be best covered by a general set of 
guidelines in the form of a General Emergency Bill. 
a. General Emergency Bill 
The SORM will delineate the information and use 
of a General Emergency Bill. It is designed for major 
emergencies and is generic in response. The CHENG is 
responsible for ensuring the bill is current and ready for 
execution.  The DCA should also ensure that it includes the 
latest of damage control directives, especially fire party 
organization and procedures. The bill cover actions taken 
by the entire crew when it is aboard as well as actions 
taken by a partial crew while in port. Everyone is required 
to know their actions during these situations.  Also, if 
the person required to take action is not available or 
otherwise not able to take action, someone will have to 
take charge and ensure those actions are carried out. This 
bill is generic because not all possible situations can be 
planned out. It is up to the personnel in charge to 
determine which actions are required and ensure that they 
are carried out. This bill could also be made to cover 
casualties not requiring the attention and participation of 
the entire crew. 
5. Mass Conflagration 
A mass conflagration is damage of a magnitude that 
cannot be readily handled by the conventional damage 
control organization; therefore, all-hands participation is 
required to save the ship. It is not required to be fire, 
but also may be flooding, natural disaster, or mass 
casualties. The general emergency bill should be utilized 
to combat this casualty. Information to support the actions 
required to be taken may come from other bills (e.g. Main 
Space Fire Doctrine, Rescue of Survivors Bill, Civil 
Disaster Bill, Heavy Weather Bill, Toxic Gas Bill, etc.) 
All personnel must be trained to react instinctively to 
combat the possible disastrous effects of a major 
conflagration scenario. On scene leadership must quickly 
evaluate the situation, organize available personnel and 
damage control assets to contain and limit the casualties. 
The DCA must ensure to include the major conflagration 
exercise in training drills. This will help prepare a 
ship's total crew in their efforts to counter a mass 
conflagration situation. Consult FXP-4 for further 
information on the Major Conflagration Exercise.  
6. Rescue and Assistance 
Emergencies may arise on other ships or shore stations 
which require actions to be taken by personnel from your 
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ship (i.e. the Rescue and Assistance Detail). It is not 
implied here that the HSAC will be required to supply 
assistance under all situations. Security of your own ship 
is paramount. The Rescue and Assistance detail is an 
organization of qualified personnel to render assistance to 
persons or activities outside the unit. The Rescue and 
Assistance Detail may be called away underway or inport. 
The following will apply to rescue and assistance: 
a. Personnel assigned to the R&A detail will be 
known. 
b. Equipment required by the R&A detail will be 
separate from ship Dc equipment needs: 
c. In port, the R&A equipment chest be kept on the 
pier IAW local SOPA regulations. 
d. During an actual casualty, only the needed equip-
ment will be sent.  Decision for equipment 
brought should be made by the Officer in Charge.  
Communications with the ship shall be maintained 
at all times. 
e. The Rescue and Assistance Detail will be employed 
for the following situations (not all inclusive): 
Plane crashes in the vicinity of the unit 
Distress on another ship or ashore 
Rescue of a large number of survivors 
f. Because it is impossible to plan and drill for 
every possible R&A scenario, the personnel 
involved must be able to be flexible enough to 
respond and take the appropriate actions. Consult 
FXP-4 drill, Rescue and Assistance, for 
evaluating the R&A party in handling emergencies 
away from the ship. 
 
F FIRE BASICS 
1. The Fire 
Terms associated with fires. 
Flash Point: The lowest temperature at which a 
substance gives off sufficient vapor to form an ignitable 
mixture, usually not enough to sustain combustion. Storage 
requirements for flammable liquids aboard ship are based on 
the flash point. 
Fire Point: A temperature slightly above flash 
point that allows for sustained combustion. 






NOTE: These are the three requirements for a fire to 
start, removal of any one of these will prevent or 
extinguish most fires, however when open flame is present a 
fourth element comes into play.  




• Uninhibited chain reaction of combustion, this 
accounts for the fire extinguishing properties of 
PKP and Halon. 
Self Sustaining Reaction 
• Burning vapor produces heat 
• Heat releases and ignites more vapor 
• Burning vapor produces more heat 
• Heat control is as important as Flame control, 
particularly if the fire is getting out of hand. 
3. Fire Dynamics 
Growth Stage: Average space temperature is low and the 
fire is localized in the vicinity of its origin. 
Flashover Stage: Normally occurs when the upper smoke 
layer temperature reaches approx. 1100 deg F. Characterized 
by the sudden propagation of flame through the unburnt 
gases and vapors in the hot upper layer. 
Fully Developed Fire Stage: All combustibles in the 
space have reached their ignition temperature and are 
burning. Burning rate is limited by the amount of oxygen 
available. Unburnt fuel in the smoke may burn as it meets 
fresh air. A fully developed fire will normally be 
inaccessible by hose teams and require extinguishment by 
indirect attack. This stage can develop quickly in a main 
machinery space flammable liquid fire. 
Decay Stage: Eventually, the fire consumes all 
available fuel and/or oxygen at which time combustion slows 
down and the fire goes out. 
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a. Types of Fires 
• Class "A" examples:  Paper, Mattresses, 
Rags, etc. 
• Class "B" examples:  Fuel Oil, Paint, 
Alcohol, etc. 
• Class "C" examples:  Controllers, 
Motors, etc. 
• Class "D" examples:  Special hazards, 
burning metals.  
b. Extinguishing Methods 
• Cooling    Remove/Lower heat 
• Smothering   Remove/Displace 
oxygen 
• Interrupt Combustion Break up Fire 
Tetrahedron 
• Starving    Remove fuel 
 
G. DC ORGANIZATION FOR A FIRE 
a. Different Types of Fire parties 
(1) Repair Party (FIRE PARTY) 
• Manned up during G.Q. 
• Represents greatest level of readiness 
• Rispatched from Locker to the scene of 
reported fires by RPL 
(2) At-Sea (FIRE PARTY) 
• Responds immediately to fire alarms 
when repair parties are not manned. 
• Extinguish small fires without 
disrupting operations. 
• Control fires until critical evolutions 
can be terminated and G.Q. can be set. 
(3) In port Emergency Team 
• Designed to handle any emergency in 
port during and after normal working 
hours. 
• Required for each duty section 
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b. Functions That Make Up the Fire Party: 
(1)  Repair Party Leader 
• normally only assigned during GQ 
• responsible for organization and 
training of the personnel assigned to 
the DCRS must be PQS qualified 
(2) Fire Marshal 
• Required in port/at-sea during non-
condition 1 
• Proceeds directly to the scene of the 
fire to direct efforts of the     RRT 
• If fire is beyond "RRT" capabilities, 
F/M will turn over to On-Scene   
Leader, and assume other duties as 
directed. These duties may include: 
- Repair Party leader 
- Supervise communications 
- Post boundary men 
- Direct logistic support 
• The F/M must assume a big-picture role 
and pay particular attention to 
potential for vertical fire spread. 
• Recommend G.Q. if required 
(3) On Scene Leader 
• In charge at the scene 
• Reports to scene of the fire equipped 
to assume control of the fire  party 
• Shall wear SCBA 
• Directs all firefighting operations 
• Establish comms with DCC or RPL with 
best means available 
• designates equipment to be used 
(4) Team Leader 
• SCBA 
• In charge of attack team 
• Uses NFTI if required 
• Directs firefighting effort 
• Reports to the Scene Leader 
(5)  Nozzleman 
• SCBA 
• primary firefighter 
• reports to / receives orders from Team 
Leader 
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• can function as Team Leader if NFTI is 
not required 
(6) "Backup" Nozzleman 
• SCBA 
• Provides second hose (if required) 




• tend hoses under direction of nozzle 
men 
• relay orders and information between 
OSL and Team Leader 
(8) Plug men 
• one per hose 
• should have SCBA available 
• charges hoses when directed by OSL 
• operates marine strainer 
• rig and operate P-100 
• rigs jumper hoses as required 
• provides C02 / PKP as required 
• rig and operate portable inline foam 
eductor 
(9) Investigators 
• investigates area to which assigned 
• follows principles of investigation 
- rapid, but cautious 
- thorough 
- report findings 
- repeat investigation 
• continuously reports to repair party 
leader/scene leader using best means 
available 
• wears SCBA 
• works in pairs 
• patrols fire boundaries 
• if fire/damage is found one 
investigator reports, other provides  
initial action. 
(10) Boundarymen 
• sets and maintains fire boundaries  
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• removes/relocates flammables from 
boundary 
• cools bulkhead/overhead/deck as 
required 
• SCBA recommended but not required 
unless within Smoke        Boundary  
• may be required to man installed Fire 
Fighting systems (i.e. AFFF, HALON, MAG 
SPRINKS) 
• minimum of four assigned to fire party. 
More may be required  
• depending on magnitude of fire. 
• other resources for boundarymen 
(11) Messenger 
• relays orders and information 
• familiar with standard damage control 
symbology 
• thoroughly familiar with routes and 
accesses through the ship 
(12) Phone Talker 
• damage control central and each 
repair/unit locker 
• operate the designated DC comms circuit 
• rig emergency phone circuits when 
required 
• use standard damage control symbology 
(13) Electrician 
• secures electrical power as directed. 
• must be knowledgeable of vital 
circuitry 
• overhauls class Charlie fires 
• energizes electrical equipment 
• assesses electrical damage and performs 
emergency repairs. 
(14) Accessman 
• SCBA required 
• gains access to the fire affected space 
when directed by the scene leader. 
• must be familiar with all forcible 
entry equipment 
• does not have to be a "dedicated body".  
(15) Reflash watch 
• SCBA required 
351 
• is posted after fire is reported out 
• have appropriate extinguishing agent(s) 
• be positioned where best able to 
respond to reflash 
(16) Overhaulman 
• SCBA required 
• work together with reflash watch to 
thoroughly extinguish fire 
• secures potential reignition sources 
 
(17) Smoke Controlman 
• secure/manipulate ventilation systems 
• install smoke curtains/blankets 
• rig and employ desmoking equipment as 
directed by the scene leader. 
(18) Dewaterman 
• rig and employ appropriate dewatering 
equipment or systems 
• when directed by the scene leader. 
(19) First Aid 
• all personnel shall be qualified to 
perform basic first aid 
(20) Rapid Response Team 
• proceeds directly to the scene 
• no SCBA or protective clothing required 
• attempts to extinguish/contain under 
direction of fire marshall 
• (4) personnel to be assigned; may have 
other functions on fireparty; i.e. 
boundaryman, electrician 
• reports to locker when relieved or 
carries out duties as directed 
• not required for G.Q. repair party 
organization 
• do not normally respond to emergencies 
in "steaming"  
• engineering spaces 
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APPENDIX X COST AND WEIGHT ESTIMATION 
A. WEIGHT ESTIMATION 
SWBS Description Weight
110 SHELL + SUPPORTS 294.9
120 HULL STRUCTURAL BULKHEADS 390.5
130 HULL DECKS 402.9
140 HULL PLATFORMS 54.0
150 DECK HOUSE STRUCTURE 141.2
160 SPECIAL STRUCTURES 494.3
170 MAST + KINGPOST + SERV PLATFORM 19.9
180 FOUNDATIONS 70.6
190 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 74.8
Group Total: 1943.2
230 PROPULSION UNITS 49.8
240 TRANSMISSION + PROPULSOR SYSTEMS 9.7
250 SUPPORT SYSTEMS 25.3
260 PROPULSION SUPPORT - FUEL, LUBE, OIL 3.7
290 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 2.7
Group Total: 91.3
310 ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION 20.8
320 POWER DISTRIBUTION 68.2
330 LIGHTING SYSTEMS 17.5
340 POWER GENERATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 8.9
390 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 2.9
Group Total: 118.3
410 COMMAND + CONTROL SYSTEMS 23.9
420 NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 2.5
430 INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS 7.3
440 EXTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS 6.0
450 SURF SURV SYSTEMS (RADAR) 10.4
460 UNDERWATER SURV SYS 0.5
470 COUNTERMEASURES 3.3
480 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS 1.7
490 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 55.7
Group Total: 111.3
510 CLIMATE CONTROL 45.8
520 SEA WATER SYSTEMS 27.0
530 FRESH WATER SYSTEMS 7.5
540 FUEL/LUBRICANTS, HANDELING+STORAGE 60.4
550 AIR, GAS + MISC FLUID SYSTEMS 9.3
560 SHIP CNTL SYSTEMS 0.0
570 UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SYSTEMS 45.9
580 MECHANICAL HANDELING SYSTEMS 84.1
590 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 21.9
Group Total: 301.9
610 SHIP FITTINGS 0.4
620 HULL COMPARTMENTATION 24.9
630 PRESERVATIVES+COVERING 46.9
640 LIVING SPACES 20.8
650 SERVICE SPACES 8.3
660 WORKING SPACES 20.8
670 STOWAGE SPACES 35.3
680 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 1.1
Group Total: 158.6  
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710 GUNS + AMMUNITION 36.2
720 MISSILES+ROCKETS 47.4
730 SMALL ARMS+PYROTECHNICS 4.3
740 MINES 0.0
750 DEPTH CHARGES 0.0
760 TORPEDOES 0.0
770 AIRCRAFT RELATED WEAPONS 0.8
780 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 7.8
790 SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 67.7
Group Total: 164.2
F10 SHIPS FORCE 17.3637
F20 MISSION RELATED EXPENDABLES 76.6828
F30 STORES 39.2138
F40 LIQUIDS, PETROLEUM BASED 851.5700
F50 LIQUIDS, NON-PETROLEUM BASED 37.8429
Total Payload w eight: 1271.9133
Group Total: 1022.7
Full Load (LT): 3911.4
Growth Margin: 6.0%
Full Load Displacement (LT): 4146.1
Light Ship (LT): 3123.5
Dead Weight (LT):
Payload Fraction (with fuel):
Payload Fraction (without fuel):  
B. COST ESTIMATION 
Lightship We Total Dead Weigh Total Shipw eight
 Ref  Tot. 3127 1027 4154
ACCESS ACCESS ACCESS ACCESS
WT Wt/Tot MAT MATERIAL Labor Labor
Description (LT) Other CER COSTS CER Hours
SHELL + SUPPORTS 294.934 0.09432 1181 $348,317 316 93199
HULL STRUCTURAL BULKHEADS 390.476 0.12487 1181 $461,152 316 123390
HULL DECKS 402.938 0.12886 1181 $475,870 316 127328
HULL PLATFORMS/FLATS 54.002 0.01727 1181 $63,776 316 17065
DECK HOUSE STRUCTURE 141.236 0.04517 1028 $145,191 692 97735
SPECIAL STRUCTURES 494.326 0.15808 1632 $806,740 251 124076
MASTS+KINGPOSTS+SERV PLATFORM 19.89766 0.00636 6183 $123,027 164 3263
FOUNDATIONS 70.618 0.02258 1028 $72,595 359 25352
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 74.772 0.02391 5000000 4758 $5,355,765 404 30208
Structure Sum 1943.2 0.62143 $7,852,434 641617
PROPULSION UNITS 49.848 0.01594 144 $7,178 209 10418
TRANSMISSION+PROPULSIOR SYSTEMS 9.67882 0.00310 63 $610 162 1568
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 25.3394 0.00810 288 $7,298 412 10440
PROPUL SUP SYS -FUEL,LUBE OIL 3.7386 0.00120 36916 $138,014 1412 5279
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 2.65856 0.00085 288 $766 0 0
Propulsion Sum 91.3 0.02919 $153,865 27705
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION 20.77 0.00664 650 $13,501 4 83
POWER DIST. SYSTEM 68.16714 0.02180 98329 $6,702,807 1294 88208
LIGHTING SYSTEM 17.52988 0.00561 5450 $95,538 1329 23297
POWER GEN SUPPT. SYSTEM 8.9311 0.00286 14545 $129,903 1882 16808
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 2.94934 0.00094 788 $2,324 471 1389
Electrical Sum 118.3 0.03785 $6,944,072 129786
COMMAND+CONTROL SYS 23.9463 0.00766 150000 $3,591,945 235 5627
NAVIGATION SYS 2.4924 0.00080 150000 $373,860 235 586
INTERIOR COMMS 7.2695 0.00232 150000 $1,090,425 235 1708
EXTERIOR COMMS 5.98176 0.00191 150000 $897,264 235 1406
SURF SURV SYS (RADAR) 10.385 0.00332 150000 $1,557,750 235 2440
COUNTERMEASURES 0.527558 0.00017 150000 $79,134 235 124
FIRE CONTROL SYS 3.3232 0.00106 150000 $498,480 235 781
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYS 1.74468 0.00056 150000 $261,702 235 410
Command/Cont Sum 55.7 0.01780 $8,350,560 13083
TSSE Joint ACCESS Cost Estimate
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CLIMATE CONTROL 45.77708 0.01464 32868 $1,504,601 494 22614
SEA WATER SYSTEMS 27.001 0.00863 50705 $1,369,086 679 18334
FRESH WATER SYSTEMS 7.5 0.00240 34033 $255,248 529 3968
FUELS/LUBRICANTS, HANDLING+STORAGE 60.4407 0.01933 42125 $2,546,064 271 16379
AIR, GAS+MISC FLUID SYSTEM 9.26342 0.00296 70265 $650,894 647 5993
SHIP CONTL SYS 0 0.00000 14025 $0 353 0
UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SYSTMES 45.9017 0.01468 8035 $368,820 176 8079
MECHANICAL HANDLING SYSTEMS 84.07696 0.02689 16853 $1,416,949 259 21776
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 21.93312 0.00701 1888 $41,410 282 6185
Auxiliary Sum 301.9 0.09654 $8,153,072 103328
SHIP FITTINGS 0.4154 0.00013 55033 $22,861 882 366
HULL COMPARTMENTATION 24.924 0.00797 11160 $278,152 741 18469
PRESERVATIVES+COVERINGS 46.9402 0.01501 10789 $506,438 494 23188
LIVING SPACES 20.77 0.00664 29677 $616,391 1235 25651
SERVICE SPACES 8.308 0.00266 26174 $217,454 135 1122
WORKING SPACES 20.77 0.00664 27376 $568,600 292 6065
STOWAGE SPACES 35.309 0.01129 86901 $3,068,387 12 424
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 1.12158 0.00036 35511 $39,828 694 778
Hab Sum 158.6 0.05071 $5,318,111 76063
GUNS + AMMUNITION 36.2 0.01158 100000 $3,620,000 235 8507
MISSILES+ROCKETS 47.3556 0.01514 100000 $4,735,560 235 11129
SMALL ARMS+PYROTECHNICS 4.3 0.00138 100000 $430,000 235 1011
MINES 0 0.00000 100000 $0 235 0
DEPTH CHARGES 0 0.00000 100000 $0 235 0
TORPEDOES 0 0.00000 100000 $0 235 0
AIRCRAFT RELATED WEAPONS 0.78926 0.00025 100000 $78,926 235 185
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYSTEMS 7.80952 0.00250 100000 $780,952 235 1835
Armament Sum 67.7 0.02165 $6,025,438 14160
MATERIAL / LABOR SUMMATIONS 2736.6 0.87517 1991 Material Cost $42,797,551 1005741
(3% inf lation rate) Total 2004 Material Cost $62,849,647
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(3% inf lation rate) Total 2004 Material Cost $62,849,647
SHIPS FORCE 17.36372 0.00555
MISSION RELATED EXPENDABLES 76.68284 0.02452
STORES 39.21376 0.01254
LIQUIDS, PETROLEUM BASED 851.57 0.27233
LIQUIDS, NON-PETROLEUM BASED 37.84294 0.01210
FUTURE GROWTH MARGIN 249.24 0.07971 Payload Cost
Total Payload w eight: 1271.91326 0.40675 $635,957
Check Sums 4008.6 1.0
Ship assembly and support labor = .478*Labor 480744.042
Integration and Engineering Labor = .186*Labor 187067.7653
Program Management Labor = .194*Labor 195113.6907 (12th ship) Labor cost
Combined Labor Total Hours @ rate 30 1868666 $56,059,985
Hours Labor Cost
1 Total 1997 1st Ship Labor 2070544.23 1st Ship $62,116,327
2 Total 1997 2nd Ship Labor 1967017.02 2nd Ship $59,010,511
3 Total 1997 3rd Ship Labor 1908874 3rd Ship $57,266,220
4 Total 1997 4th Ship Labor 1868666.17 4th Ship $56,059,985
5 Total 1997 5th Ship Labor 1838062.72 5th Ship $55,141,882
6 Total 1997 6th Ship Labor 1813430.3 6th Ship $54,402,909
7 Total 1997 7th Ship Labor 1792861.61 7th Ship $53,785,848
8 Total 1997 8th Ship Labor 1775232.86 8th Ship $53,256,986
9 Total 1997 9th Ship Labor 1759827.15 9th Ship $52,794,814
10 Total 1997 10th Ship Labor 1746159.58 10th Ship $52,384,787
11 Total 1997 11th Ship Labor 1733887.23 11th Ship $52,016,617
12 Total 1997 12th Ship Labor 1722758.79 12th Ship $51,682,764
Joint ACCESS Specialized Equipment used for ship cost estimate
One Tim e Installs Costs in 2004 Costs in 1991
Engines/AWJ21 $120,000,000 $84,165,586
Electric Plant $70,000,000 $49,096,592 $230,000,000
Composite Bow  Door Sy $10,000,000 $7,013,799 $80,000,000
EW Suite $10,000,000 $7,013,799
Multi Function Radar $25,000,000 $17,534,497
Other Weps/Sensor Sys $20,000,000 $14,027,598
ESSM $25,000,000 $17,534,497





Costs are ref lected back to 1991 at 3% inf lation rate to align w ith CER's in given model.




Shipyard Gen. & Admin O.H. 0.065
Shipyard Insurance 0.01
Shipyard Contingency 0.1
Shipyard Prof it 0.04
Total Shipyard O.H. Rate 0.215
Engineering Burdened Rate $50.00
Non-Recurring Engineering Hours 1300000 $65,000,000
Navy Program Cost Factor = 1% $650,000
Total Non-recurring Eng. Cost $65,650,000
Learning Curve Exponent 0.95
Multi-Hull Adj unit cost w ith basic With Multi-Hull
.30*Labor Shipyard Overhead Labor Overhead 1st Ship w ith Eng Burden











$15,504,829 $139,156,879 $154,661,708 <------Acquis ition Cost
Tw elveth Ship
Estimated System Cost (w/o Manning):
Ship $154,661,708
One Tim e Installs $320,000,000
Payload $635,957
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